In re Estate of Kirkpatrick

• Decision Date: 01 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-211.,02-211.
• Citation: 77 P.3d 404,2003 WY 125
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF John Henry KIRKPATRICK, Deceased. Karen Shippey, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Carol Marafioti and Jean Lien, Appellees (Respondents).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

77 P.3d 404

2003 WY 125

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF John Henry KIRKPATRICK, Deceased.

Karen Shippey, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Carol Marafioti and Jean Lien, Appellees (Respondents).

No. 02-211.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

October 1, 2003.

Representing Appellant: Kathleen B. Dixon of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, Wyoming; and Loyd E. Smith of Murane & Bostwick, Cheyenne, WY.

Representing Appellees: Drew A. Perkins of Perkins & Powers, P.C., Casper, WY.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Karen Shippey's uncle, who was adopted, died intestate, and the district court found his heirs included the descendants of both his adoptive and his biological siblings. Ms. Shippey claims an adopted child's biological siblings are no longer his "brother" and "sister" and, thus, they are not entitled to inherit from the adopted child's intestate estate. We agree and reverse.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The question presented for appeal is whether biological siblings (and their descendants) of an adopted decedent may claim rights as heirs in intestacy.

FACTS

[¶ 3] The facts in this case are not in dispute. John Henry Kirkpatrick was born Gion Rosetti to Joseph and Beatrice Rosetti in 1914. He had ten siblings. On January 25, 1927, Edgar and Margaret Kirkpatrick adopted Gion and his brother, Leo Rosetti. The Kirkpatricks changed Gion's name to John Henry Kirkpatrick (John Kirkpatrick) and Leo's name to Edward Watson Kirkpatrick (Edward Kirkpatrick). The other nine birth siblings were either adopted away or remained with their birth parents. John Kirkpatrick was married briefly, divorced, and had no children. Edward Kirkpatrick married and, with his wife, raised a daughter, Ms. Shippey. John and Edward Kirkpatrick's nine biological siblings produced eight children (the cousins).

[¶ 4] John Kirkpatrick died intestate on August 4, 2000, leaving a substantial estate consisting of stocks, bonds, real estate, and personal property. Rick Rogers and Ms. Shippey were appointed co-personal representatives of John Kirkpatrick's estate. The co-personal representatives filed a Verified Interim Accounting and Petition for Partial Distribution on July 19, 2001, asking the court to determine the proper heirs for distribution of the estate. Ms. Shippey, through her attorney, filed a brief asserting that John Kirkpatrick's adoption terminated the rights of any biological relative not adopted by his adoptive family, thus leaving Ms. Shippey as the sole heir. The cousins opposed this position, contending John Kirkpatrick's adoption had no effect on the biological siblings' right to inherit from him; thus, the cousins claimed their per capita share of the portion of the estate which would have been distributed to their parents.

[¶ 5] The district court concluded that, in light of the pertinent caselaw and statutes, the cousins—the children of John Kirkpatrick's biological siblings—were entitled to the share of the estate that would have been distributed to their parents. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6] The interpretation of statutory language is essential to our resolution of this case. The construction and interpretation of statutes are questions of law which we review de novo. Powder River Coal Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423,

¶ 6 (Wyo.2002); Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo.2000). Our objective is to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. Id. We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. Jones v. State Department of Health, 2001 WY 28, ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1189, ¶ 11 (Wyo.2001). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶ 12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2001); Fontaine v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 894-95 (Wyo.2000); Richards v. Board of County Commissioners of Sweetwater County, 6 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Wyo.2000). In ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and construe them in harmony. TOC v. TND (In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, ¶ 20, 46 P.3d 863, ¶ 20 (Wyo.2002).

[¶ 7] When the Court determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Sechrist v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 45, ¶ 10, 23 P.3d 1138, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001). If, on the other hand, the Court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation to help it determine the legislature's intent. Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo.2000); Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo.1999).

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. Furthermore, when we are confronted with two possible but conflicting conclusions, we will choose the one most logically designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the legislature was attempting to accomplish.

Collicott v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 35, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] This dispute presents a clear but completely unsettled question of law. To answer the question, we must reconcile the Wyoming intestacy and adoption statutes as well as related caselaw.

[¶ 9] The district court decided in favor of the cousins, concluding that John Kirkpatrick's biological nephews and nieces were "entitled to the share that would have been distributed to their parents." In reaching that result, the court concluded (1) the adoption statutes which allow an adoptee to inherit from his biological parents should be interpreted to create mutuality by allowing the biological relatives to inherit from the adoptee; (2) the intestate statute's reference to "brother" and "sister" included biological siblings of an adopted child; and (3) Randall v. Potter, 506 P.2d 432 (Wyo.1973), required a holding that biological siblings could inherit from adopted siblings and was still controlling. While the district court's interpretation of Wyoming statutes and Randall was well written and thorough, it failed to consider the effect of substantive amendments to the statutes and to give full effect to the legislative intent that adoption terminates the parent-child relationship. The district court's imposition of mutuality reads language into the statute which is not there. The terms "brother" and "sister" in the intestacy statute must be read in light of the clear termination in the adoption statutes of the biological family's legal relationship with the adopted child. The district court's conclusion that "close examination of the pertinent statutes in effect when Randall was decided and of those statutes that govern this case have little substantive differences" is inaccurate as we will discuss more thoroughly below.

A. Interrelationship Between the Intestacy Statutes and the Adoption Statutes

[¶ 10] Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101 and 2-4-107 (LexisNexis 2003) establish the rules of intestate succession and, specifically, those that apply to persons in an adoptive family. The pertinent parts are:

(a) Whenever any person having title to any real or personal property having the nature or legal character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of, and not otherwise limited by marriage settlement, dies intestate, the estate shall descend and be distributed in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment of his debts, in the following course and manner:

....

(c) Except in cases above enumerated, the estate of any intestate shall descend and be distributed as follows:

....

(ii) If there are no children, nor their descendents, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are dead, the descendents collectively taking the share which their parents would have taken if living, in equal parts[.]

Section 2-4-101.

(a) If for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child shall be established to determine succession by, through or from a person:

(i) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and of the natural parents for inheritance purposes only. The adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and that natural parent;

(ii) An adopted person shall inherit from all other relatives of an adoptive parent as though he was the natural child of the adoptive parent and the relatives shall inherit from the adoptive persons estate as if they were his relatives [.]

Section 2-4-107 (emphasis added).

[¶ 11] Section 2-4-107(a)(ii) explicitly establishes the adopted person inherits the same as any other member of the adoptive parent's family and provides mutuality by requiring the "relatives" of the adoptive parent shall inherit from the adopted person as well. In addressing the respective rights of the adopted person and the relatives of the adoptive parent, the legislature was silent on the inheritance rights of an adopted person's biological relatives. The adoption statutes, on the other hand, act to terminate the legal relationship between the biological parents and the adopted child. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-22-114, 14-2-317 (LexisNexis 2003). When the legislature adopts a statute, we presume it does so with full knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference to the statute's...