In re Chapman
| Decision Date | 24 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-0153,15-0153 |
| Parties | Upon the PETITION OF Judith Ann CHAPMAN, Appellee, and Concerning John Kendall Wilkinson Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Carmen E. Eichmann of Eichmann Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Judith A. Chapman, Grimes, pro se appellee.
The district court found a son committed elder abuse against his mother and entered an order against the son. The son appealed. Our court of appeals affirmed. The son sought further review. On further review, we are letting the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision that the district court advised Wilkinson of his right to counsel as required by Iowa Code section 235F.5(5). 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1107, § 5 (codified at Iowa Code § 235F.5(5) (2015)). We are also letting the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision that under Iowa Code sections 235F.1(8) and (14) a person does not need to be a caretaker to commit elder abuse because a person standing "in a position of trust or confidence with the vulnerable elder" can perpetrate elder abuse. Additionally, we are letting the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision that sufficient evidence existed to find the mother had a life estate in the mobile home. On further review, we affirm the judgment of the district court that the mother was a vulnerable elder under section 235F.1(17).
Judith Chapman is sixty-nine years old and the mother of three adult children. After Chapman's husband passed away in 2008, she moved to Grimes and purchased a mobile home. Thereafter, she put the title of the mobile home in her son John Wilkinson Jr.'s name. When she transferred the title of the mobile home to her son, she told him, At around the same time she put the title to the mobile home in her son's name, she transferred ownership in a duplex to her two daughters.
She continued to live in the mobile home and paid the taxes on it. At some point, one of Chapman's daughters moved into the mobile home with her. This caused Wilkinson to ask Chapman to pay him $35,000 for him to give the title of the mobile home back to her. Chapman reiterated that the mobile home was to be Wilkinson's inheritance and that he could sell it when she died. Following that discussion, Wilkinson posted at least three eviction notices to Chapman and her daughter on the door of the mobile home.
On October 25, 2014, Wilkinson called the Polk County sheriff's office regarding his sister trespassing at the mobile home. Wilkinson showed up at the mobile home with two deputies, and after speaking with Chapman and her daughter, the deputies informed Wilkinson that it was a civil matter.
On November 4, Chapman filed a petition for relief from elder abuse under Iowa Code section 235F.2. She named Wilkinson as the defendant and alleged that the nature of the abuse was a "property dispute" and that he was "trying to take [her] home before [her] death." On the same day, the district court entered a temporary protective order and scheduled a hearing on November 13 to determine if it should enter a final protective order. On November 5, Wilkinson filed a motion for continuance because of a work obligation. The district court granted his motion.
On November 24, the matter proceeded to a final hearing on Chapman's request for an elder abuse protective order against Wilkinson. Both parties appeared pro se. At the hearing, Chapman testified that she put Wilkinson's name on the title as his inheritance, and she would retain the mobile home as her residence until she died. She further testified, Her daughter who was living in the mobile home with her also testified it was known that the mobile home "would go to [Wilkinson] in inheritance upon [their mother's] death."
Additionally, Wilkinson testified Chapman transferred the title into his name, brought it to him, and said, However, Wilkinson also stated he was the "sole proprietor owner of that property" and wanted to sell it now. He testified his attorney advised him this was an issue of "gifter's remorse." The district court asked Wilkinson the name of his attorney and if his attorney was present in court. Wilkinson stated his attorney was not present, and the court replied, "Probably would have been a good idea to have him here today."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court entered a final protective order against Wilkinson, finding that "[he] has financially exploited [Chapman] by failing to recognize the life estate she maintained in her mobile home at the time she gifted the remainder to him." The district court ordered Wilkinson "shall take no action to infringe upon [Chapman's] life estate in the mobile home." Wilkinson was further prohibited from exercising control over or transferring any "funds, benefits, property, resources, belongings, or assets" of Chapman's. Wilkinson was "restrained from abusing, harassing, intimidating, molesting, interfering with, or menacing the [v]ulnerable [p]etitioner, or attempting to abuse, harass, intimidate, molest, interfere with or menace the [p]etitioner." Wilkinson was also "restrained from entering or attempting to enter" the mobile home, and "restrained from exercising any powers on behalf of the [p]etitioner through a court-appointed guardian, conservator, or guardian ad litem, an attorney in fact, or another third party."
On December 8, Wilkinson orally requested an extension of time to file a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) as he had recently retained counsel. The court granted the request, allowing Wilkinson until December 12 to file the motion. Wilkinson obtained counsel and filed a motion to enlarge or amend on December 12. In the motion, Wilkinson argued that (1) "the [c]ourt erred in failing to advise defendant that he was entitled to counsel and that he was entitled to a continuance to secure counsel," (2) "[p]laintiff is not a ‘vulnerable elder’ as defined in Chapter 235F.1(11)," (3) "[d]efendant is not a ‘caretaker’ as defined under Chapter 235F.1(2)," and (4) "[t]he [c]ourt erred in finding there was [a] ‘life estate’ in the mobile home." Chapman did not resist the motion.
On December 28, the district court denied the motion to enlarge or amend its order, granting a final elder abuse protective order against Wilkinson. The court rejected each of Wilkinson's arguments, finding the court advised Wilkinson of his right to counsel at the time he appeared before the court on November 5 to request a continuance.
Next, the court stated, "[T]here was no showing that petitioner had a mental or physical condition which rendered her incapable of defending herself from elder abuse." The court determined such a finding was unnecessary. The court further found Chapman "was unable to defend herself from respondent's financial exploitation because of her age." In reaching this conclusion, the court stated such a finding was sufficient under section 235F.1(17) to find elder abuse had occurred.
Third, the court found Wilkinson committed elder abuse by financial exploitation as an adult child "who stands in a position of trust or confidence" to Chapman under section 235F.1(14)(a ) and not as a "caretaker." Lastly, the court found there was sufficient evidence to establish Chapman retained a life estate in the mobile home.
Wilkinson filed a notice of appeal. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals found the district court advised Wilkinson of his right to counsel as required by section 235F.5(5). It also found a person does not need to be a caretaker to commit elder abuse because a person standing "in a position of trust or confidence with the vulnerable elder" can perpetrate elder abuse. Iowa Code § 235F.1(8). The Code defines a person who "stands in a position of trust or confidence" with the vulnerable elder as including an adult child. Id . § 235F.1(14). The court of appeals further found sufficient evidence existed to find Chapman had a life estate in the mobile home.
Finally, the court of appeals found the district court had sufficient evidence to support its finding that Chapman "was a ‘vulnerable elder’ under section 235F.1(17) because she was unable to protect herself from financial exploitation due to her age." Wilkinson filed and we granted his application for further review.
District courts hear civil domestic abuse cases in equity, and we review them de novo. Wilker v. Wilker , 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). Because of the similar nature of our elder abuse law and domestic abuse law, we also review elder abuse cases de novo. "Under a de novo standard of review, we are not bound by the trial court's conclusions of law or findings of fact, although we do give weight to factual findings, particularly when they involve the credibility of witnesses." In re Estate of Warrington , 686 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 2004) ; see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 6.904(3)(g ).
Finally, if an issue of statutory interpretation arises in our de novo review, we review issues of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law. State v. Wiederien , 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006).
Although Wilkinson raises numerous issues on appeal, we have discretion to review all the issues raised on appeal or in the application for further review, or only a portion thereof. Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C. , 878 N.W.2d 759, 768 (Iowa 2016). In exercising our discretion, we choose to review only the issue as to whether, on our de novo review, the evidence supports the district court's finding that Chapman "was a ‘vulnerable elder’ under section 235F.1(17) because she was unable to protect herself from financial...
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