In re A. R. J.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | A22-0708 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. R. J. and B. J. J., Parents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
St Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-JV-17-357
Miles John Ringsred, Duluth Minnesota (for appellant mother A.R.J.)
Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Benjamin M Stromberg, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health & Human Services Department)
Tess V. Jacobson, Duluth, Minnesota (for child L.J.J.)
Joan Mahle, Duluth, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Kirk, Judge. [*]
Appellant-mother A.R.J. challenges the district court's order summarily denying her petition to reestablish parental rights to one of her children following the voluntary termination of her parental rights. She argues that the district court erred because (1) certain provisions of the reestablishment-of-parental-rights statute, Minnesota Statutes section 260C.329 (2020), do not apply in the context of a voluntary termination of parental rights and (2) even if those provisions are applied, she established grounds to reestablish her parental rights, or at least a prima facie case, entitling her to an evidentiary hearing. A.R.J. also argues that the district court erred by denying her request for visitation and that this court should order visitation and contact. We affirm.
In June 2016, respondent St. Louis County Public Health & Human Services Department petitioned the district court to adjudicate as children in need of protection or services (CHIPS) the two children of A.R.J. and father B.J.J. The children, L.J. (born in 2010) and N.J. (born in 2012), were removed from the home, placed in foster care, and later adjudicated CHIPS. After efforts to reunify the family failed, the county petitioned the district court to involuntarily terminate the parental rights (TPR) of both parents. On the first day of trial on January 16, 2018, both parents agreed to voluntarily terminate their parental rights to both children. The parents executed affidavits of consent, which were accepted by the court that day, and the county dismissed its petition for an involuntary TPR.
On January 26, before the district court filed a final TPR order, the parents moved to vacate their consents to the termination. In an affidavit, A.R.J. stated that she and B.J.J. felt "unfairly pressed" into signing the agreement to terminate their parent rights. She said that they were told by their counsel that they did not foresee the trial ending in their favor and that signing a consent to a voluntary TPR "was the only way to have guaranteed contact" with their minor children.
Following a hearing, the district court filed an order denying the parents' motions to vacate their consents to a voluntary TPR. The memorandum accompanying that order stated that (a) the parents' "extremely difficult, painful decision" agreeing to a voluntary TPR "does not rise to the level of duress or coercion, and the Court declines to allow a withdrawal of consent in this case"; (b) the parents' attorneys were "doing their job" when they informed their clients that an involuntary TPR would mean that they had no right to have contact with their minor children but that "a consent to termination" might allow the parents "to set up visits and continue contact"; and (c) the best interests of the children would not be served by permitting withdrawal of the parents' consent.
Soon after denying the motions to vacate, the district court filed orders voluntarily terminating each parent's parental rights to each child. Neither parent appealed.[1]
In March 2022, A.R.J. filed a petition to reestablish parental rights pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.329. Additionally, A.R.J. filed a motion to vacate the TPR order and to compel the county to grant visitation with the children. Following a hearing, the district court concluded that, on its face, the petition to establish parental rights did not satisfy the requirements of section 260C.329 and denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. In the same order, the district court also denied the motion to vacate or to order visitation.
A.R.J. appealed. A special term panel of this court ruled that we lack jurisdiction over A.R.J.'s challenge to the denial of the motion to vacate and dismissed that portion of the appeal.
A.R.J challenges the denial of her petition to reestablish parental rights, arguing that the district court erred in applying certain provisions of the reestablishment-of-parental-rights statute and erred by denying her petition without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant also challenges the district court's denial of her motion to order visitation. We address each of A.R.J.'s arguments in turn.
A.R.J. contends that that the district court erred by applying certain provisions of section 260C.329 for two reasons. First, she argues that those provisions do not apply in the context of a voluntary TPR because doing so would wrongly presume-in conflict with other law-that a parent who voluntarily terminated parental rights is an unfit parent. Second, she argues that applying the provisions specifically in her case violates her due-process rights because there was no factual adjudication on the question of "good cause" to voluntarily terminate parental rights to her children when the TPR order was filed. We address both arguments in turn, but first we describe the relevant statutory framework.
A court may voluntarily or involuntarily terminate parental rights "[i]f, after a hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the conditions set out in section 260C.301 [(2020)] exist." Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2020). One of the conditions in section 260C.301 is that the parent has provided written consent that the parent "for good cause desires to terminate parental rights." Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). Good cause exists under "a variety of circumstances" and does not require a fitness analysis. In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 485-86 (Minn. 1997); In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135-36 (Minn. 2014). A TPR with a parent's consent is a voluntary TPR. Id. The remaining conditions set out in section 260C.301 provide statutory grounds for an involuntary TPR. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b).
After parental rights have been voluntarily or involuntarily terminated, section 260C.329 provides a route for parents to petition to reestablish parental rights. That statute lays out the conditions that must be met to petition for reestablishment of parental rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.329, subd. 3. One condition is that "the parent has corrected the conditions that led to an order terminating parental rights." Id., subd. 3(2). Section 260C.329 also dictates the contents of a parent's petition to reestablish parental rights. Id., subd. 3a. Among other things, the parent must state "what steps the petitioner has taken toward personal rehabilitation since the order terminating parental rights, including treatment, work, or other personal history that demonstrates rehabilitation," id., subd. 3a(a)(6), and "how the petitioner has corrected the conditions that led to the order terminating parental rights for which reunification is sought," id., subd. 3a(a)(7).
A.R.J. asserts that she is a presumptively fit parent following her voluntary TPR. She then relies on that presumption to argue that sections 260C.301 and 260C.329 are in conflict because a voluntary TPR under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(a), carries no presumption of unfitness but section 260C.329, subdivision 3a(a), presumes unfitness by requiring parents to rehabilitate or to correct conditions that led to the TPR. She argues that, to avoid violating her due-process rights, those provisions of section 260C.329 must be interpreted to not apply to her petition because she voluntarily terminated her parental rights.
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo." Cocchiarella v Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing a district court's reading of a statute, the reviewing court first determines whether the statute's language is ambiguous. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017); In re Welfare of Children of A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn.App. 2019). A statute is ambiguous if "its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015); A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. When addressing whether a statute's language is ambiguous, "words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage." Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020); see In re Welfare of Children of S.R.K., 911 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Minn. 2018) (). If the court determines that statutory language is unambiguous, the language's plain meaning controls. Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015); see A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. A.R.J. seeks to create a conflict between sections 260C.301 and 260C.329 by reading a presumption of unfitness into section 260C.329. A.R.J. infers this presumption from the requirement in section 260C.329 that a petitioner demonstrate personal rehabilitation and correction of the conditions that led to the order terminating parental rights. In essence, A.R.J. argues that requiring her to "rehabilit...
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