In re Edwin S. Alleged to Be

• Citation: 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 23399,42 Misc.3d 595,977 N.Y.S.2d 601
• Parties: In the Matter of EDWIN S. A Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 22 November 2013
• Court: New York Family Court

42 Misc.3d 595

977 N.Y.S.2d 601

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 23399

In the Matter of EDWIN S. A Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Respondent.

Family Court, Queens County, New York.

Nov. 22, 2013.

Tracie Reilly, Esq., New York City Corporation Counsel, Jamaica, for Presentment Agency.

Lisa Tuntigian, Esq., The Legal Aid Society, Jamaica, for Respondent.

STEPHEN J. BOGACZ, J.

The United States Supreme Court introduced the now familiar Miranda warnings ¹ ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966] ) to American jurisprudence over forty-five years ago. In determining that the general principle that citizens are presumed to know the law did not extend to police detainees being subjected to custodial interrogation, the high Court directed that the police must first advise detainees of those rights “in clear and unequivocal terms.” ( Id., at 467–8, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) An ever-expanding body of state and federal case law has provided interpretive meaning to the Supreme Court's mandate since 1966.

For example, it is now well-settled that no “talismanic incantation” of a precise formula is required when law enforcement personnel administer the warnings to a detainee, so long as the meaning of the warnings is fully communicated. (California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 [1981]; People v. Parker, 258 A.D.2d 479, 682 N.Y.S.2d 922 [2d Dep't 1999]; People v. Bartlett, 191 A.D.2d 574, 595 N.Y.S.2d 89 [2d Dep't 1993]; People v. Crosby, 91 A.D.2d 20, 457 N.Y.S.2d 831 [2d Dep't 1983]. See also People v. John, 288 A.D.2d 848, 732 N.Y.S.2d 505 [4th Dep't 2001] and People v. Peraza, 288 A.D.2d 689, 733 N.Y.S.2d 510 [3d Dep't 2001].) On the other hand, omission of any part of the Miranda rights will subject a subsequent statement to suppression. ( See People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011, 384 N.Y.S.2d 444, 348 N.E.2d 920 [1976] and People v. Hermance, 35 N.Y.2d 915, 364 N.Y.S.2d 900, 324 N.E.2d 367 [1974]. See also People v. Grace, 245 A.D.2d 387, 665 N.Y.S.2d 584 [2d Dep't 1997].)

Proper administration of the Miranda warnings to under-age police detainees has spawned its own specialized body of case law. Courts have long recognized the existence of a less-than-level playing field when police question youthful suspects. Even well before the Miranda decision, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the need for courts to utilize “ special care in scrutinizing the record” concerning police interrogation of an accused fifteen-year-old male and his ensuing confession. (Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 [1948].) The Court further observed that “[a]ge 15 is a tender and difficult age .... He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.” (Id., at 599, 68 S.Ct. 302.)

Post- Miranda, New York State's Appellate Division, Second Department, developed what is now established law in a series of decisions that defined and mandated a standard of “greater care” to protect the rights of young detainees who are questioned by the police. In People v. Ward, 95 A.D.2d 351, 353, 466 N.Y.S.2d 686 [2d Dep't 1983], the Second Department liberally quoted the above language from Haley in holding that “[a] child of 15 years of age should not be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity” and suppressed the youth's admission to the police. Three years later, the Second Department noted that “it is well recognized that .... the police must exercise greater care (emphasis added) to insure that the rights of youthful suspects are vigilantly observed” (People v. Hall, 125 A.D.2d 698, 701, 509 N.Y.S.2d 881 [2d Dep't 1986] ), in again relying upon Haley and suppressing another fifteen-year-old's confession to law enforcement.²

This standard of “greater care” was subsequently given a more precise definition. In Matter of Chad L., 131 A.D.2d 760, 517 N.Y.S.2d 58 [2d Dep't 1987], the Court redefined the “reasonable person, innocent of any crime” standard that determines whether a person is in police custody when questioned. The Court essentially carved out a “reasonable 10–year–old” subset from the greater group to whom the “reasonable person” yardstick applied. This “reasonable juvenile” test developed into settled law in a series of consistent decisions from three Appellate Division Departments. (Matter of Robert H., 194 A.D.2d 790, 599 N.Y.S.2d 621 [2d Dep't 1993]; Matter of Rennette B., 281 A.D.2d 78, 723 N.Y.S.2d 31 [1st Dep't 2001]; Matter of Ricardo S., 297 A.D.2d 255, 746 N.Y.S.2d 707 [1st Dep't 2002]; Matter of Angel S., 302 A.D.2d 303, 758 N.Y.S.2d 606 [1st Dep't 2003]; Matter of Dalton BB, 61 A.D.3d 1105, 875 N.Y.S.2d 649 [3d Dep't 2009].)

