In re Marriage of Tyner
| Docket Number | 54513-6-II |
| Decision Date | 01 June 2022 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Marriage of JESSA ROSE TYNER, n.k.a. BLACKHURST, Respondent, and JASON SCOTT TYNER, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Jason S. Tyner appeals the trial court's order denying his petition to modify spousal maintenance paid to his former spouse, Jessa R. Tyner (n.k.a. Blackhurst). Tyner argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the award of spousal maintenance survives Blackhurst's remarriage under the dissolution decree and that Blackhurst's remarriage to a person with significant income was not a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of spousal maintenance.
We hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that the award of spousal maintenance survives Blackhurst's remarriage under the dissolution decree. However, we hold that the trial court erred by failing to consider whether Blackhurst's current spouse's higher income was a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of spousal maintenance. Accordingly we reverse the trial court's order denying Tyner's petition to modify spousal maintenance and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Tyner and Blackhurst finalized their dissolution by agreement on March 15, 2018. The dissolution decree provides that Tyner will pay spousal maintenance to Blackhurst for 10 years. The dissolution decree states:
13. Spousal Support (maintenance/alimony)
[X] The (check one): [X] Respondent must pay spousal support as follows:
Each payment shall be due on the 5th day of the month, beginning March 5, 2018.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4. This spousal maintenance provision was provided for on a mandatory pattern form for dissolution decrees provided by the State from 2016 to 2019. At the time of the dissolution, Tyner was self-represented, and Blackhurst was represented by an attorney. Before signing the dissolution decree, Tyner went through each line of the agreement with members of his own family, with Blackhurst's father, and with Blackhurst's lawyer.
Blackhurst remarried on July 13, 2019, and Blackhurst's current spouse's income is $215, 000.00 per year. Blackhurst was a stay-at-home mother during her marriage to Tyner and is not currently employed. Tyner has an income of approximately $140, 000.00 per year.
Tyner sought modification of the spousal maintenance award based on Blackhurst's remarriage to a person earning significant income and relocation with their children to Oregon. After an evidentiary hearing on Tyner's modification request, the trial court denied Tyner's request for modification in an oral ruling. The trial court later expressly incorporated its findings from its oral ruling into its final order denying Tyner's petition to modify spousal maintenance.
The trial court found that, per the dissolution decree, the spousal maintenance award survives Blackhurst's remarriage. The trial court stated that the award survived because "there is clear and unequivocal intent shown by the language in the final divorce order to make maintenance in effect for a specific time and continue after remarriage." 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 4, 2020) at 16. The trial court did not consider Tyner's subjective intent because there was no ambiguity in the language of the spousal maintenance provision.
The trial court denied Tyner's request for modification of the award because Tyner "knew or should have known" that Blackhurst could remarry, Blackhurst's remarriage was a circumstance Tyner "could have contemplated" and "objectively should have [] contemplated" because the dissolution decree expressly addressed Blackhurst's remarriage in the spousal maintenance provision, and Tyner went over drafts of the decree step by step. 2 VRP (Mar. 4, 2020) at 18. The trial court noted however, that "Tyner clearly did not contemplate subjectively any remarriage of his ex-wife." 2 VRP (Mar 4, 2020) at 19.
The trial court also found that Blackhurst's current spouse's higher income did not justify modification because it was "connected to the possibility of remarriage" which was "expressly addressed in the divorce order" and was therefore "within the sphere of possible contemplation at the time of the dissolution." 2 VRP (Mar. 4, 2020) at 19.
Tyner appeals.
Tyner argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the spousal maintenance award survives Blackhurst's remarriage because the parties never agreed to spousal maintenance surviving Blackhurst's remarriage and because the spousal maintenance provision in the decree misstates the law.[1] We disagree.
We review questions of law de novo. Young v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 196 Wn.2d 310, 317, 472 P.3d 990 (2020). "[C]ontract interpretation is a question of law when the interpretation does not depend on the use of extrinsic evidence." Viking Bank v. Firgrove Commons 3, LLC, 183 Wn.App. 706, 711, 334 P.3d 116 (2014).
Here, the trial court heard testimony and considered documentary evidence before interpreting the spousal maintenance provision in the dissolution decree. However, as discussed below, the contract presents no ambiguity, and no extrinsic evidence is required to interpret the contract terms. Therefore, interpreting the spousal maintenance provision is a question of law that we review de novo. See Young, 196 Wn.2d at 317; Viking Bank, 183 Wn.App. at 711.
"A contract is not ambiguous when a reading of the contract as a whole leads to only one meaning." Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77 Wn.2d 911, 917, 468 P.2d 666 (1970). "A contract provision is not ambiguous merely because the parties to the contract suggest opposing meanings." GMAC v. Everett Chevrolet, Inc., 179 Wn.App. 126, 135, 317 P.3d 1074, review denied, 181 Wn.2d 1008 (2014).
We "follow the objective manifestation theory of contracts." Hearst Commc'ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005). Under this approach, we "attempt to determine the parties' intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties." Id. "[T]he subjective intent of the parties is generally irrelevant if the intent can be determined from the actual words used." Id. at 504. While surrounding circumstances and other extrinsic evidence can be considered, they must "be used 'to determine the meaning of specific words and terms used' and not to 'show an intention independent of the instrument' or to 'vary, contradict or modify the written word.'" Id. at 503 (quoting Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 683, 695-96, 974 P.2d 836 (1999)).
Here, the dissolution decree expressly states that spousal maintenance would end upon either party's death or Blackhurst's remarriage "unless a different date or event is provided below." CP at 4. The parties checked the "Date" box immediately below this statement and provided that CP at 4. The intent in this dissolution decree provision is clear: the parties intended for spousal maintenance payments to continue for 10 years, until March 5, 2028, instead of ending upon remarriage or death.
The dissolution decree is not ambiguous; rather, the language in the dissolution decree is clear and is subject to only one meaning. Because we can ascertain the parties' intent from the actual words in their agreement, Tyner's subjective intent is irrelevant. Any extrinsic evidence of Tyner's intent cannot be used to delete or contradict the provision expressly providing that spousal maintenance payments will continue for 10 years instead of ending upon Blackhurst's remarriage. Therefore, the dissolution decree shows the parties agreed that spousal maintenance would survive Blackhurst's remarriage.[2]
Parties to a dissolution are presumed to incorporate the existing statutes into the dissolution decree unless they "expressly declare their mutual intention to so exclude." In re Marriage of Briscoe, 134 Wn.2d 344, 348, 949 P.2d 1388, 971 P.2d 500 (1998). This express agreement must be a "'clear manifestation of intent.'" Id. (quoting Wagner v Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 99, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980)). The agreement must be "'directly and distinctly stated or expressed rather than implied or left to inference.'" Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Allen, 78 Wn.App. 672, 678, 898 P.2d 1390 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
Tyner relies on Allen, 78 Wn.App. 672, to support his argument that the spousal maintenance provision misstates the law...
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