In re Meippen

• Decision Date: 09 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 95394-5,95394-5
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of: Time Rikat MEIPPEN, Petitioner.

193 Wash.2d 310

440 P.3d 978

In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of: Time Rikat MEIPPEN, Petitioner.

No. 95394-5

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued November 15, 2018

Filed: MAY 09, 2019

Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-1683, for Petitioner.

Amy R. Meckling, Ann Marie Summers, King County Prosecutor’s Office, 516 3rd Avenue, Suite W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2390, for Respondent.

Eric Riley Nusser, Terrell Marshall Law Group, 936 N. 34th Street, Suite 300, Seattle, WA 98103-8869, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, 901 5th Avenue, Suite 630, Seattle, WA 98164-2086, Vanessa Torres Hernandez, Northwest Justice Project, 401 2nd Avenue S., Suite 407, Seattle, WA 98104-3811, for Amicus Curiae (American Civil Liberties Union of Washington).

Teymur Gasanovich Askerov, Black Law PLLC, 705 2nd Avenue, Suite 1111, Seattle, WA 98104-1720, Rita Joan Griffith, Attorney at Law, 4616 25th Avenue NE, PMB 453, Seattle, WA 98105-4523, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 Time Rikat Meippen was a juvenile when he was convicted in adult court of first degree assault, first degree robbery, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Meippen to the top of the standard sentencing range and imposed a firearm sentence enhancement. Several years after Meippen’s sentencing, this court decided State v. Houston-Sconiers .¹ In Houston-Sconiers , this court held that when sentencing a juvenile in adult court, a trial court has absolute discretion to depart from the standard sentencing ranges and mandatory sentence enhancements prescribed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW. 188 Wash.2d at 9, 391 P.3d 409. Meippen subsequently filed an untimely personal restraint petition (PRP), arguing that Houston-Sconiers constitutes a significant and material change in the law that should apply retroactively.

¶ 2 Even assuming Meippen can show that Houston-Sconiers is a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively, we hold that he is not entitled to collateral relief because he does not demonstrate that any error actually and substantially prejudiced him. Meippen does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would have been shorter if the trial court had absolute discretion to depart from the SRA at the time of sentencing. The trial court had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence under the SRA at the time and instead sentenced Meippen at the top of the standard sentencing range. Accordingly, Meippen cannot make a threshold showing of actual and substantial prejudice, and we dismiss his PRP. Thus, we decline to consider whether Houston-Sconiers is a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, and we save the question for another day.

FACTS

¶ 3 In 2006, Meippen robbed a tobacco store and shot the store clerk in the head, inflicting nonlethal injuries. Meippen was 16 years old. Meippen was automatically transferred to adult court, where a jury convicted him of first degree assault and first degree robbery, plus one firearm enhancement. See former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) (2005). Meippen was also convicted of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm in a concurrent bench trial.

¶ 4 At sentencing, Meippen’s counsel recommended that Meippen receive a bottom-end standard range sentence. Meippen’s counsel argued that Meippen was too young to appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions and that he "lack[ed] an understanding ... of the seriousness of the situation he involved himself in." State’s Resp. to PRP, App. at 27-28. Meippen’s counsel also noted that Meippen was "very immature in his thought processes and beliefs" and opined that due to Meippen’s age, a lengthy prison sentence would be especially difficult. Id. at 27; see id. at 28. The trial court rejected counsel’s recommendation, stating, "I find [Meippen’s] behavior cold, calculated, and it showed complete indifference towards another human being." Order Transferring Mot. for Relief from J. to Court of Appeals, State v. Meippen , No. 06-1-05905-7-SEA, App. A at 17 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2017). The court imposed a top-end standard range sentence of 231 months in confinement, including a 60-month firearm sentence enhancement. Meippen appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentence and issued its mandate in 2009. State v. Meippen , noted at 149 Wash. App. 1014, 2009 WL 597290 (2009).

