In re Peña
| Decision Date | 26 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-18-00627-CV |
| Parties | IN RE MATIAS PEÑA JR. D/B/A PEÑA FARMS |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONBefore Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Relator Matias Peña Jr. d/b/a Peña Farms filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on November 13, 2018. Through this original proceeding, relator seeks to compel the trial court to (1) vacate its November 1, 2018 order granting a motion to extend postjudgment deadlines, and (2) if applicable, vacate any other orders signed after the expiration of the trial court's plenary power.1 We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
Edson Amaro filed suit against Dustin W. Cook and relator for personal injuries arising from a schoolyard shooting. The case was submitted to a jury, which returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the defense, concluding that the negligence of neither defendant proximately caused the injuries in question. On June 22, 2018, the trial court signed a take-nothing final judgment based on the jury's verdict. The court clerk served counsel for the parties with the signed judgment. At the time, Amaro was represented by three attorneys: Raul Medina, Ruben Medina, and John R. Griffith. The final judgment included a correct e-mail address for only one of Amaro's attorneys, Griffith. The final judgment included an incorrect e-mail address for Raul Medina and did not include an email address for Ruben Medina. The final judgment referenced the court's charge and jury verdict as "Exhibit 1" and "incorporated [them] by reference for all purposes," but the judgment provided to the parties by the court did not include these attachments.
On September 20, 2018, Amaro filed a motion to extend postjudgment deadlines on grounds that Amaro and his counsel did not receive proper notice of the final judgment. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a. The motion requested that the trial court designate September 17, 2018 as the date on which lead counsel received knowledge of the judgment.
On October 31, 2018, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the motion to extend deadlines. On November 1, 2018, the trial court granted the motion to extend postjudgment deadlines and ordered that the designated date of the final judgment was the date of this order.
This original proceeding ensued. By four issues, relator contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by granting the Rule 306a motion and there is not an adequateremedy by appeal; (2) the Rule 306a motion did not extend the trial court's plenary power in the absence of a verification and prima facie proof of lack of timely notice; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Rule 306a motion because its order failed to comply with Rule 306a; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by entering a void order granting a Rule 306a motion outside its plenary power.
Relator argues, in sum, that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a only extends the trial court's plenary power and appellate deadlines when a party strictly complies with the rule and demonstrates that neither the party nor its counsel received timely notice or had actual knowledge of an appealable judgment. Relator contends that this did not happen here because (1) Amaro failed to strictly comply with Rule 306a; (2) Amaro's counsel Griffith received notice from the court clerk on June 22, 2018 by email and had actual knowledge the judgment was entered by June 26, 2018; (3) the court's order granting Amaro's motion fails to comply with the purpose of Rule 306a; and (4) at the latest, all of Amaro's attorneys had actual notice of the court's Final Judgment on September 18, 2018; however, Amaro filed no other postjudgment motions extending the court's plenary power and because the court did not hear Amaro's Rule 306a motion until October 31, 2018, and did not grant it until November 1, 2018, the order granting the motion is void.
This Court requested but did not receive a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Amaro.
To obtain relief by writ of mandamus, a relator must establish that an underlying order is void or a clear abuse of discretion and that no adequate appellate remedy exists. In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling is arbitrary and unreasonable or is made without regard for guiding legal principles or supporting evidence. In re Nationwide, 494 S.W.3d at 712; Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2012). We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. When an order is void, the relator need not show the lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and mandamus relief is appropriate. In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Merino, 542 S.W.3d 745, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding).
Amaro argued that he lacked timely notice that the trial court had signed the judgment. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(3) requires the clerk of the court to provide notice regarding the entry of judgments or appealable orders. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(3). The rule states, in relevant part:
When the final judgment or other appealable order is signed, the clerk of the court shall immediately give notice to the parties or their attorneys of record by first-class mail advising that the judgment or order was signed. Failure to comply with the provisions of this rule shall not affect the periods mentioned in paragraph (1) of this rule, except as provided in paragraph (4).
Id. Paragraph (1), as referenced in the rule, provides that the deadline for filing postjudgment motions, such as a motion for new trial or motion to reinstate a case, begins to run on the date the judgment is signed. See id. R. 306a(1). Paragraph (4) addresses what happens, as here, when a party does not immediately receive notice of a judgment.
See id. R. 306a(4). It provides that, when more than twenty days have passed between the date that the trial court signs the judgment or appealable order and the date that a party receives notice or acquires actual knowledge of the signing, the periods referenced in paragraph (1) will begin on the earlier of the date the party received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing, but in no event will the period begin more than ninety days after the judgment was signed. Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(a)(1); Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC v. McCray, 416 S.W.3d 168, 176 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); see also John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2001).
To obtain an extension of postjudgment deadlines under Rule 306a(4), the party must prove in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice: (1) the date the party received notice or actual knowledge of the signing; and (2) that this date was more than twenty but less than ninety-one days after the judgment was signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5); TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(a)(1); Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994); In re J.S., 392 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); Nathan A. Watson Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 218 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). The purpose of a sworn motion is to establish a prima facie case that the party lacked timely notice of the judgment to reinvoke a trial court's jurisdiction for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the date on which the party or its counsel first received notice or acquired knowledge of the judgment. In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, orig. proceeding); In re J.S., 392 S.W.3d at 337; Nathan A. Watson Co., 218 S.W.3d at 800-01; Carrera v. Marsh, 847 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ). Compliance with the provisions of Rule 306a(5) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to extending the time to file postjudgmentmotions. Mem'l Hosp. v. Gillis, 741 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 1987); In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d at 50; In re J.S., 392 S.W.3d at 337; Carrera, 847 S.W.2d at 342.
As stated previously, relator contends generally that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the Rule 306a motion and that he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.2 Relator specifically contends that Amaro's Rule 306a motion did not extend the trial court's plenary power because he failed to file a verified motion with prima facie proof that he lacked timely notice of the judgment.
Here, Amaro's motion to extend postjudgment deadlines was not verified, but was instead supported by affidavits provided by Amaro, Raul Medina, Ruben Medina, and John Griffith. Each of the affiants "swore on oath" that the facts in their affidavits were true. The Texas Supreme Court has held that affidavits of counsel may suffice in the absence of a proper verification for a Rule 306a motion. See Guest v. Dixon, 195 S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). This holding is based on the appellate doctrine that we construe rules reasonably but liberally so that appellate decisions turn on substance rather than procedural technicalities. See id. However, when, as here, a sworn motion is a requirement to establish jurisdiction, the motion must be "sufficiently verified" to invoke the trial court's power to act. City of Laredo v. Schuble, 943 S.W.2d 124, 126(Tex. App.—San Antonio ...
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