In re Jefferson

• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. A06A2253.,A06A2253.
• Parties: In re JEFFERSON.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

284 Ga. App. 877

645 S.E.2d 349

In re JEFFERSON.

No. A06A2253.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 30, 2007.

Reconsideration Denied April 11, 2007.

Sherri J. Jefferson, pro se.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

Sherri Jefferson appeals from a juvenile court's finding that she was in contempt of court in the course of an appearance at a delinquency hearing. We find no error and affirm.

"On appeal of a criminal contempt conviction the appropriate standard of appellate review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) In re Waitz, 255 Ga.App. 841, 842, 567 S.E.2d 87 (2002).

So viewed, the record shows that at the time of the alleged contempt, Jefferson was an assistant public defender who was assigned to represent juvenile defendants in the Juvenile Court of Glynn County. The alleged improper statements made by Jefferson occurred during a delinquency hearing in which she represented the minor child B.W. Among other offenses, B.W. was charged as a party to the crime of aggravated battery based on a shooting that occurred outside of an acquaintance's home.

During the delinquency hearing, the prosecution sought to prove that B.W. had supplied the handgun used in the shooting and had encouraged the shooter to fire the handgun at the victim. As part of her examination of the law enforcement officer who had investigated the shooting, Jefferson attempted to question the officer about certain statements made to him by the alleged shooter, who had not yet testified. The prosecution objected on hearsay grounds, and the juvenile court sustained the objection. The juvenile court went on to suggest that in order to avoid the hearsay problem, Jefferson should first call the alleged shooter to the stand and question him about the statement, and then recall the investigating officer and question him about any inconsistencies in the shooter's statement. In response, Jefferson requested that she instead be permitted to continue questioning the officer about the shooter's statement and then call the shooter himself, rather than vice versa. When the juvenile court said that he would not allow her to proceed in that manner, Jefferson objected by stating, "[T]hat's a gross interference with the way that I can represent my client, Your Honor."

Later during the examination, the officer testified that B.W. had told the shooter to fire the handgun and had "egged it on." Jefferson then asked, "Can you show me in the shooter's statement where he told you that [B.W.] said shoot him?" The officer responded that "[i]t's not in the shooter's statement." When Jefferson started to follow up on the officer's response, the prosecution objected on hearsay grounds to any testimony about what the shooter said or did not say to the officer. The juvenile court then ruled that he would give no probative value to any hearsay contained in the officer's testimony; after further discussion, the court also held that the police officer's report was inadmissible. The juvenile court then reiterated its ruling: "I've already overruled your proffer of [the police officer's] report and also your efforts to get [the officer] to testify about his conversation with [the shooter]." When Jefferson continued to resist, the court commented that "[w]hat you're doing now is making a closing argument," and said that it "had heard enough on this issue." Jefferson then protested: "I just find the Court is biased in its view. You say that you're not prejudging the case but it seems to me like you've made up your mind and any and everything that I do to effectively defend my client I'm being rebutted."

At the conclusion of the delinquency hearing, the juvenile court served a notice of contempt and show cause order alleging eight instances of contempt committed by Jefferson, including her "gross interference" and "biased" statements. The presiding judge then recused himself so that another judge could preside over the contempt proceedings. After a new judge from the juvenile court had been appointed, a hearing was held on the show cause order in which Jefferson testified. Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued an order finding Jefferson not guilty of six of the eight instances of alleged contempt. However, the juvenile court found that Jefferson's "gross interference" and "biased" statements constituted contemptuous conduct. On May 1, 2006, and citing OCGA § 15-11-5, the juvenile court sentenced Jefferson to ten days incarceration for the first statement and twenty days incarceration for the second statement without specifying whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively, and also granted "a supersedeas of this Order pending the resolution of any appeal hereof." One week later, the juvenile court amended its order to provide that the sentences would run consecutively, and again granted supersedeas.

