In re D.M.
| Docket Number | 01-22-00323-CV |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2023 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF D.M. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
1
IN THE MATTER OF D.M.
No. 01-22-00323-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, First District
August 24, 2023
On Appeal from the 315th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2021-00598J
Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.
OPINION
APRIL L. FARRIS, JUSTICE
The State of Texas filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that D.M. ("Denise"),[1] a child, engaged in delinquent conduct, and the State requested an
adjudication hearing. Denise filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition did not state her father's name and address as required by Family Code section 53.04(d)(3). See Tex. Fam. Code § 53.04(d)(3) (listing information that "petition must state," including "the names and residence addresses, if known, of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child"). Denise argued that such information was mandatory and jurisdictional and its omission from the petition required dismissal of the case. The State did not amend the petition, and the juvenile court granted Denise's motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.
In a single issue on appeal, the State argues that the juvenile court erred by dismissing the case because the court had jurisdiction despite the omission of the information listed in the Family Code.[2] We agree with the State that the requirements in section 53.04(d)(3) are mandatory but not jurisdictional. Nevertheless, we hold that the juvenile court did not err by dismissing the case because Denise challenged the defective petition for noncompliance with the statutorily mandated petition
requirements and the State did not replead to cure the defect. We modify the judgment to delete the juvenile court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction, and we affirm as modified.
Background
The State alleges that Denise left her young nephew "unattended in a bathtub containing water," and the nephew drowned. The State filed a petition in juvenile court in April 2021 alleging that Denise, a child, engaged in delinquent conduct by causing serious bodily injury to another child. The petition was approved by a grand jury. See Tex. Fam. Code § 53.035. The State sought an adjudication hearing and determinate sentence based on the allegations of delinquent conduct. See id. §§ 54.03(a) (providing that child may be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct only after adjudication hearing), 54.04(d)(3) (providing for determinate commitment of child in Texas Juvenile Justice Department for up to forty years with possible transfer to Texas Department of Criminal Justice). In addition, the State requested that Denise, her parent, or "other person" be required to pay court costs, a reasonable sum of support if she was confined in a juvenile detention facility, a monthly court fee if she was placed on probation, and restitution.
The petition named only Denise as a party. See id. § 53.04(d)(2). It did not include the name and address of her parent, guardian, custodian, or other known adult relative. See id. § 53.04(d)(3), (4) (providing that petition "must state," among
other things, name and address of child's parent, guardian, custodian, or other known adult relative).
In February 2022, Denise filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. She argued that the State's petition did not comply with section 53.04(d) because it omitted the name and address of a parent, guardian, custodian, or other known adult relative. See id. She further argued that the statutory requirement was mandatory and jurisdictional, and the State's failure to comply with the provisions entitled her to dismissal of the case.
In response, the State did not dispute that the petition omitted the statutorily required information, but it disputed that the requirement was jurisdictional. The State acknowledged Denise's argument that the statute was "both mandatory and jurisdictional," but it did not address the argument concerning the mandatory nature of the requirements except to argue that "[m]andatory statutory duties are not necessarily jurisdictional." According to the State, its failure to include the required information was "a mere defect in the State's pleading that may be corrected upon amendment," but it did not request leave to amend or file an amended petition.
The juvenile court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on March 9, 2022. The State conceded that omission of the statutorily required information in its pleading was a defect, but it maintained that the defect did not implicate the court's
jurisdiction. The State argued that it had "the right to amend up until adjudication or until this case is resolved . . . ."
At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court invited the parties to submit additional briefing. Both parties filed additional briefing.
On March 31, the juvenile court held a second hearing on the motion to dismiss. After the brief hearing, the court noted that the State had not filed an amended petition, and it orally rendered a ruling granting the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The same day, the court signed a written order granting the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The order stated that the court "determine[d] that it lacks jurisdiction" over the case. This appeal followed. See id. § 56.03(b)(1) (authorizing State to appeal order dismissing petition in juvenile case in which grand jury approved petition).
Statutory Petition Requirements
On appeal, the State primarily contends that the juvenile court erred by dismissing the case because the statutory pleading requirements are not jurisdictional and therefore do not require dismissal.
A. Standard of Review
Generally, appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. City of Webster v. Myers, 360 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). However, the proper standard of review is
determined by the substance of the issue to be reviewed, not necessarily by the type of motion to which the order relates. Id.
In this case, the issues presented relate to subject-matter jurisdiction and require the Court to interpret statutory text. Issues of subject-matter jurisdiction present a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004); Myers, 360 S.W.3d at 56. Likewise, statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex. 2014); Myers, 360 S.W.3d at 56.
B. Governing Law
To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over a case. In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022); Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex. 2021). Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to adjudicate a case. In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379. Texas courts derive subject-matter jurisdiction solely from the Texas Constitution and state statutes. Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by consent or waiver, and a judgment issued by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is never considered final. Id.; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000).
We apply ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to determine whether a statutory requirement is jurisdictional. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284, 287 (Tex. 2019); City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009). Our primary purpose in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. White, 288 S.W.3d at 394.
We first look to the plain language of the statute because "it is a fair assumption that the Legislature tries to say what it means, and therefore the words it chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent." Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Shaikh, 445 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999)). We read every word, phrase, and expression in a statute as if they were deliberately chosen and presume that words excluded from a statute were excluded purposefully. Id.
We do not examine a term or provision in isolation, but rather we read the particular statute as a whole. Id. Words and phrases "shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage." Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting Tex. Gov't Code § 311.011). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we interpret its language according to its common meaning without considering rules of construction or extrinsic aids. Id. at 389. We rely on the plain meaning unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain
meaning leads to absurd results. Id. at 389-90. Courts must avoid an interpretation that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. Id. at 390.
Courts are generally "reluctant to conclude that a statutory requirement affects a court's subject-matter jurisdiction absent clear legislative intent to that effect." In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379; White, 288 S.W.3d at 393. As such, we begin with the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to make statutory requirements jurisdictional. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 287. Only "clear contrary legislative intent" will overcome this presumption. Id. In determining whether a statutory requirement is jurisdictional, the Texas Supreme Court has set out four factors for courts to consider: (1) the plain meaning of the statute; (2) whether the statute contains specific consequences for noncompliance; (3) the purpose of the statute; and (4) the consequences that would result from each possible construction. Id.; Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 392.
C. Analysis
1. Section 53.04(d)(3) is not a...
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