In re Meyer

• Decision Date: 18 November 1913
• Citation: 209 N.Y. 386,103 N.E. 713
• Parties: In re MEYER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

209 N.Y. 386

103 N.E. 713

In re MEYER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 18, 1913.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Application of Nicholas Meyer, as executor of Mary R. Meyer, deceased, for an order vacating or modifying an assessment of a transfer tax against the estate. From an order of the Appellate Division (156 App. Div. 930,141 N. Y. Supp. 1131) affirming as a matter of law, and not in the exercise of discretion, an order of the Surrogate's Court denying the executor's petition, he appeals. Affirmed, without costs.

William G. Cooke, of New York City, for appellant.

Thomas E. Rush, of New York City, for respondent.

COLLIN, J.

The estate of the testatrix consisted of personal property of an inventoried value less than the expenses of administration, namely, $153.25, and an one-half interest in the equity of redemption in certain mortgaged real estate, which interest in the transfer tax proceedingwas on December 31, 1909, appraised at about $8,000. On July 13, 1911, the Surrogate's Court fixed the transfer tax on certain legacies at $297.08. The real estate was sold September 25, 1912, under the judgment in the action to foreclose the mortgage upon it, for the sum due and unpaid upon the mortgage. The executor has not at any time, therefore, had any money or property with or from which he could pay any of the legacies or the transfer tax. The Tax Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 60, § 236) provides: ‘No executor, administrator or trustee shall be entitled to a final accounting of an estate in settlement of which a tax is due under the provisions of this article unless he shall produce a receipt’ duly issued for the payment of the tax.

[1] The petition alleges as the sole ground for vacating the tax that the appraisal in the transfer tax proceeding was grossly inaccurate; that in fact there was at that time, within the statutory provisions relating to the transfer tax, no transferable property, and consequently no transfer to be taxed. The petition was justly and properly denied under the principles stated in Matter of Lowry, 89 App. Div. 226,85 N. Y. Supp. 924, and Matter of White, 208 N. Y. 64, 101 N. E. 793, and the order appealed from should be affirmed.

The provision of section 236 of the Tax Law, above quoted, is not applicable, however, to the final accounting of the estate in question under the facts presented in the present record. The situation under our consideration is: The appraisal of the estate honestly and legally made and the nature of the bequests required that the transfer tax be fixed at $297.08. It came to pass, within the administration of the estate, without fault or delinquency upon the part of the executor, that the estate yielded a value less than the expenses of its administration. Therefore the executor did not receive or acquire any money or property usable for the payment of the transfer tax. If he is not entitled to a final accounting and discharge from his office unless he shall produce a receipt for the payment of the transfer tax, he must pay it from his individual moneys or property, although he has completely and honestly fulfilled the duties of his executorship. We think the Legislature did not intend or enact such result. It is true that the language of the statute thus declares and seems too plain to call for judicial construction, if we look to that alone. It is a familiar rule that it is not the province of the courts to supervise or revise legislation, and a law plain and certain in its meaning declares itself and is insusceptible of interpretation. It is as binding upon a court as upon every citizen. There must be some uncertainty of sense, else the natural and ordinary meaning of its words must prevail. Uncertainty of sense, however, does not spring along from uncertainty of expression. The legislative intention, if expressed, is the law itself. It is always presumed, in regard to a statute, that no unjust or unreasonable result was intended by the Legislature. Hence if, viewing a statute from the standpoint of the literal sense of its language, it works such a result, an obscurity of meaning exists, calling for judicial construction.

[2] Where a particular application of a statute in accordance with its apparent intention will occasion great inconvenience or produce inequality or injustice, another and more reasonable interpretation is to be sought. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; Murray v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., *43 N. Y. 274; People ex rel. Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 1 N. E. 599;Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421, 14 L. Ed. 755;State ex rel. Heiden v. Ryan, 99 Wis. 123, 74 N. W. 544. The courts must in that event look to the act as a whole, to the subject with which it deals, to the reason and spirit of the enactment, and thereby determine the true legislative intention and purpose; and, if such purpose is reasonably within the scope...