In re Keylor, 2005 Ohio 1661 (OH 3/30/2005)
| Decision Date | 30 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 04 MO 02. |
| Citation | 2005 Ohio 1661 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Elijah M. Keylor and Gabriel M. Keylor, Minor Children. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Atty. Grace L. Hoffman, Hoffman Law Office, 160 East Main Street, P.O. Box 310, Barnesville, Ohio 43713, for Appellant, Michaelann Keylor:
Atty. Mark Morrison, 117 North Main Street, Woodsfield, Ohio 43793, for Appellant, Matthew Keylor.
Atty. Albert E. Davies, III Thomas, Fregiato, Myser, Hanson & Davies, 320 Howard Street, Bridgeport, Ohio 43912, for Appellees, Jack D. and Donna J. Keylor.
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Hon. Gene Donofrio, Hon. Mary DeGenaro.
{¶1} Appellants Matthew Keylor ("Matthew") and Michaelann Young Keylor ("Michaelann") are appealing the judgment of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which terminated their custody rights over their minor children, Elijah and Gabriel Keylor. The court awarded custody to the paternal grandparents, Appellees Jack and Donna Keylor, after finding that Michaelann was incapable of caring for the children and was an unfit parent, using the criteria established in In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 369 N.E.2d 1047. The record reflects that Michaelann had primary custody of the children. She had a bipolar psychological disorder, but this appeared to be under control at the time of the custody hearing. It appears that Michaelann and Matthew engaged in violent arguments, but that Michaelann was a good mother to the children apart from those violent episodes with her husband. Matthew made it clear that he did not want to have custody, and that he fully supported Michaelann's right to custody. It is not clear from the record whether the trial court fully considered if Michaelann could have retained custody as long as she had no contact with Matthew, or at least no contact in the presence of the children. Given the extreme gravity of the trial court's judgment (including an order that Michaelann and Matthew would only be allowed minimal supervised visitation), this matter must be remanded for the trial court to determine whether Michaelann, individually, may retain custody of her two boys.
{¶2} Appellants are the biological parents of Gabriel M. Keylor, d.o.b. 12/26/1997, and Elijah M. Keylor, d.o.b. 12/5/1999. Appellees are the biological parents of Matthew, and are the paternal grandparents of Gabriel and Elijah.
{¶3} Michaelann is the primary caregiver and has had custody of Gabriel and Elijah from birth. Matthew is not presently living in the home. Michaelann has a daughter named Emily residing with her, and has a son named Samuel who resides with Michaelann's parents. Matthew is not the biological parent of Emily or Samuel.
{¶4} On February 17, 2000, Appellees were granted visitation and companionship rights with the children. At the time of this order, Michaelann and Matthew were not married.
{¶5} On March 20, 2003, Appellees filed a "Petition for Custody" in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, pursuant to R.C. §2151.23(A)(2). The petition acknowledged that Michaelann and Matthew had never been convicted of any offense that resulted in a child being an abused or neglected child, nor had either of them engaged in conduct that resulted in a child being an abused or neglected child.
{¶6} On April 19, 2003, after the initiation of these custody proceedings, Michaelann and Matthew were married. During the next few months, Matthew was asked to leave the residence more than once. Michaelann and Matthew expressed on the record no intention of getting a divorce, nor do they have specific plans to begin living together again.
{¶7} The court appointed separate counsel for both Michaelann and Matthew, and appointed a guardian ad litem for the children.
{¶8} The court held a custody hearing on December 5, 2003. Michaelann, Matthew and Appellees all testified. Other witnesses included former neighbors, a police officer who responded to a fire at Appellants' home, a guardian ad litem, a family doctor, and the maternal grandmother of the children. Appellees also attempted to have mental health professionals testify, but the trial court barred most of the testimony due to concerns about confidentiality.
{¶9} There was considerable testimony about the volatile relationship between Matthew and Michaelann, about Michaelann's bipolar disorder, and about the fact that Michaelann changed her place of residence many times. On the other hand, there was overwhelming testimony that Michaelann was a capable and caring parent.
{¶10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the court allowed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court rendered its judgment on December 31, 2003. The trial court adopted Appellees' proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and proposed judgment. The court also expanded upon the judgment proposed by Appellees by awarding visitation rights to the maternal grandparents, as well as ordering limited supervised visitation rights to Michaelann and Matthew.
{¶11} This timely appeal was filed on January 15, 2004.
{¶12} Appellants' sole assignment of error states:
{¶13} "The trial court abused its discretion, committed reversible error and ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence when awarding custody of the minor children to their paternal grandparents as the evidence did not support the finding that the mother was unsuitable."
{¶14} The trial court judgment now under review involves the issue of child custody. The basic standard of review of a trial court's decision regarding child custody is whether the court abused its discretion. Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178, syllabus. "A child-custody decision that is supported by a substantial amount of competent and credible evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Myers v. Myers, 153 Ohio App.3d 243, 2003-Ohio-3552, 792 N.E.2d 770, ¶43. An abuse of discretion constitutes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
{¶15} Appellants argue that this case is more specifically governed by the holding in Perales, supra, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 369 N.E.2d 1047. In Perales, the natural parent signed an agreement shortly after her daughter was born to relinquish custody of the child to a nonparent. The child remained in the care and custody of the nonparent for over two years, when the mother filed a complaint to regain custody. The trial court granted custody to the nonparent based on its conclusion that it was in the best interests of the child. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that the best interests test was not the test to use in an original custody matter arising under the authority of R.C. §2151.23(A)(2). Perales held that:
{¶16} "In an R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) child custody proceeding between a parent and a nonparent, the hearing officer may not award custody to the nonparent without first making a finding of parental unsuitability—that is, without first determining that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the parent abandoned the child, that the parent contractually relinquished custody of the child, that the parent has become totally incapable of supporting or caring for the child, or that an award of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child." Id. at syllabus.
{¶17} Appellants cite the correct law governing this case, including the Perales case. Any consideration of procedures designed to terminate parental rights begins with the recognition of the unique sanctity that our culture and our law place on the parent/child relationship. In re Sara H. (Dec. 16, 1994), 6th Dist. No. L-94-116. It is well recognized that the right to raise a child, "is an 'essential' and 'basic' civil right." In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169, quoting Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551. A parent's interest in the care, custody, and management of his or her child is "fundamental." Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599.
{¶18} Although many of these principles arose in cases involving the permanent relinquishment of all parental rights, the same principles apply to other types of termination of parental rights, such as in the instant case where a nonparent is attempting to gain legal custody of a child. In re Hockstok, 98 Ohio St.3d 238, 2002-Ohio-7208 781 N.E. 971, ¶16-17. It is unclear why the dissent concludes that these principles do not apply to Appellants' situation. The fundamental parental right discussed in Stanley, Santosky, Hockstok, and a myriad of related cases, is the right to the care and custody of the child, which is the same right under review here. The dissent is simply in error when it concludes that we are holding the trial court to an artificially high standard of review.
{¶19} Most recently, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning their children in Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49. Troxel held that, "so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." Id. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49. The court also held that, "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply...
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