In re Hayer's Estate
| Decision Date | 16 November 1943 |
| Docket Number | 46267. |
| Citation | 11 N.W.2d 593,233 Iowa 1343 |
| Parties | In re HAYER'S ESTATE. DANIELSON v. REDENBAUGH. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Herrick, Sloan & Langdon, of Des Moines, and R. B. Hawkins, of Leon, for appellant.
O M. Slaymaker, R. E. Killmar, and D. D. Slaymaker, all of Osceola, for appellee.
The appellant, J. C. Danielson, is the executor of the estate of Ellen B. Hayer, deceased, who died in February, 1940. Vera Hayer Redenbaugh, decedent's adopted daughter, and appellee herein, was appointed special administratrix of the estate. On March 5, 1940, Vera Hayer Redenbaugh filed objections to the probate of Ellen B Hayer's will. There was verdict and judgment denying admission of the will to probate, and upon appeal to this court the case was reversed, the verdict and judgment set aside, and remanded to the trial court. See In re Hayer's Estate, 230 Iowa 880, 299 N.W. 431.
On June 2 1942, the district court entered an order and judgment overruling the objections to the probate of the will and admitting the will to probate. Judgment was entered in favor of the estate in the sum of $1,403.15 for costs taxed in the Supreme Court and in the sum of $468.75 against the contestant in the district court.
On June 19 1942, Vera Hayer Redenbaugh filed her final report as special administratrix. To this report J. C. Danielson, who had been appointed executor, filed objections and exceptions upon the grounds that the final report was not in proper form and failed to account for the judgment for costs above referred to; and further asserting that any compensation allowed Vera Hayer Redenbaugh as administratrix should be offset and applied on said judgment. At a hearing on said report the judge did not approve it, and on July 7, 1942, a supplemental report was filed. To this supplemental report the executor again filed objections and exceptions on the same grounds as to the original report. On July 10, 1942, the court overruled the objections to the report and held that the special administratrix was not required to account for the judgment which was rendered against her individually for costs. As compensation the court allowed the special administratrix $500 but directed that this should be held by the clerk and did not decide whether this amount of $500 should be applied on the judgment against Vera Hayer Redenbaugh. The special administratrix was discharged and her bond exonerated.
Appellant sets out two questions for decision: First, whether Vera Hayer Redenbaugh, as special administratrix, was required to account for the judgment against herself as an individual; and, second, whether the estate is entitled to offset or apply on said judgment the $500 fee allowed her as special administratrix. Appellant argues that there was no valid reason why the question of retention and application of the fee allowed upon the judgment should not have been determined. The court did not pass upon the second proposition, but we will refer to that later.
Was the court correct in approving the final report of the special administratrix? No question seems to be made in this appeal to any items listed in the report or the supplemental report. The objection raised by appeal is the failure to list and account for the judgment for costs taxed against Vera Hayer Redenbaugh and in favor of the estate. The judgment of June 2, 1942, which was not appealed from, is against Vera Hayer Redenbaugh personally, and is for costs in the will contest and the appeal therefrom, and is not a judgment against her as special administratrix. The record does not show what these taxed costs consisted of or to whom they belong. They are not itemized in the transcript, abstract or amendment thereto. If any items were properly chargeable against the special administratrix in favor of the estate, they should appear on her report and be accounted for.
I. We think it may be assumed as true, as claimed by appellant, that the liability of an administratrix is properly contested by objections to her final report. In re Christensen's Estate, 229 Iowa 1162, 296 N.W. 198, and cases cited; In re Estate of Windhorst, 227 Iowa 808, 288 N.W. 892.
