IN RE MESSER
Decision Date | 14 December 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 2913.,2913. |
Citation | 333 S.C. 391,509 S.E.2d 486 |
Parties | Ex parte Petition of Patricia Houston MESSER. In re John A. Messer, III, Respondent, v. Patricia Houston Messer, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
J.D. Todd, Jr., and William B. Swent, both of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, of Greenville, for appellant.
Randolph W. Hunter and Margaret Sheehan Plummer, both of Randolph W. Hunter Law Firm, of Greenville, for respondent.
Patricia Houston Messer appeals from a family court order dismissing her petition and rule to show cause for contempt on the ground the parties had previously agreed to arbitrate all disputes connected with their separation agreement. We reverse.
These parties were formerly husband and wife, having been divorced in September of 1983. Prior to their divorce, the parties entered into a separation agreement, which, inter alia, provided for Wife's support.1 Paragraph seventeen of the agreement stated:
Any dispute or misunderstanding arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be arbitrated. Accept [sic] as otherwise below provided, the arbitration shall be had pursuant to Section 15-47-10 through Section 15-47-30 of the Code of Laws of the State of South Carolina, 1976 as amended. The parties intend that such decision of the arbitrators shall be final and Section 15-47-40 and Section 15-47-50 of the Code of Laws of the State of South Carolina shall have no effect and there shall be no right of appeal.
In the parties' divorce decree, dated September 14, 1983, the family court judge approved the agreement and made it a part of the decree.
By petition dated August 15, 1997, Wife alleged Husband had refused to make alimony payments as provided in paragraph four of the separation agreement and sought to hold him in contempt. In his reply, Husband asserted that, pursuant to paragraph seventeen of the agreement, this dispute should be submitted to arbitration. Thereafter, Husband filed a motion to dismiss the action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
At the hearing on Husband's motion to dismiss, counsel for Wife asserted the arbitration provision contained in the separation agreement was unenforceable because it did not comply with South Carolina Code section 15-48-10(a). The family court judge ruled that because the separation agreement had been approved and made an order of the court, the provision with respect to arbitration was no longer part of a contract subject to section 15-48-10(a), but was binding as a court order. Accordingly, the family court judge granted Husband's motion to dismiss, finding that any dispute must be resolved by arbitration.
Subsection (b) goes on to exclude certain types of claims from the Uniform Arbitration Act, including workers' compensation claims, unemployment compensation claims, and collective bargaining disputes between employers and employees. Also excluded are lawyer-client and doctor-patient agreements, personal injury claims, and claims based on insurance or annuity contracts. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b).
In Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu—Way Env., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that section 15-48-10 must be strictly construed by the courts. "The terms of the statute are clear; therefore, the court must apply those terms according to their literal meaning." Id. at 457, 476 S.E.2d at 151; see Osteen v. T.E. Cuttino Constr. Co., 315 S.C. 422, 424, 434 S.E.2d 281, 282-83 (1993)
; Timms v. Greene, 310 S.C. 469, 472-73, 427 S.E.2d 642, 643-44 (1993); Circle S. Enters., Inc. v. Stanley Smith & Sons, 288 S.C. 428, 429 n. 1, 343 S.E.2d 45, 46 n. 1 (Ct.App.1986).
Prior to 1983, the law in South Carolina was unclear as to what specific words were necessary to render a separation agreement enforceable in the family court. In Kelly v. Edwards, 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981), the supreme court held that an agreement incorporated but not merged in a divorce decree was enforceable only as a contract and that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce it. Thereafter, in Brooks v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 322, 326, 286 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1982), the supreme court concluded the family court properly held a party in contempt for violating a separation agreement that was not merged in the final decree. See also Bryant v. Varat, 278 S.C. 77, 292 S.E.2d 298 (1982)
(. )
In 1983, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that words of art were no longer controlling on whether the family court had jurisdiction to enforce a separation agreement that had been approved by the family court. Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 353, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983). The court held: Id.
Moseley makes it clear that except for matters relating to children, over which the family court retains jurisdiction to do whatever is in their best interest, parties to a separation agreement may "contract out of any continuing judicial supervision of their relationship by the court." Id. Moreover, it specifically provides that the parties "may agree to any terms they wish as long as the court deems the contract to have been entered fairly, voluntarily and reasonably." Id. Therefore, parties to a separation agreement may agree to submit all disputes, other than those involving their children, to arbitration and thus deprive the family court of its traditional powers of enforcement over those disputes.
Although the agreement here was executed prior to Moseley, it was approved by the family court shortly after issuance of the opinion. Thus, the agreement became a part of the decree. Id.
On appeal, Wife argues the family court judge erred in holding that the parties are bound by an arbitration clause that does not comply with the provisions of South Carolina Code section 15-48-10(a). We agree.
It is undisputed that paragraph seventeen of this...
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...agreement may ‘contract out of any continuing judicial supervision of their relationship by the court.’ " Ex Parte Messer , 333 S.C. 391, 395, 509 S.E.2d 486, 487–88 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Moseley , 279 S.C. at 353, 306 S.E.2d at 627 ). "Therefore, parties to a separation......
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