The additional requirements of “greater care” also necessarily impacted upon the Second Department's review of how law enforcement personnel must administer the Miranda warnings ³ to children and adolescents. In the first of three cases, the Court acknowledged that age and intellectual capacity were among the factors to be considered in assessing whether a particular youth has voluntarily waived his/her rights under Miranda. It went on to suggest that “an evaluation of these various factors may occasionally require an extra effort (emphasis added) to assure that the [ Miranda ] rights are explained in language comprehensible to the minor suspect.” ( Matter of Julian B., 125 A.D.2d 666, 671, 510 N.Y.S.2d 613 [2d Dep't 1986].) In Matter of Chad L., supra, the Court extended this reasoning to a ten-year-old detainee. In the culmination of this trilogy, the Second Department was unable to “conclude that the People [had] met their burden of proving that [a] 13–year–old juvenile with no prior criminal involvement [had] ... waived his Miranda rights” after the detective had “read him [those] rights .... [w]ithout any further explanation (emphasis added).” ( People v. Gotte, 150 A.D.2d 488, 488, 541 N.Y.S.2d 89 [2d Dep't 1989].)

This Court must assess the facts of the case at bar against this backdrop of developed precedent in determining the voluntariness, as a matter of law, of the statement made to law enforcement by the thirteen-year-old in question. Preliminarily,at the Huntley ( see People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 [1965] ) hearing that was had in this matter, the Court had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of the three witnesses who testified. The Court essentially credits the testimony of the police detective, but does not fully credit the testimony of either the Respondent's mother or that of the Respondent himself. The mother's testimony was at times guarded and contradictory, and that of the Respondent was often guarded and self-serving.

At the conclusion of any pre-trial suppression hearing, the Court is required to render specific findings of fact, and the conclusions of law to be drawn therefrom. The findings of fact are as follows:

On or about November 13, 2012, the testifying detective met the thirteen-year-old Respondent and his mother and step-father at the offices of the Queens Child Abuse Squad. This followed two telephone conversations between the detective and the mother four days earlier, at which the detective advised the mother that her niece had made certain allegations against her son (the Respondent) and that the detective needed to speak with the Respondent concerning them. She essentially told the mother to “bring him in and he'll be arrested” and further that he would have to see a Judge. She also advised the mother that if she did not bring in her son, the detective would have to come to her home and arrest him. She did not affirmatively advise the mother that she could have an attorney present when she brought in her son.

When the Respondent and his parents arrived that morning, the detective initially directed them to be seated in the waiting area while she went to retrieve her case folder. A short time later, the detective returned and brought the mother and step-father to a different room, telling them that the mother's niece had made an allegation of a sexual nature against the Respondent, and that the detective had interviewed her and believed her. The mother then made some indication that she knew her son had done wrong, that during a party the mother had walked into a bedroom and found her son and her niece adjusting their clothing. The mother also offered that she was in the process of getting help for the Respondent. The Detective, motivated in part by her desire for the mother to cooperate, was solicitous of the mother, indicating she understood she was “going through a hard time.” The mother acknowledged in her testimony that, upon arriving at the police offices, she was aware of, and concerned about, the possibility of her son being sent to “juvenile jail.”

At this point, the detective advised the mother that she was going to read the “juvenile Miranda warnings” to her son and to arrest him. She indicated uncertainty as to whether he would then be able to return home. The detective then told the mother that it was “up to her” in terms of granting the detective permission to speak with the Respondent. The mother, at this point, was crying, but indicated her “permission.” The step-father then proceeded to the waiting area.

The Respondent entered the room where the detective was already present with his mother. The detective called this room the “designated juvenile room” in conclusory fashion. She did not testify by whom it was so “ designated.” Previously, she had described the room as “tiny,” containing a small table and two chairs. The detective sat on one side, while the Respondent and his mother sat across from her. The Respondent was not handcuffed and did not ask for food or drink, or to use the bathroom. The detective then explainedthat she was going to read him a paper...