II. In considering the duties and liabilities of a special administrator, the question arises, do the rules which pertain to a general administrator apply with like force to a special administrator? Section 11885, Code of 1939, provides for the appointment of special administrators when for any cause general administration or probate of a will cannot be immediately granted. Section 11886 provides:
A special administrator is a temporary officer of the court, generally a disinterested person, and frequently appointed to take charge of an estate in case of the contest of a will. He is required to give bond, to take oath for the faithful discharge of his duties, to file an inventory and to do all things needful in the preservation of the estate, and to turn over all assets thereof to the general administrator or executor when the latter is duly appointed and qualified. A special administrator must account for all property of the estate and should so account whether it comes into his hands at the time of appointment or thereafter. Except as to the allowance of claims, his duties and responsibilities are substantially the same as those of a general administrator, and so far as his powers and duties extend, ordinarily the same rules apply to the special administrator as to the general. One difference lies in the fact that at the termination of the incumbency of the special administrator, the estate is not closed but continues in the hands of the general administrator or executor.
III. It is the duty of an administrator to collect the debts due the estate. This includes not only the debts due from others, but his own debts to the estate. An executor or administrator is considered as having paid the debts due from him and as having in his possession that much more cash, and he is held liable to the estate to the extent of his ability to pay. If he establishes that during the period of his appointment he was insolvent, and thus unable to make payment, he is not charged with the debt in his official capacity. Nor in such case should his bondsman be held liable, unless through neglect or design he has caused or permitted his own debt to become of less value or uncollectible. The burden is upon the administrator to make the showing of inability to pay. See 21 Am.Jur. pp. 478-480, Pars. 193, 194; McEwen v. Fletcher, 164 Iowa, 517, 146 N.W. 1, Ann.Cas.1916D, 631; In re Estate of Parker, 189 Iowa 1131, 179 N.W. 525; In re Estate of Kendrick, 214 Iowa 873, 243 N.W. 168; 33 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, p. 1156, § 182. The cases above cited related to a general administration of estates but, we think, apply to the duty of the special administrator to account for his indebtedness.
IV. It may be argued that the debt of Vera Hayer Redenbaugh arose after the death of decedent and was therefore not the property of deceased or of her estate. To constitute liability it must have been an asset and the property of the estate. There is no question but that a debt due from an administrator is an asset of such estate. Any property which during the continuance of an estate accrues to the benefit of those entitled to the proceeds of such estate is an asset thereof. Stolenburg v. Diercks, 117 Iowa 25, 90 N.W. 525; 33 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, p. 1056, § 101. It is true that the debt herein was not due decedent in her lifetime and did arise after decedent's death, but as special administratrix Vera Hayer Redenbaugh was the trustee with the duty to collect any debt which might belong to the estate. If it is the property of the estate, she must account therefor as such trustee or special administratrix. The word "estate" has a great variety of meanings. An estate includes all forms of personal property. Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1070, 205 N.W. 870, 43 A.L.R. 567. An estate, in the sense here used, is deemed to exist from the death of a person until finally closed. The estate continues to exist until the property has been distributed or disposed of in accordance with the orders of court and the estate has been declared closed. State v. District Court, 76 Mont. 143, 245 P. 529.
It is the duty of the administrator to collect interest, rentals, and in many cases legacies and distributive shares of property coming to the deceased after his death. As to rentals, see Ihle v. Ihle, 222 Iowa 1086, 270 N.W. 452; and In re Estate of Holderbaum, 82 Iowa 69, 47 N.W. 898. In some instances such property or assets might never have been the property of the deceased in his lifetime, did not arise out of any contract, nor were the income of any property belonging to the deceased during his lifetime-for example, a legacy. Yet we could not hold that such after-acquired property was not a part of decedent's estate or should not be handled or disposed of by the administrator. Any argument which would deny a right or claim of the special administrator to such after-acquired property would apply with equal force to the executor or administrator. If not a part of the estate in the hands of the special administratrix, then it is not such in...
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Danielson v. Redenbaugh (In re Hayer's Estate)
...233 Iowa 134311 N.W.2d 593In re HAYER'S ESTATE.DANIELSONv.REDENBAUGH.No. 46267.Supreme Court of Iowa.Nov. 16, 1943. Appeal from District Court, Decatur County; Geo. A. Johnston, Judge. Objections were filed by J. C. Danielson, executor of the estate of Ellen B. Hayer, deceased, to the final......