In re Heather Cox, Delinquent Child Case Nos. 98-G-2183 and 98-G-2184
| Decision Date | 23 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | 99-LW-6112,98-G-2183 and 98-G-2184 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF: HEATHER COX, DELINQUENT CHILD CASE NOS. 98-G-2183 and 98-G-2184 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
HON DONALD R. FORD, P.J., HON. JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., HON WILLIAM M. O'NEILL, J.
ATTY DAVID N. PATTERSON, PATTERSON AND SIMONELLI, 33579 Euclid Avenue, Willoughby, OH 44094(For Appellant, Christine Marquette)
(For Appellee, Geauga County Department of Human Services)
STEPHANIE WEEMHOFF, c/o Geauga CASA, P.O. Box 23485, Chagrin Falls, OH 44023 (Guardian ad litem)
These are accelerated appeals taken from final judgments of the Juvenile Division of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant, Christine Marquette, appeals from the juvenile court's imposition of jail time on her after being held in contempt of court.
On February 18, 1998, the Geauga County Department of Human Services ("Department of Human Services") filed a delinquency complaint against appellant's minor daughter pursuant to R.C. 2151.02(B). The girl pled true to both counts contained in the complaint, and the juvenile court adjudged her to be a delinquent child at an adjudicatory hearing on April 9, 1998. At the subsequent dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sentenced appellant's daughter to the commitment of a youth detention facility.
Beyond this, the juvenile court also granted the Department of Human Services protective supervision over appellant's daughter. The Department of Human Services drafted a case plan to address the family problems that gave rise to the girl's unruly behavior. The provisions of the case plan were directed at both appellant and her daughter. With regard to appellant, the case plan required that she refrain from consuming alcohol, attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, attend an aftercare treatment program, and submit to periodic drug screenings upon the request of the Department of Human Services. The juvenile court adopted the case plan as an order of the court.
The record does not reflect that appellant ever raised any issue as to whether the juvenile court had personal jurisdiction over her. It is apparent that appellant simply acquiesced to the juvenile court's exercise of such jurisdiction over her after being served with a copy of the summons and delinquency complaint that were filed against her daughter.
The matter came on for a status hearing on July 22, 1998 in order to determine whether any progress had been made in achieving the objectives set forth in the case plan. Appellant, her daughter, and representatives from the Department of Human Services were in attendance. During the course of this proceeding, the suggestion was raised that appellant had continued to consume alcohol and had failed to comply with other aspects of the case plan.
Based on this information, the juvenile court determined that appellant should be required to show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with the case plan.yfn At the conclusion of the status hearing, the juvenile court informed appellant about the unresolved question of her contempt and scheduled a show cause hearing for August 26, 1998.
On the day of the show cause hearing, appellant appeared and made an oral request that the matter be delayed so that she could retain counsel. The juvenile court admonished appellant for failing to file a timely motion for a continuance, but nevertheless continued the hearing.
Appellant retained an attorney and was, consequently, represented by counsel when the matter proceeded on September 17, 1998. As mentioned earlier, caseworkers from the Department of Human Services had previously informed the juvenile court that appellant violated the terms of the court-ordered case plan during the status conference on July 22, 1998. Specifically, the Department of Human Services alleged that appellant consumed alcohol and failed to submit to a drug screen. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that this was an evidentiary hearing, in addition to being a status conference.
During the show cause hearing, appellant was given the opportunity to be heard in response to the allegations that had previously been brought to the juvenile court's attention. Appellant, however, offered no explanation for her alleged failure to comply with the prior orders of the juvenile court. Further, there was no objection to the juvenile court's reliance upon the allegations made to the court during the earlier status conference. In fact, appellant's counsel even conceded that she had violated the case plan because she drank alcohol on at least one occasion and she had not yet submitted to the drug test.
At the conclusion of the show cause proceeding, the juvenile court found appellant to be in contempt of court and ordered her to serve thirty days in the Geauga County Safety Center. The juvenile court suspended twenty-five days upon the condition that appellant henceforth comply with the provisions of the case plan. As for the five days that were not suspended, the juvenile court ordered that appellant report to the Geauga County Safety Center at 9:00 a.m. the following day, to wit: September 18, 1998.
Appellant did not report to jail as ordered. Consequently, the juvenile court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. On September 25, 1998, a different attorney filed an entry of appearance indicating that he was the newly retained counsel acting on behalf of appellant. This attorney also filed a document captioned "Motion to Present Christine Marquette for Sentencing" in which he requested that appellant be allowed to appear for sentencing on September 28, 1998.
Appellant appeared in court on September 28, 1998, after turning herself in on the bench warrant. She was represented by her new attorney. After again affording appellant the opportunity to be heard through counsel, the juvenile court found her to be in contempt of court for failing to report to the Geauga County Safety Center on September 18, 1998. As punishment for this second act of contempt, the juvenile court ordered appellant to serve five additional days of the previously suspended jail time. Appellant, therefore, had to serve a total of ten days in jail in the wake of the second contempt finding, with the remainder of the original thirty-day sentence suspended on the condition that appellant thereafter comply with the case plan.
Appellant filed timely notices of appeal from the September 17 and September 28, 1998 judgment entries. This court stayed the sentences imposed by the juvenile court upon motion filed by appellant. Thereafter, we sua sponte consolidated the appeals for purposes of disposition.
On appeal, appellant now asserts the following assignments of error:
At the outset, it is necessary to review the law governing contempt. In its simplest terms, contempt of court is disobedience of an order of a court. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined it as "conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions." Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 55, paragraph one of the syllabus. See, also, Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15; South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80 v. D'Amico (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 50, 52. The contempt power is inherent in a court because it is necessary to the exercise of the judicial function. Denovchek, 36 Ohio St.3d at 15; Zakany v. Zakany (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 192, 194; State ex rel. Shoop v. Mitrovich (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 220, 221.
A finding of contempt must be reviewed on two different levels. State v. Kilbane (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 203. First, the contemptuous conduct must be examined to see whether it constituted a direct or indirect contempt. Second, the trial court's treatment of the matter must be analyzed in order to ascertain whether the contemnor was dealt with under the court's civil or criminal contempt powers. Id.; State v. Sandlin (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 84, 85.
A court's direct contempt powers are set forth in R.C. 2705.01:
"A court, or judge at chambers, may summarily punish a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice."
The Supreme Court of Ohio has also observed that direct contempt is misbehavior "committed in the presence of or so near the court as to obstruct the due and orderly administration of justice, and punishment therefor may be imposed summarily without the filing of charges or the issuance of process." In re Lands (1946), 146 Ohio St. 589, 595. Direct contempt usually involves some form of misbehavior in the actual courtroom. The concept, however, has been expanded to include challenges to judicial authority that are directed at an officer of the court who is engaged in the execution of the court's business. See, e.g., State v. Local Union 5760 (1961), 172 Ohio St. 75, 82, overruled in part on other grounds.
An indirect contempt of court is one "committed outside the presence of the court but which also tends to...
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