In re McKinney
Decision Date | 17 June 2003 |
Docket Number | No. COA02-1307.,COA02-1307. |
Citation | 158 NC App. 441,581 S.E.2d 793 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | In the Matter of Zoe McKINNEY, DOB: 02/28/00. |
Northen Blue Law Firm, by Carol J. Holcomb and Samantha H. Cabe, Chapel Hill, for petitioner-appellee Orange County Dept. of Social Services.
Epting & Hackney, by Karen Davidson, Chapel Hill, for petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Winifred H. Dillon, for respondent-appellant.
Respondent mother (Michelle McKinney) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights in her daughter, Zoe McKinney [hereinafter juvenile]. The factual and procedural history of this case is summarized as follows: The juvenile was born on 28 February 2000. When the juvenile was approximately seven months old, the Orange County Department of Social Services [hereinafter petitioner] filed a petition alleging neglect and dependency and naming both of the juvenile's parents as respondents. The juvenile initially was placed with her maternal grandparents, Thomas and Linda Elliott; however, on 13 November 2000, District Court Judge M. Patricia DeVine entered an order placing temporary custody of the juvenile with petitioner. The case was continued several times during the following six months, and the juvenile's custody remained with petitioner. On 6 March 2001, Judge DeVine entered an order concluding in relevant part that as to respondent, the juvenile was both "a dependent juvenile within the meaning ... of N.C.G.S. [§ ] 7A-517(13)[,]" and a "neglected juvenile[] within the meaning and scope of N.C.G.S. [§ ] 7A-523(21)[.]" The trial court also concluded that custody should remain with petitioner, and ordered that further efforts at reunification be ceased and that petitioner file a petition to terminate parental rights within the following sixty (60) days.
On 29 March 2001 petitioner filed a document captioned "Motion in the Cause." On 26 April 2001 respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's motion, in part on the basis that petitioner's motion failed to seek or request any relief. Respondent's motion was summarily denied on 18 September 2001. On 26 April 2002 Judge Joseph Moody Buckner entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights in the juvenile. From this order, respondent appeals and asserts errors not associated with subject matter jurisdiction. Because we determine that petitioner's "Motion in the Cause" was insufficient to constitute a petition for termination of parental rights, and thus did not confer jurisdiction on the trial court, the order terminating respondent's parental rights must be vacated.
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 143 N.C.App. 688, 693, 547 S.E.2d 127, 130 (citing 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11, at 108 (1982)), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 217, 554 S.E.2d 338 (2001). Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C.App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (citing W. Shuford, N.C. Civil Practice and Procedure § 12-6 (1981)). Moreover, a court's inherent authority does not allow it to act where it would otherwise lack jurisdiction. "Courts have the inherent power to do only those things which are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. In re Transportation of Juveniles, 102 N.C.App. 806, 808, 403 S.E.2d 557, 559 (1991)
(citing 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 78 (1965)). "[T]he inherent powers of a court do not increase its jurisdiction but are limited to such powers as are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction." Hopkins v. Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 619-20, 27 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1943).
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 2 (2001), provides in relevant part that: "There shall be in this State but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action." Under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 3 (2001), "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Accordingly, jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence of a valid motion, complaint, petition, or other valid pleading:
A court cannot undertake to adjudicate a controversy on its own motion; rather, it can adjudicate a controversy only when a party presents the controversy to it, and then, only if it is presented in the form of a proper pleading. Thus, before a court may act there must be some appropriate application invoking the judicial power of the court with respect to the matter in question.
In re Transportation of Juveniles, 102 N.C.App. at 808, 403 S.E.2d at 558-559 (emphasis added) (where "no action or proceeding had been commenced ... the district court was without jurisdiction to enter an order") (citing 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 94 (1965)). Similarly, in Freight Carriers v. Teamsters Local, 11 N.C.App. 159, 162, 180 S.E.2d 461, 463, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971), the appellee filed a document that "did not purport to be a complaint and cannot be held to be one[,] ... [and which] was not properly captioned as required by Rule 10(a)[, and in which] ... there was no demand for relief made in the document as required by Rule 8(a)(2)[.]" This Court held that "no complaint had been filed by plaintiff" and thus "the [court] never acquired jurisdiction[.]" Id. at 160-61, 180 S.E.2d at 463. To be valid, a pleading or motion must include a request or demand for the relief sought, or for the order the party desires the trial court to enter:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial or at a session at which a cause is on the calendar for that session, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1) (2001) (emphasis added). See Farm Lines, Inc. v. McBrayer, 35 N.C.App. 34, 40, 241 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1978)
(. )
The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings for termination of parental rights:
353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 809 (2001) () (citing In re Bullabough, 89 N.C.App. at 179, 365 S.E.2d at 646).
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-200(a)(4) (2001), the district court has "exclusive, original jurisdiction over ... [p]roceedings to terminate parental rights." The district court has "exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any petition or motion relating to termination of parental rights[.]" N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2001) (emphasis added). However, in the absence of a proper petition, the trial court has no jurisdiction to enter an order for termination of parental rights. See In re Ivey, ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 576 S.E.2d 386, 389
(2003) ("trial court erred in [entering order for non-secure custody] ... where no petition had been filed and the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the child"); In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C.App. 285, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993) ( ).
In the present case, an examination of petitioner's motion reveals that it nowhere asks for the termination of respondent's parental rights. The document is captioned generally as a "Motion in the Cause"; thus, its title does not state the relief desired. Below the caption is stated, "NOW COMES
[PETITIONER] BY AND THROUGH THEIR UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL WHO RESPECTFULLY PRAYS THE COURT AS FOLLOWS[.]" Thereafter petitioner sets out seven paragraphs containing factual allegations as follows:
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