In re A.G.D.
Decision Date | 01 May 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 258A19,258A19 |
Citation | 841 S.E.2d 238,374 N.C. 317 |
Parties | In the MATTER OF: A.G.D. and A.N.D. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee mother.
Edward Eldred, for respondent-appellant father.
Respondent-father Aaron D. appeals from orders1 entered by the trial court terminating his parental rights in his minor children A.G.D. and A.N.D. on the grounds of willful abandonment.2 After careful consideration of respondent-father's challenge to the trial court's termination orders in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's termination orders should be affirmed.
Petitioner Amber D. and respondent-father were married in April 2008, with Amy having been born to the parents in 2008 and with Andy having been born to the parents in 2011. The parties separated in March 2013 after Amy revealed that respondent-father had committed repeated sexual assaults against her. Along with a number of other individuals, respondent-father was subsequently charged with having committed multiple criminal acts of sexual abuse in the state and federal courts, including crimes involving child pornography. On 27 May 2014, an order was entered granting the mother sole legal and physical custody of the children, with respondent-father being ordered to have no contact with them in the absence of a further order of the court.3 A judgment granting an absolute divorce between the parents was entered in July 2014.
On 26 June 2018, the mother filed petitions seeking to have respondent-father's parental rights in the children terminated on the grounds that he had willfully failed to pay any portion of the cost of the children's care and that he had willfully abandoned the children. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4), (7) (2019). After a hearing held on 25 February 2019, the trial court entered orders terminating respondent-father's parental rights in both children on 6 March 2019,4 with this decision resting upon determinations that respondent-father had willfully abandoned Amy and Andy and that the termination of respondent-father's parental rights in the children would be in their best interests. Respondent-father noted appeals to this Court from the trial court's termination orders.
In seeking to persuade us to grant relief from the trial court's termination orders, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by determining that his parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the grounds of willful abandonment in light of the fact that he had been "prohibited ... from having any contact with his children." According to respondent-father, "it was not within [his] power to display his love and affection for his children because he was court-ordered not to contact them." In respondent-father's view, the trial court's reliance upon his failure to seek relief from the earlier custody and visitation order was misplaced given that the record contained no evidence tending to show that he had the ability to make such a filing or that there had been "any change of circumstances warranting the filing of" such a motion, citing Shipman v. Shipman , 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003) ( ), with it "beg[ging] belief" that respondent-father "could have filed a custody motion every six months for four years." As a result, since respondent-father "was court-ordered not to contact [his children] and could only have shown them filial affection by disobeying a court's order," respondent-father contends that the trial court's termination orders should be reversed.5
"We review a trial court's adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.’ " In re E.H.P. , 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984) ). A trial court may terminate a parent's parental rights in his or her children based upon a determination that "[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion ...." N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7).6 In order to find that a parent's parental rights are subject to termination based upon willful abandonment, the trial court must make findings of fact that show that the parent had a "purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to [the child]," In re N.D.A. , 373 N.C. 71, 79, 833 S.E.2d 768, 774 (2019) (quoting In re D.M.O. , 250 N.C. App. 570, 573, 794 S.E.2d 858, 861–62 (2016) ), with a parent having abandoned his or her child for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) in the event that he "withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully neglects to lend support and maintenance ...." Pratt v. Bishop , 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962).
We further note that "[o]ur precedents are quite clear—and remain in full force—that ‘[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision.’ " In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153, 804 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2017) ( )(quoting In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 10, 618 S.E.2d 241, 247 (2005), aff'd per curiam , 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) ). Although "a parent's options for showing affection while incarcerated are greatly limited, a parent will not be excused from showing interest in [the] child's welfare by whatever means available. " In re C.B.C. , 373 N.C. 16, 19–20, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 621, 810 S.E.2d 375, 378 (2018) ). As a result, our decisions concerning the termination of the parental rights of incarcerated persons require that courts recognize the limitations for showing love, affection, and parental concern under which such individuals labor while simultaneously requiring them to do what they can to exhibit the required level of concern for their children. In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 283, 837 S.E.2d 861, 867–68 (2020) ( ).
In the course of determining that respondent-father's parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the grounds of willful abandonment, the trial court found as a fact that:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re B.B.
...and "requir[es parents] to do what they can to exhibit the required level of concern for their children." In re A.G.D. , 374 N.C. 317, 320, 841 S.E.2d 238 (2020) (cleaned up). Thus, we are not convinced that respondent's periods of incarceration should excuse respondent from failing to prov......
-
In re J.A.J.
...simultaneously requiring them to do what they can to exhibit the required level of concern for their children." In re A.G.D. , 374 N.C. 317, 320, 841 S.E.2d 238 (2020) (citing In re K.N. , 373 N.C. 274, 283, 837 S.E.2d 861 (2020) ).¶ 31 Here the trial court supported the adjudication of gro......
-
In re B.R.L.
...the "purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful determination" to abandon all parental responsibilities. In re A.G.D., 374 N.C. 317, 319, 841 S.E.2d 238 (2020).4 The dissent's argument that this Court acts improperly when it reviews evidence in the record is misplaced. In conducting the ......
-
In re C.A.B.
...prison, as opposed to facts necessarily attendant to the fact of respondent-father's incarceration in general. Cf. In re A.G.D. , 374 N.C. 317, 327, 841 S.E.2d 238 (2020) ("[T]he fact of incarceration is neither a sword nor a shield for purposes of a termination of parental rights proceedin......