Young v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.
| Decision Date | 24 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 97576-1,97576-1 |
| Citation | 472 P.3d 990,196 Wash.2d 310 |
| Parties | Duane YOUNG, an individual, and all those similarly situated, Petitioner, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., a California corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Brian Cameron, Attorney at Law, Kirk David Miller, Kirk D. Miller, P.S., 421 W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 660, Spokane, WA, 99201-0410, for Petitioner.
Michael Mallow, Rachel Straus, Mark D. Campbell, Shook Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3000, Los Angeles, CA, 90067, Weston Dunn, Attorney at Law, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 6800, Seattle, WA, 98104-7066, for Respondent.
Amy Chia-Chi Teng, John Matthew Geyman, Washington Attorney General's Office, 800 Fifth Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Amicus Curiae Attorney General for the State of Washington.
Scott Kinkley, Northwest Justice Project, 1702 W. Broadway Ave., Spokane, WA, 99201-1818, for Amicus Curiae Northwest Justice Project.
Beth Ellen Terrell, Blythe H. Chandler, Maria Hoisington-Bingham, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, 936 N. 34th St. Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98103-8869, for Amicus Curiae Northwest Consumer Law Center.
Valerie Davis McOmie, Attorney at Law, 4549 Nw Aspen St., Camas, WA, 98607-8302, Daniel Edward Huntington, Richter-Wimberley PS, 422 W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 1300, Spokane, WA, 99201-0305, for Amicus Curiae Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.
¶ 1 "Buyer beware" is not the law in the State of Washington. Instead, our Consumer Protection Act (CPA) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce. RCW 19.86.020. To prevail on a private CPA claim, a plaintiff must establish five elements, the first of which is "an unfair or deceptive act or practice." Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. , 166 Wash.2d 27, 37, 204 P.3d 885 (2009) (citing Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. , 105 Wash.2d 778, 784, 719 P.2d 531 (1986) ). Over the years, some authorities have concluded that to prove this first element, the plaintiff necessarily has to prove that the unfair or deceptive act or practice was material in some way. That conclusion mistakes the sufficient for the necessary. While materiality might be relevant as a matter of fact in some cases, it is not categorically required as a matter of law in all.1
¶ 2 After a long search for his ideal vehicle, Duane Young bought a new 2014 Toyota Tacoma pickup truck with a limited package of additional features from a dealership in Burlington, Washington. Young paid about $36,000 for the truck. At the time Young was researching his purchase, the Toyota website, Toyota's advertising, and the Monroney label2 for the 2014 Toyota Tacoma with the limited package incorrectly asserted that the vehicle had an outside temperature display on the rearview mirror along with some other displays. Some of the displays had been moved to the dashboard, but the outside temperature display was no longer available.
¶ 3 A Toyota Tacoma truck with the colors and features Young wanted was not available in Eugene, Oregon, where he lived. Young called dealerships in Washington and Oregon until he found what he wanted in Burlington. He negotiated the purchase over the phone, paid a deposit, and, on October 30, 2013, flew to Burlington to pick up his truck.
¶ 4 Shortly before Young flew to Burlington, Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. (Toyota) realized that its advertising was incorrect and that some 2014 Toyota Tacoma trucks had been shipped with an incorrect Monroney label. On October 22, 2013, the company notified its regional representatives of the error, and the next day made new Monroney labels available to be printed. By the end of the month, Toyota had updated its online advertising. The price of the vehicle did not change. Before the error was corrected, 147 vehicles, including three in Washington State, were sold with the representation that they had the enhanced rearview mirror with the temperature display when they did not.
¶ 5 After realizing its mistake, Toyota offered $100 compensation to each consumer who had purchased a truck without the advertised feature. This was ten times the cost to Toyota of installing the outside temperature gauge during manufacturing. Young declined that offer and several others, including an offer to replace the display with aftermarket equipment.
¶ 6 After the parties were unable to negotiate a satisfactory resolution, Young brought a CPA suit against Toyota, along with other claims that are not before us. The case went to a two-day bench trial. The trial judge returned a defense verdict. The judge found that Young had failed to prove the first element of his CPA claim because he had not shown Toyota's false statements of fact about the vehicle had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. The judge also found, among other things, that Young had failed to prove public interest; causation; injury; or that Toyota had violated the automobile dealers practices act, ch. 46.70 RCW.