¶ 5 Nearly eight years after Meippen’s judgment and sentence became final, this court decided Houston-Sconiers . In Houston-Sconiers , this court noted that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires courts to recognize that "children are different." 188 Wash.2d at 18, 391 P.3d 409. This court reasoned that because children are different, the Eighth Amendment mandates that trial courts have absolute discretion to impose sentences below the SRA standard sentencing ranges and mandatory sentence enhancements when sentencing a juvenile in adult court. Id. at 9, 391 P.3d 409. This court further held that to comply with the Eighth Amendment’s mandate, trial courts must have complete discretion to consider the mitigating qualities associated with youth at sentencing. Id. at 21, 391 P.3d 409. These mitigating qualities include a juvenile defendant’s age, immaturity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. Id. at 23, 391 P.3d 409.

¶ 6 In 2017, Meippen filed a pro se motion for relief from judgment, requesting a new sentencing hearing. The trial court transferred Meippen’s untimely motion to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a PRP. Soon after, Meippen filed an amended PRP, arguing that his petition was timely because Houston-Sconiers represents a significant and material change in the law that should apply retroactively to his sentence. The Court of Appeals transferred Meippen’s amended PRP to this court as a successive petition that raised new grounds. This court retained the petition for consideration on the merits.

ISSUE

¶ 7 Does Meippen demonstrate that the trial court’s alleged sentencing error actually and substantially prejudiced him such that this court will consider whether Houston-Sconiers is a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review?

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Meippen argues that the one-year time bar does not apply to his PRP because Houston-Sconiers constitutes a significant and material change in the law that should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. We hold that Meippen fails to demonstrate that the trial court actually and substantially prejudiced him because he does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would have been shorter if the trial court had absolute discretion to depart from the SRA at the time of his sentencing. Because Meippen does not meet his threshold burden of showing actual and substantial prejudice, we must dismiss his petition. Accordingly, we decline to consider whether Houston-Sconiers is a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively.

¶ 9 A petitioner is generally barred from filing a PRP "more than one year after [his] judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." RCW 10.73.090(1). A petitioner can overcome the one-year time bar if he can identify (1) a significant change in the law, (2) that is material to his conviction or sentence, and (3) that applies retroactively. RCW 10.73.100(6) ; State v. Miller , 185 Wash.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016). However, a petitioner must show not only error but also a threshold showing of harm to obtain relief on a PRP. In re Pers. Restraint of McNeil , 181 Wash.2d 582, 589, 334 P.3d 548 (2014) ; see State v. Buckman , 190 Wash.2d 51, 65, 409 P.3d 193 (2018). "These threshold requirements are justified by the court’s interest in finality, economy, and integrity of the trial process and by the fact that the petitioner has already had an opportunity for judicial review." In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore , 151 Wash.2d 294, 298, 88 P.3d 390 (2004).

¶ 10 A petitioner alleging constitutional error has the threshold, prima facie burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the alleged error. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis , 152 Wash.2d 647, 671-72, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). In doing so, the petitioner " ‘must shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice,’ " but that the outcome would more likely than not have been different had the alleged error not occurred. In re Pers. Restraint of Hagler , 97 Wash.2d 818, 825, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982) (quoting United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed. 2d 816 (1982) ); see Buckman , 190 Wash.2d at 60, 409 P.3d 193. If the petitioner fails to make the threshold, prima facie showing of actual and substantial prejudice, we must dismiss his PRP. In re Pers. Restraint of Yates , 177 Wash.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013) ; see In re Pers. Restraint of Khan , 184 Wash.2d 679, 686, 363 P.3d 577 (2015) (plurality opinion) (stating that a PRP may be dismissed without addressing a debatable legal issue that was properly raised).

¶ 11 Meippen contends that Houston-Sconiers renders his sentence unconstitutional. Because Meippen alleges a constitutional error, he must show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged error to obtain collateral relief. Meippen fails to meet this threshold, prima facie burden for the following reasons.

¶ 12 To begin with, Meippen does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would have been shorter if Houston-Sconiers was a significant, material change in the law that applied retroactively. At...