In re Hawkins
| Decision Date | 02 November 1923 |
| Docket Number | 23,506 |
| Citation | 195 N.W. 766,157 Minn. 33 |
| Parties | IN RE CHARLES R. HAWKINS v. KRONICK CLEANING & LAUNDRY COMPANY AND ANOTHER |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Upon the relation of Lillian Hawkins the supreme court granted its writ of certiorari directed to the Industrial Commission of Minnesota to review the decision of the commission in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act brought by Charles R. Hawkins, as employe, against Kronick Cleaning and Laundry Company, as employer. Affirmed.
Presumption against suicide not conclusive.
1. The presumption against suicide is a presumption of fact, and a strong one, but it does not control where there is substantial proof, from which rational consideration may reach the conclusion of suicide.
Cases limited.
2. Lindahl v. Supreme Court, I.O.F. 100 Minn. 87; Kornig v. Western Life Indemnity Co. 102 Minn. 31 limited.
Trafford N. Jayne, for relator.
L. N Foster, for respondent.
Certiorari to review a decision of the Industrial Commission denying to relator compensation on account of the death of her husband while he was in the employ of the laundry company as a driver of a delivery truck.
The deceased's route took him from Minneapolis to Excelsior and other Lake Minnetonka points. At 6:30 in the evening of July 27, 1922, he was found dead at the steering wheel of his truck. It was then on the Minnetonka boulevard, somewhat to the side of the road, between four and five miles from and headed toward Excelsior. Death resulted from a wound caused by a 22 short bullet. It entered his breast, passed entirely through his body and lodged in the side or back. There were bundles of soiled laundry in the car and also bundles ready for delivery. Much of the cargo taken out by deceased that morning had been delivered. When his body was found, the deceased's vest was open; his right trouser's pocket was pulled out and there was no money on his person. His watch chain, broken, was hanging from his vest pocket. The record leaves us in doubt as to whether the watch was missing, but it was worth only $1.50. Two exploded shells lay on the seat. The truck was in gear and the ignition still "on."
The deceased had been in some difficulty with his employer over his accounts. There was, or at least had been, a substantial shortage therein. That morning on the outward bound trip he had purchased a 22 caliber revolver. At the suggestion of the salesman rather than on his own initiative, he purchased also a box of 22 short cartridges. Neither the revolver nor any unexploded cartridges were found on deceased's person. At a distance of about 175 yards easterly, and towards Minneapolis, from where the truck was found, a revolver answering the description of the one purchased that morning by the deceased had been found by passersby at about 3 p.m. that afternoon. Two chambers had been fired; the others were clean and bright. The finders were on their way to Minnetonka and did not notice the laundry truck, if then it was stopped at the side of the road where later it was found. While in Excelsior, deceased had received a telephone order to return immediately to the laundry in Minneapolis. This condensed statement of facts is taken in the main from relator's brief and presents the question, resolved by the Industrial Commission against the relator, as to whether the deceased came to his death at the hands of highwaymen or from suicide.
If on that question, under the facts stated, there had been a finding that the deceased came to his death in attempting to foil a holdup, or that even without such an attempt he had been murdered by highwaymen, it would follow that his death was due to an injury received in and arising out of his employment. But that was not the conclusion. On the contrary, both the referee who took the evidence, and the Industrial Commission on appeal, found that it was a case of suicide.
In compensation cases, the burden is on the claimant to prove a case within the statute, and that the injuries in question were caused by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. But the burden is on the employer to prove that an injury was intentionally self-inflicted. Section 9, chapter 82, p. 92, Laws 1921.
So in this case there are two elements operating in relator's favor; the first being that on the issue of suicide the burden is upon the employer; and the second the presumption against suicide. It is upon the latter that counsel for relator so confidently places his argument, and urges that there should be a reversal because of the failure of the referee and Industrial Commission to give controlling weight to the presumption against suicide.
It is argued that, where circumstantial evidence is relied on to prove suicide, the party having the affirmative of that issue must establish facts which preclude any reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death, and Lindahl v. Supreme Court I.O.F. 100 Minn. 87, 110 N.W. 358, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 916, 117 Am. St. 666, followed in Kornig v. Western Life Indemnity Co. 102 Minn. 31, 112 N.W. 1039, the assigned justification for that argument.
The rule of State ex rel. Niessen v. District Court, 142 Minn. 335, 172 N.W. 133, does not relieve us from the duty of passing on a claim, such as is made here, that the commission has applied an erroneous principle of law in weighing evidence.
"'Gainst self-slaughter" there is a presumption. It is founded on the canons of "the Everlasting," and confirmed by human experience. It is perforce adopted by human judgment. It is a strong presumption and not to be displaced by slight contrary proof. But it is not conclusive, unless there are no circumstances which upon fair consideration might lead a reasonable mind to the conclusion of suicide. It is a presumption addressed entirely to triers of fact, and controls the decision only when there is no substantial proof to the contrary. Such a presumption is not of itself evidence. It has been referred to as "a simple rule to which resort is had when there is a failure of evidence." Duggan v. Bay State St. Ry. Co. 230 Mass. 370, 378, 119 N.E. 757, L.R.A. 1918E, 680. "Presumptions are indulged to supply the place of facts; they are never allowed against ascertained and established facts." Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S. 614, 617, 26 L.Ed. 1189.
The proper function of the presumption now under consideration was stated by the late Mr. Justice Day, while he was a circuit judge, as follows: Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Thornton, 40 C.C.A. 564, 569, 100 F. 582, 587, 49 L.R.A. 116.
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