¶ 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed by divided opinion. Young v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. , 9 Wash. App. 2d 26, 442 P.3d 5 (2019). Relying in part on federal precedent and administrative opinions interpreting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, the majority below held that to be unfair or deceptive for purposes of the CPA, a misstatement of fact must be material. Id. at 33-35, 442 P.3d 5 (). The Court of Appeals concluded the display, with an estimated value of $10, was financially immaterial to a $36,000 transaction and Young had not established it was material in any other way.
Id. at 35-36, 442 P.3d 5. Judge Fearing joined in result but did not join the majority opinion. Id. at 43, 442 P.3d 5 (Fearing, J., concurring). Instead, he wrote separately, noting that no Washington State Supreme Court case had held that to be unfair or deceptive under the CPA, an affirmative misrepresentation of fact must be material. Id. at 40-42, 442 P.3d 5 (Fearing, J., concurring). We granted review.
¶ 8 Under Washington's CPA, "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are ... unlawful." RCW 19.86.020. The legislature has directed that the CPA "be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served." RCW 19.86.920. Both our attorney general and injured plaintiffs may enforce the CPA. RCW 19.86.080, .090. To prevail, a private plaintiff must establish "(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) affecting the public interest, (4) injury to a person's business or property, and (5) causation." Panag , 166 Wash.2d at 37, 204 P.3d 885 (citing Hangman Ridge , 105 Wash.2d at 784, 719 P.2d 531 ). "[A] claim under the Washington CPA may be predicated upon a per se violation of statute, an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive substantial portions of the public, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest." Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank , 176 Wash.2d 771, 787, 295 P.3d 1179 (2013).
¶ 9 We will sustain findings of fact if substantial evidence supports them.
Soltero v. Wimer , 159 Wash.2d 428, 433, 150 P.3d 552 (2007) (citing Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue , 120 Wash.2d 935, 942, 845 P.2d 1331 (1993) ). The unchallenged findings here are verities on appeal. See Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay St. Assocs., LLC , 176 Wash.2d 662, 675, 295 P.3d 231 (2013) (citing Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. , 94 Wash.2d 119, 123, 615 P.2d 1279 (1980) ). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC , 177 Wash.2d 94, 104, 297 P.3d 677 (2013) (citing Dreiling v. Jain , 151 Wash.2d 900, 908, 93 P.3d 861 (2004) ).
¶ 10 Where, as here, the relevant operative facts are undisputed, whether that act or practice is "unfair or deceptive" is a question of law. See Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc. , 131 Wash.2d 133, 150, 930 P.2d 288 (1997). "A plaintiff need not show the act in question was intended to deceive, only that it had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public." Panag , 166 Wash.2d at 47, 204 P.3d 885 (citing Leingang , 131 Wash.2d at 150, 930 P.2d 288 ). "Deception exists ‘if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead’ a reasonable consumer." Id. at 50, 204 P.3d 885 (quoting Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n , 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986) ).
¶ 11 To satisfy the first element of a CPA claim, a plaintiff need not show that they—or anyone—was in fact deceived. Panag , 166 Wash.2d at 47, 204 P.3d 885 ; Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc. , 162 Wash.2d 59, 74-75, 170 P.3d 10 (2007). Instead, the plaintiff must establish that the unfair or deceptive act or practice had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. Panag , 166 Wash.2d at 47, 204 P.3d 885 (citing Leingang , 131 Wash.2d at 150, 930 P.2d 288 ). This is consistent with the foundational case, Hangman Ridge , where we observed that "[t]he purpose of the capacity-to-deceive test is to deter deceptive conduct before injury occurs." 105 Wash.2d at 785, 719 P.2d 531 ().
¶ 12 Nor is there a need to prove reliance to establish the first element. State v. Ralph Williams’ N. W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. , 87 Wash.2d 298, 317, 553 P.2d 423 (1976) () (citing Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n , 157 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1946) ); Panag , 166 Wash.2d at 47, 204 P.3d 885 (...
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