In re Estate of Rule

• Decision Date: 27 October 1916
• Docket Number: 31171,31172,31173
• Citation: 159 N.W. 699,178 Iowa 184
• Parties: IN RE ESTATE OF SAMUEL RULE, Deceased. v. JOHN CAREY, Administrator, et al., Appellants, (and two other cases) MARY L. RULE, Appellee,
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

159 N.W. 699

178 Iowa 184

IN RE ESTATE OF SAMUEL RULE, Deceased.

MARY L. RULE, Appellee, v. JOHN CAREY, Administrator, et al., Appellants, (and two other cases)

No. 31171, 31172,|31173

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 27, 1916

Appeal from Dallas District Court.--J. H. APPLEGATE, Judge.

THE plaintiffs above named, each holding one or more alleged promissory notes made by Samuel Rule in his life-time, filed their several claims against his estate. The heirs of the deceased were permitted to appear in the hearing and resist the allowance. In each instance the claim was allowed as prayed, and defendants appeal. Though the issues raised in the several cases are dissimilar, they have been tried and submitted together, and will be disposed of in separate paragraphs of a single opinion.

Affirmed.

Burton Russell, for appellants.

White & Clarke, for appellees.

WEAVER J. EVANS, C. J., DEEMER AND PRESTON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

I.

Mary L Rule is the widow of Samuel Rule, deceased, and bases her claim upon three several promissory notes made to her by her husband in his lifetime and after the date of their marriage. These notes are as follows: One for $ 2,500, bearing date March 1, 1910; one for $ 900.50, dated December 13, 1912; and one for $ 1,298, dated August 5, 1914. The maker of these notes died February 17, 1915. The resistance to the claim made on these notes is in writing, and may be stated briefly as follows: That deceased was not in fact indebted to plaintiff; that he never in fact executed or delivered the notes; and that said notes were without consideration.

In support of her claim, Mrs. Rule testified that she married deceased in 1885; that, during their married life, they had acquired 160 acres of land in Dallas County; that they were childless; and that the name of Samuel Rule subscribed to each of the notes was his genuine signature. A sister of the claimant also testified that she wrote the body of each of the three notes at the request of the deceased, and that he signed them in her presence, and in each instance delivered the executed instrument to the plaintiff, saying, in substance, that he wanted to protect his wife in what he owed her. According to her statement:

"He said he wanted to protect her in what he owed her. He said he owed her the amount stated in the note. After I had written it, he signed his name and handed it to Mary L. Rule."

The defendants offered no evidence of any kind upon any of the issues raised by their objections. At the close of the testimony, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict in her favor, on the ground that the undisputed evidence shows a valid indebtedness of the deceased to the amount of the promissory notes. Defendants also moved for a verdict in their favor because of lack of evidence to justify a recovery. The trial court denied the defendants' motion and sustained the motion of plaintiff. Defendants then filed a motion in arrest, because of plaintiff's failure to offer any evidence tending to show that the notes were made or given upon any valid consideration, or that such transactions had any relation to plaintiff's separate estate, stating that, without such showing, she could not recover thereon. The motion in arrest was denied.

