In re Interest of M.C., 06–15–00064–CV
| Decision Date | 11 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 06–15–00064–CV,06–15–00064–CV |
| Citation | 482 S.W.3d 675 |
| Parties | In the Interest of M.C., K.G., and K.G., Children |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jason A. Duff, Attorney at Law, Greenville, TX, for appellant.
Michael D. Becker, Office of General Counsel, Austin, TX, for appellee.
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Jade's continued involvement with drugs, including her use of and dealing in them, which resulted in her incarceration, was the apparent precipitating cause of the termination of Jade's parental rights to her three children, M.C., K.G., and K.L.G.1 The father of one of the children is deceased, and the parental rights of the fathers of the other two children had previously been terminated.
The trial concerning the termination of Jade's parental rights was a bench trial wherein the trial court ordered termination. Jade has effected this appeal wherein she contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that she committed one or more acts prescribed by statute to justify termination and that termination was in the best interests of the children. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN . § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O), (2)
(West Supp.2015). We affirm the trial court's judgment because we find (1) that sufficient evidence supports at least one finding of a statutory ground for termination of Jade's parental rights to the children and (2) that sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination was in the best interests of the children.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the right of a parent to maintain custody of and raise her child "is an interest far more precious than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)
. The Texas Supreme Court agrees with this assessment and has held that a parent's interest in maintaining custody of and raising her children is paramount. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 273 (Tex.2002) ; Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1985) ; In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex.1980). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at trial." In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex.2014)
. We, therefore, "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is ... sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id . at 500. Further, "involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.' " In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20 ). An individual's parental rights to her child may only be terminated if the trial court finds, "by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of both of the following statutory requirements: (1) that the parent has engaged in one of the statutory grounds for termination and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest." In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp.2015); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex.2012) ; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex.2002) ). "Clear and convincing evidence" is that "degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." TEX. FAM.CODE ANN . § 101.007 (West 2014) ; see In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex.2009).
In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven. E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802–03
(citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002) ); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005) (per curiam); C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d at 178. We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted. E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802–03 (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573 ; C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d at 179.
In our factual sufficiency review, due consideration is given to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex.2006)
(per curiam). We determine " ‘whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the [ ] allegations.’ " Id. at 108 () (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002). Conversely, if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could have reasonably resolved any conflicts to form a firm conviction that grounds for termination exist, then the evidence is factually sufficient, and the termination findings must be upheld. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19 ; C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d at 179. "[I]n making this determination," we must undertake " ‘an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’ " A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 ). We also recognize that " " In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex.2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex.1994) (citation omitted)). The child's emotional and physical interests will not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26
.
"Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001(1)
is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (citing A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 ); In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) ); see In re N.R., 101 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). If the trial court finds multiple predicate grounds, we will affirm if the evidence supports any one of the grounds. See C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d at 179 ; K.W., 335 S.W.3d at 769.
At the termination hearing, Jade admitted that she was arrested March 6, 2014 and charged with manufacturing and transporting cocaine. On that same day, M.C., K.G., and K.L.G. were removed from the home by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) because they were in Jade's presence while she was either in possession of or engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Upon removal, the children were placed in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department. After an adversary hearing, the trial court entered orders on March 24, 2014, which required Jade, in Phase I, to submit to a drug and alcohol dependency assessment and follow all recommendations of the assessment, to participate in either an Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) or a Celebrate Recovery program not less than three hours per week and provide the Department with proof of attendance, and to successfully complete an intensive outpatient program (IOP) and a supportive outpatient program (SOP). The court also ordered Jade, in Phase II, to attend counseling sessions until the counselor determined that no further sessions were necessary, to successfully complete parenting classes, and to successfully complete an anger management program. Finally, the court ordered Jade, on an ongoing basis, to submit to drug testing when requested by the Department, to abstain from drug or alcohol use during the pendency of the suit, to maintain stable, safe, and appropriate housing, to refrain from engaging in any criminal activity, and to comply with each requirement of the Department's service plan.
At the final hearing, Jade claimed that she participated in NA meetings twice a week and in AA meetings a couple of times, but could not recall how many meetings she attended. However, Morgan Shields, who oversaw Jade's case for the Department, testified that the attendance sheets provided by Jade showed that she had failed to attend meetings on many occasions and had not attended them either regularly or as often as she claimed. Jade also claimed that she completed the IOP in July 2014 and the SOP in September 2014 at the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Clinic (MHMR) in Terrell. She denied that MHMR withdrew her certificates of completion of the IOP/SOP, but also testified that she completed another IOP in February 2015 at a rehabilitation facility. Marti Koenig, a licensed professional counselor with Lakes Regional MHMR in Terrell testified that Jade had completed the IOP in July 2014 and had completed the required number of sessions for the SOP in September 2014. However, Koenig rescinded Jade's SOP completion certificate upon being informed that Jade had admitted to continuing her use of drugs and stated that she had informed Jade by telephone of the rescission. Koenig also testified that Jade had applied to be admitted to an SOP in March 2015, but only attended one group session. Although Jade also claimed that she completed the counseling and anger management requirements with Koenig at MHMR, Koenig testified that neither she nor MHMR conduct individual counseling or anger management programs, so Jade could not have completed those requirements with her....
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