Wilmer-Hutchins ISD v. Sullivan
Citation | 51 S.W.3d 293 |
Decision Date | 21 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00-0847,00-0847 |
Parties | (Tex. 2001) Wilmer-Hutchins Independent School District, Petitioner v. Joyce E. Sullivan, Respondent |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
The issue here is whether the trial court has jurisdiction over this suit for retaliatory discharge despite the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies when the defendant did not tell her such remedies existed. The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that jurisdiction must be determined solely on the plaintiff's pleadings. 47 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2000). We agree with the trial court.
Joyce Sullivan received workers' compensation benefits for an injury she sustained while working as a custodian for the Wilmer-Hutchins Independent School District. Ten months later, when her physician released her to return to work, the District told her that she had been terminated as part of a reduction in personnel for budget reasons. Believing that she had been terminated for filing a compensation claim, she contacted the District's attorney, who told Sullivan that she could not help her. The attorney did not inform Sullivan of the District's grievance procedures or suggest that she seek legal counsel.
Sullivan sued the District for retaliatory discharge. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that Sullivan had not exhausted her administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Sullivan's pleading that she had exhausted her administrative remedies was conclusive, despite unchallenged evidence to the contrary, absent an allegation by the District that the pleading was fraudulently made to confer jurisdiction on the court when none existed. 47 S.W.3d at 532.
The court of appeals based its holding on its prior decision in Bland Independent School District v. Blue, 989 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1999), which we have since reversed, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000). Sullivan concedes, as she must, that the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with our decision in Bland ISD, but she contends that the court of appeals' decision to reverse the dismissal of the case was correct.
Sullivan admits that she did not exhaust her administrative remedies and acknowledges that exhaustion of remedies is a prerequisite to the trial court's jurisdiction in a case like this involving disputed fact issues. See Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1992); Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Diserens, 188 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. 1945). But she argues that the District should be estopped from asserting a lack of jurisdiction by its attorney's conduct.
As a general rule, a court cannot acquire subject-matter jurisdiction by estoppel. Nevitt v. Wilson, 285 S.W. 1079, 1084 (Tex. 1926); see also Southern Surety Co. v. Inabnit, 24 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, opinion adopted) ( ). The rule has been applied in three cases involving circumstances very similar to those in the present case. In Daniel v. Dallas Independent School District, 351 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a school custodian alleged that he had been wrongfully terminated because of his membership in a union. The plaintiff argued that the school district was estopped to assert a lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the school board and superintendent had told him after his termination that "there was nothing more for him to do, and that as far as they were concerned the matter was concluded". Id. at 358....
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