In re Estate of Podhajsky
| Decision Date | 19 March 1908 |
| Citation | 115 N.W. 590,137 Iowa 742 |
| Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF JOSEPH PODHAJSKY, deceased. MAMIE L. PODHAJSKY, ADMRX., Appellee, v. CHARLES BEDNAR, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. B. H. MILLER, Judge.
PROCEEDING in probate. From an order directing Charles Bednar to turn over to the administratrix of said estate certain moneys in his hands, said Bednar appeals.
Reversed.
Lewis Heins, for appellant.
Smith & Smith and S. K. Tracy, for appellee.
Joseph Podhajsky, late of Linn county, died interstate July 26 1904. In November, 1905, Mamie L. Podhajsky, administratrix of his estate, commenced this proceeding by presenting an application for an order requiring Charles Bednar -- suspected by her, as she says, of having in his possession personal property belonging to said estate -- to appear and submit to an examination. A citation issued, and an examination was had, following which the administratrix moved the court for an order directing Bednar "to turn over the $ 1,000 of money, together with interest from July 26 1904, that belonged to the deceased, Joseph Podhajsky, and that is admitted is in his possession . . . This motion is based on the testimony given by said Bednar in a proceeding to disclose property," etc. To the motion thus made Bednar appeared and filed an answer and resistance, and a hearing was had before the court, on which hearing a state of facts was disclosed as follows: On June 17, 1904, Joseph Podhajsky was the owner of certain lots in the city of Cedar Rapids, and on that day he executed a deed of conveyance thereof to his wife, Anna Podhajsky, and placed the same in the hands of Bednar, together with an instrument in writing in these words: On the face of such instrument appears an indorsement of acceptance of the trust by Bednar in these words: Following the death of Joseph Podhajsky, Bednar delivered the deed so placed in his hands to the widow, Anna Podhajsky, she having in the meantime -- the exact date thereof does not appear -- paid to him the sum of $ 1,000. Thereafter, and on August 14, 1905, Bednar paid to Mary Podhajsky the sum of $ 500 as directed in the so-called instrument of trust, and took her receipt therefor. At the close of the hearing the administratrix, on her own motion, dismissed so much of her claim as had relation to the money paid to the daughter, Mary, and elected to demand only an order for payment of the sum of $ 500 still remaining in the hands of Bednar. And the order entered directed Bednar to pay over "the sum of $ 500 which he claims to hold for Robert Kolin and Celetina Podhajsky, . . . and that he pay costs."
It will be observed that the proceeding was instituted and tried throughout on both sides on the theory that the delivery of the deed by Bednar after the death of Podhajsky was authorized, and was sufficient to clothe the grantee named therein with title to the property described. Accordingly that the situation involved no more than the question of the proper disposition of the money paid into the hands of Bednar by Mrs. Podhajsky; and, as did the court below, we may accept of that as the ultimate question in the case. But, in disposing of such question, we shall find it necessary to consider to some extent the effect of the execution of the deed, as well as what was done following in respect thereto. We may premise by saying that construction of the deed and the contemporaneous writing is to be given as of one instrument. This must be true, because otherwise there would be nothing to indicate the purpose in the execution of the deed or expressive of the desire of the grantor in respect thereto. It is no part of the contention of appellant that the instrument should be given effect as a testamentary devise, and it could not well be. It was not executed as the statute requires. If, then, it can be given effect at all, it must be on the theory that by the execution of the instrument and the delivery thereof to Bednar there was created a trust in favor of the persons named which became enforceable by them on the happening of the death of Podhajsky. And here we think is to be found the complete answer to the contention of plaintiff. In receiving the deed and availing herself of the benefits thereof, the widow evidenced her acceptance of its terms and her obligation to pay the sum named by her grantor, and, under all the authorities, such acceptance had relation back to the date of the delivery of the deed into the hands of Bednar for her benefit. White v. Watts, 118 Iowa 549, 92 N.W. 660. And it is not material that the record fails to show in express terms that the grantee or the persons to whom the grantor directed the money received from the grantee should be paid knew of such deposit or of the terms upon which it was made, or that they or either of them expressly assented to or accepted the provision thus made for their benefit. White v. Watts, supra; Cumberland v. Codrington, 3 Johns. Ch. 261 (8 Am. Dec. 492) Sheppard v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch. 137 (8 Am. Dec. 561); Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571 (25 A. 487, 33 Am. St. Rep. 944). Under the circumstances, the rule is that the acceptance of a gift by the donee or of the benefits a trust will be implied. Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N.H. 238; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421 (22 N.E. 940, 6 L. R. A. 403, 15 Am. St. Rep. 531); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 94 Mich. 11 (53 N.W. 788); Stone v. King, 7 R.I. 358 (84 Am. Dec. 557).
When therefore, Podhajsky thus delivered the deed in deposit and thus divested himself of the title to the lots, he became, in turn, vested with a property right in the obligation of the grantee to pay the specified sum of $ 1,000, and this property right he could lawfully dispose of by will or by assignment or gift to his children or to some third party for their use and benefit. It will not be disputed that it is entirely competent for a person, either by a duly acknowledged written instrument or even by parol, to turn over personal property, moneys, securities or choses in action into the hands of another, to be held and used for the benefit of some designated beneficiary, and that, when this is done, such beneficiary obtains an immediate and vested interest in the subject of the trust, which the trustor cannot revoke or disaffirm unless such power of revocation has been reserved in express terms at the time the trust was created. Hellman v. McWilliams, 70 Cal. 449 (11 P. 659); Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323 (41 P. 1089, 50 Am. St. Rep. 43); Ewing v. Buckner, 76 Iowa 467 (41 N.W. 164); Millspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Abb. Pr. 380. And this is none the less true where the trust is entirely voluntary and without any valuable consideration passing from the beneficiary to the trustee. Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262; Minot v. Tilton, 64 N.H. 371 (10 A. 682); Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N.Y. 206. Neither will the fact that the trust cannot be administered and settled until after the death of the trustor afford any reason for invalidating the trust. Lewis v. Curnutt, 130 Iowa 423, 106 N.W. 914. Where one makes a deposit in a savings bank in his own name in trust for a designated beneficiary declaring at the time that he wishes the deposit to vest in the donee at his death there is a completed and enforceable trust in favor of such beneficiary, and the fund is held not to pass as a part of the estate of the trustor. Bath Savings Institution v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122 (33 A. 836, 32 L. R. A. 377, 51 Am. St. Rep. 382); Bartlett v. Remington, 59 N.H....
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