The appellants argue for a reversal, upon the single proposition that, under the rule followed in Heacock v. Heacock, 108 Iowa 540, 79 N.W. 353, a wife cannot maintain an action at law against her husband for recovery upon a promissory note made by him to her. In that case, a wife sued her husband to recover an installment of interest upon a promissory note executed by him to her, and made payable at his death. It was there held, by a divided court, that the petition was demurrable because it did not show that the contract evidenced by the note had its origin in some transaction concerning her separate property or estate. Assuming, for the purposes of the argument, that the cited case is an authoritative precedent for the general proposition just stated, we think it has no controlling application in disposing of the case now before us. The action in the Heacock case was by a living payee against a living payor, and the plaintiff was held to compliance with the rules of pleading which obtain generally in the presentation and litigation of ordinary actions at law. In the trial and allowance of claims against the estate of a deceased person, the same strictness does not prevail. No formal pleadings are required, and omissions in the statement of a claim which might render a former petition demurrable are not necessarily fatal. See Harrison v. Harrison, 124 Iowa 525, 528, 100 N.W. 344. In the case at bar, no objection was raised to the sufficiency of the statement of plaintiff's claim except in the motion in arrest, filed after a verdict had been directed and returned. The only issues raised by the defendants in their written objections to the allowance of the claim were: first, that, at the time of the death of Samuel Rule, he was not indebted to plaintiff in any sum whatever; and, second, that Samuel Rule did not execute or deliver or authorize the execution or delivery of the notes presented by the plaintiff. As we have already stated, the defendants offered no evidence whatever in support of the defenses so asserted. On the other hand, plaintiff did offer competent evidence of the execution and delivery of the notes by Samuel Rule, and also of his acknowledgment or statement that he was indebted to his wife, and that the notes were made to protect her rights. This, we think, is ample justification for the action of the court in directing a verdict, even though we were to agree with appellants' counsel that plaintiff had the burden not only of proving the execution and delivery of the notes, but also of showing affirmatively that they evidenced enforceable contracts between herself and her husband. It is true that, in the Heacock case, a statement may be found to the effect that, as the wife has "no remedy against her husband unless it be for the infraction of some of her property rights, she cannot sue him on his personal contract." It is very clear, however, that this clause, when detached from the body of the opinion, and read without reference to our statute or to the numerous decisions in which the enforceable character of many contracts between husband and wife is upheld, is much too broad, and was not used in the strictly literal sense which counsel now place upon it. By Code Section 3153, a married woman may own in her own right property acquired by gift, descent or purchase, and manage, sell, and dispose thereof to the same extent and in the same manner as the husband can property belonging to him. By Code Section 3155 the wife is empowered to maintain action against her husband for the possession or control of her own property, or "for any right growing out of the same, in the same manner and extent as if they were unmarried." By Section 3157 of the Code, conveyances, transfers and liens of one spouse in favor of the other are declared valid. We have held that a wife may maintain an action of replevin against her husband. Jones v. Jones, 19 Iowa 236. In the case of Logan v. Hall, 19 Iowa 491, 496, the court, by Dillon, J., apparently leaving undecided the question whether a wife can maintain an action except in equity upon the promissory notes of a husband in his lifetime, proceeds to say:

"Where, as in this case, the marital relation is dissolved by the death of the husband, we see no reason why the widow may not maintain an action directly on the notes against the administrator without formally resorting to a bill in equity."

This holding seems to recognize that the common-law rule which forbids litigation of this character between husband and wife had its origin in a purpose to prevent domestic discord, and that such reason ceases with severance of the marriage by death, leaving the surviving wife at liberty to assert legal rights which, out of regard to the marital relation, the law would not recognize while that relation existed. We have also held that, even where the common law ruled and the legal title to the wife's money passed to the husband, yet she retained an equitable title thereto, and if the husband, recognizing the equitable obligation arising therefrom, gave her his promissory note, the consideration was sufficient and the note enforceable. Payne v. Wilson, 76 Iowa 377, 380, 41 N.W. 45. In Rice v. Crozier, 139 Iowa 629, 117 N.W. 984, we distinctly held that a wife had a right of action upon the promissory note of her husband, and that such right was barred by failure to sue within the statutory period of limitation. See also In re Estate of Deaner, 126 Iowa 701, 102 N.W. 825. In a very recent case, where a widow asserted a claim against her husband's estate upon a promissory note, it is said that:

"It cannot be doubted that a transaction between husband and wife, which is in the nature of a gift, or a matter of contract between them, is, in the absence of fraud or like conditions which would vitiate it, an enforceable one. The rule of the common law that a gift of personal property from husband to wife was void was based upon the fact that the title to all such property held by either was vested in the husband. In these later days, when the right of each to hold and manage their separate estate is recognized by statute, that rule is without application." Harman v. Estate of Harman, 167 Iowa 106, 108.

Contrary to the rule recognized in many jurisdictions, it is the law of this state that the husband and wife may become partners in business. Hoaglin v. Henderson, 119 Iowa 720, 94 N.W. 247. In disposing of that case, the court, while recognizing the disability of the wife at...