1. As a preliminary matter, we reject Jefferson's contention that the juvenile court's jurisdiction does not extend to matters of criminal contempt or to the imposition of sentences in such cases. As a constitutional court, the juvenile court was authorized both to adjudicate the matter and to impose punishment. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Par. I (jurisdiction of juvenile court is "as . . . provided by law"); OCGA § 15-11-5(a) (a juvenile court "may punish a person for contempt of court for willfully disobeying an order of the court or for obstructing or interfering with the proceedings of the court"); In re Burton, 271 Ga. 491, 493(2), 521 S.E.2d 568 (1999) (juvenile court has jurisdiction to issue contempt orders against counsel appearing before it); In re Liles, 278 Ga.App. 496, 629 S.E.2d 492 (2006) (affirming juvenile court's adjudication of contempt arising from violation of its protective order).

2. The crux of this appeal is Jefferson's contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction.

As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, the Georgia courts have reserved to themselves the common law power to describe criminal contempt in this state, rejecting legislative efforts to limit that power, and construing state constitutional provisions so as to preserve it. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962), citing Atlanta Newspapers v. State of Ga, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960), and Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 171-172, 36 S.E. 630 (1900) (under the Georgia constitution, the Georgia legislature can limit the punishment for, but not the definition of, criminal contempt). "The test applied to determine whether a statement is contemptuous is whether [the statement represents] a clear and present danger to [the] orderly administration of justice." Garland v. State, 253 Ga. 789, 790(2), 325 S.E.2d 131 (1985).

Jefferson accused the judge of (a) "gross interference" with her efforts to represent her client and (b) being "biased" and prejudiced against her client.

( a) "A judge's authority to maintain decorum in his courtroom does not depend upon the correctness of his rulings. No matter how unsound[ ] or erroneous one may consider them to be, they afford no justification or excuse for contempt of the court." White v. State of Ga., 218 Ga. 290, 294(3)(b), 127 S.E.2d 668 (1962). "[T]aking into account the setting in which the statement is made," Garland, supra, 253 Ga. at 791(2), 325 S.E.2d 131, we note that Jefferson made her claim of "gross interference" in the face of the juvenile court's repeated adverse rulings. Such a claim not only mistakes the "orderly administration of justice" for its opposite, but openly accuses the court of perpetrating misrule. The evidence sufficed to sustain Jefferson's conviction for criminal contempt. See White, supra, 218 Ga. at 292-293, 294(3)(b), 127 S.E.2d 668 (counsel's comments, including that if he erred "in the slightest," the trial court would "give [him] the works," amounted to criminal contempt).

(b) The record shows that the trial court had definitively informed counsel that its consideration of the matter was closed when counsel attacked the trial court at the core of its function as an impartial arbiter of justice. Indeed, the judge hearing the contempt matter found Jefferson's second statement at issue to be "the absolute zenith of contempt a trial participant can express for a Court."

If and when counsel believes that a trial court is biased against her client, she should move for recusal, thus guaranteeing herself, her client, and the trial court all the safeguards which accompany such a motion, including the designation of a new judge to hear the matter. Compare In re McLarty, 152 Ga.App. 399, 400-401(2), 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979) (motion to recuse made with "some evidence in support of it" is not contemptuous). It is within a trial court's power to forbid a disgruntled lawyer from impugning the integrity of a court at the moment the inclination strikes her, and to hold her accountable, after due process, when such an attack occurs. As Judge Pope wrote in Smith v. Adams, 161 Ga.App. 820, 821(3), 288 S.E.2d 775 (1982):

Words which bring the court into disrespect, which offend[s] its dignity or affront[s] its majesty, or challenge[s] its authority, constitute contempt. A solicitor is an officer of the court and whenever he impedes or obstructs the administration of justice by the use of contemptuous words he may be properly punished.

The evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding. Id. (counsel's assertion that trial court "can't tell [the law]" authorized a finding of contempt); see also In re McLarty, 150 Ga.App. 395, 396(2), 258 S.E.2d 10 (1979) (counsel who informed trial court immediately after adverse ruling that "maybe the Court of Appeals will understand the law" is guilty of contempt).

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