In re Estrada

• Decision Date: 05 April 2016
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13–16–00127–CV
• Citation: 492 S.W.3d 42
• Parties: In re Belinda Estrada a/k/a Belinda Macias
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

492 S.W.3d 42

In re Belinda Estrada a/k/a Belinda Macias

NUMBER 13–16–00127–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

Delivered and Filed April 5, 2016

Francisco J. Rodriguez, Law Office of Francisco J. Rodriguez, Attorneys At Law, McAllen, TX, for Relator.

J. R.'Bobby' Flores, Hidalgo County Courthouse, Edinburg, TX, for Respondent.

Robert Flores, Law Offices of Robert R. Flores, P.L.L.C, for Real Parties of Interest.

Before Justices Garza, Perkes, and Longoria

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Garza¹

On February 24, 2016, relator Belinda Estrada a/k/a Belinda Macias (“Estrada”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus contending that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a bill of review.² We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. Background

The underlying litigation arises from a dispute regarding the purchase and sale of real estate. Estrada sold a lot in Edinburg to the real parties in interest, Daniel Hernandez, Alma Veronica Hernandez, and their principal, Abel Avitia Quezada. The real parties allegedly failed to perform their obligations under the contract for sale, and Estrada foreclosed on the property. Real parties subsequently brought suit against Estrada for partition and trespass to try title in cause number C–3396–12–C in the 139th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Estrada filed a counterclaim in that suit seeking to quiet title to the real estate involved in the sale. During the course of the case, Estrada filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. The real parties filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, and the trial court took the motion under advisement. On December 16, 2014, the trial court rendered a final summary judgment in favor of Estrada.

Real parties alleged that they did not receive notice that final judgment had been rendered. By email sent on February 13, 2015, Estrada's counsel provided the real parties with a copy of the final judgment.

On April 16, 2015, real parties filed a petition for bill of review seeking to set aside the judgment in cause number C–1579–15–C in the 139th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. Real parties also sought and received injunctive relief. Estrada filed an answer and an amended answer to the petition for bill of review.

The trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the petition for bill of review on June 4, 2015. On August 10, 2015, the trial court granted the bill of review, extended the temporary injunction previously rendered in favor of the real parties, vacated the final summary judgment rendered in cause number C–3396–12–C, and ordered the case to be reset for trial on the merits.

This original proceeding ensued. By five issues, Estrada contends: (1) atrial court cannot grant a bill of review premised merely on the argument of counsel; (2) affidavits which are not admitted into evidence cannot support a bill of review; (3) a trial court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of affidavits; (4) a litigant cannot obtain relief by bill of review when he has not exercised his rights under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a ; and (5) a litigant lacks an adequate remedy by appeal from an order granting a bill of review.

This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from the real parties in interest. The real parties filed numerous “objections” to the petition for writ of mandamus on grounds that “it is not in proper form and deliberately omits documents material to [r]elator's claim for mandamus relief.” The real parties contend generally that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the bill of review, and (2) Estrada possessed an adequate remedy by appeal but did not utilize it because she could have filed an appeal from the order granting the bill of review. The real parties request “just damages” if we find this original proceeding to be frivolous.

By reply, Estrada contends, inter alia, that the granting of a bill of review is not an immediately appealable order; that real parties improperly utilize the “old mandamus harm test”; that real parties have failed to point out any evidence supporting the trial court's order; and that Estrada properly presented her contention to the trial court that Rule 306a controlled. Estrada also requests that the real parties be sanctioned for their “frivolous” request for sanctions.

II. Standard of Review

Mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at the discretion of the court.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex.2004) (orig.proceeding). “Mandamus relief is proper to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Frank Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex.2012) (orig.proceeding); see In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex.2010) (orig.proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36 ; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d at 888 ; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Mandamus will not issue “when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy.” In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36 ). Stated otherwise, mandamus should not issue to correct grievances that may be addressed by other remedies. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex.2009) (orig.proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

The parties in this case vigorously dispute whether or not an erroneously granted bill of review is subject to mandamus review. By her fifth issue, which we take out of turn, Estrada contends that she lacks an adequate remedy by appeal and the improper granting of a bill of review merits mandamus relief:

If the bill of review is improperly granted, taxpayers, the court system, and the parties themselves will suffer a meaningless trial, only to have the results set aside on appeal. Such pleadings, motions, discovery, jury selection, evidence, trial and eventual judgment amount to a clear waste of judicial resources, causing the loss of rights, rendering mandamus proper.

In contrast, real parties allege that Estrada has an adequate remedy by appeal either from the trial court's order granting the bill of review or by appeal from the final judgment in the case.

An order granting a bill of review is not subject to interlocutory appeal, but may instead be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. It is a well-established rule in Texas that if a judgment rendered in a bill of review proceeding does not dispose of the entire controversy, it is interlocutory in nature and not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie. See Tesoro Petroleum v. Smith, 796 S.W.2d 705, 705 (Tex.1990) (per curiam); Shahbaz v. Feizy Import & Export Co., 827 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). Stated otherwise, a court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an order setting aside a previous judgment by bill of review but not disposing of the case on the merits. See Jordan v. Jordan, 907 S.W.2d 471, 471 (Tex.1995) (per curiam). The order at issue in this case does not dispose of the entire case and is thus interlocutory, so no appeal lies from the order. See Tesoro Petroleum, 796 S.W.2d at 705.

The courts of appeal are split on whether or not mandamus will lie to review the interlocutory granting of a bill of review. Some courts have held that mandamus is available to review an order granting a bill of review. See, e.g., In re J.M. IV, 373 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2012; orig. proceeding) ; In re Po l lo Gordo, Inc., 373 S.W.3d 107, 109–10 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2012, orig. proceeding) ; In re Spiller, 303 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex.App.–Waco 2010, orig. proceeding) ; In re Nat'l Unity Ins. Co., 963 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding) ; Schnitzius v. Koons, 813 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1991, orig. proceeding) ; see also In re Epps, No. 07–14–00420–CV, 2014 WL 7448497, at *1 (Tex.App.–Amarillo Dec. 31, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Botello, No. 04–08–00562–CV, 2008 WL 5050437, at *1 (Tex.App.–San Antonio Nov. 26, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.); In re Attorney Gen. of Tex., No. 04–00–00672–CV, 2001 WL 8547, at *1 (Tex.App.–San Antonio Jan. 3, 2001, orig. proceeding).

Other courts, including this Court, have held that mandamus does not lie and relief must be obtained on review from the final judgment. See, e.g., In re Moreno, 4 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) ; Tex. Mex. Ry. Co. v. Hunter, 726 S.W.2d 616, 617–18 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 1987, orig. proceeding) ; see also Patrick O'Connor & Assocs., L.P. v. Wang Inv. Networks, Inc., No. 01–12–00615–CV, 2013 WL 1451358, at *2 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2013, orig. proceeding [mand. denied] ) (mem. op.); Stettner v. Apollo Paint & Body Shop, Inc., Nos. 01–02–00667–CV & 01 –02–00204–CV, 2002 WL 1586282, at *1 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] July 18, 2002) (combined appeal & orig. proceeding) (order); Ott v. Files, No. 03–00–00612–CV, 2000 WL 1675737, at *1 (Tex.App.–Austin Nov. 9, 2000, no pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication). The First District Court of Appeals has recognized an exception to this general rule in the context of paternity suits. In re Office of Attorney Gen., 276 S.W.3d 611, 621 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).³

In examining the availability of mandamus review, we note that the standard of review for the adequacy of a remedy by appeal has evolved since the majority of these opinions were decided. In a seminal opinion issued in 2004, the ...