In re RAB

• Decision Date: 20 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 90345.,90345.
• Citation: 757 N.E.2d 887,197 Ill.2d 358,259 Ill.Dec. 24
• Parties: In re R.A.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. R.A.B., Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

757 N.E.2d 887

197 Ill.2d 358

259 Ill.Dec. 24

In re R.A.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. R.A.B., Appellee).

No. 90345.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 20, 2001.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Joseph E. Birkett, State's Attorney, Wheaton (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Lisa A. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Lawrence M. Bauer, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel), for the People.

Karen L. Daniel, Chicago, Amanda Fuchs and Stephanie Weiner, law students, for appellee.

Justice GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 1998, the State filed a delinquency petition against respondent, R.A.B., as a delinquent minor, alleging he committed two counts of robbery. After a stipulated bench trial, the circuit court of Du Page County adjudicated respondent a violent juvenile offender and committed him to the Department of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday. On appeal, respondent argued that he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-36(d) (West 1996)) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-820 (West 1998)) and that, because the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to an admission, he did not knowingly waive his privilege against self-incrimination. The appellate court agreed that the respondent did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and reversed and remanded. 315 Ill.App.3d 620, 248 Ill.Dec. 471, 734 N.E.2d 179. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315).

BACKGROUND

On June 25, 1998, the State filed a delinquency petition pursuant to section 5-3 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-3 (West 1996)) against the 16-year-old respondent, charging him with two counts of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1996)). The petition alleged that respondent committed robbery when he grabbed $90 from the hand of Nicole Lenz and took the money by use of force and by threatening the imminent use of force. The State also filed motions indicating its intent to prosecute respondent as a violent juvenile offender (705 ILCS 405/5-36 (West 1996)) and under the criminal laws as an adult (705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(a) (West 1996)). Following a transfer hearing, the circuit court denied the State's motion to prosecute respondent as an adult. Thereafter, respondent filed two motions to suppress and a motion to dismiss the State's petition seeking adjudication as a violent juvenile offender. In November 1998, the circuit court denied the respondent's motion to dismiss and set respondent's motions to suppress for hearing on December 4, 1998.

On that date, respondent withdrew the motions to suppress and the following exchange occurred regarding the stipulated bench trial:

"MS. ZAHRIEH [respondent's attorney]: We would be stipulating that if the State put on the witnesses, that the court would find the petitions proven.

MS. ORTON [Assistant State's Attorney]: Your Honor, this is essentially a stipulated bench trial.

THE COURT: Okay, what's the difference between a stipulated bench trial and actual admission to the charge?

MS. ORTON: My understanding, your Honor, is that you, that in order to pursue an appeal regarding the court's ruling on the minor's petition regarding the violent juvenile offender petition by the People, in order to pursue an appeal, that, in fact, minor need to only stipulate or go through a stipulated bench trial, rather than actually admit the petition.

THE COURT: Is that the manner in which you wish to proceed?

MS. ZAHRIEH: Yes, sir."

The State then presented the facts for the stipulation and the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: [Respondent], at this time this is a stipulated bench trial, in that this is the evidence if the case were to proceed forward the State would produce. It does appear to be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the two charges—three charges that have been filed.

* * *

THE COURT: You do, however, have the right to have a formal hearing, where the witnesses were required to appear in the courtroom, then subject them to cross-examination.

And if you proceeded this way, however, the stipulated bench trial, these are the rights you're giving up. The only other trial there will be is what the state's attorney has just elicited, do you understand this?

MINOR RESPONDENT: Yes."

The circuit court explained the possible penalties involved in this case and the respondent stated that he understood. After these statements, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: Bearing everything in mind that I have explained to you, also the possible consequences, is it your agreement to proceed this way on a stipulated bench trial, or, in fact, do you wish to have the witnesses brought into court and proceed to trial?

MINOR RESPONDENT: I'd like to admit, sir.

THE COURT: All right, this is not really in the nature of an admission. You're not admitting to the charges, but what you're doing is not contesting the State's evidence.

MINOR RESPONDENT: I don't want to go to trial.

THE COURT: You actually do not want a trial beyond what has occurred this morning, is that right?

MINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. You're making that decision of your own free will?

MINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, on that basis then I'm going to concur and proceed this morning as a stipulated bench trial. And will then indicate that my findings are the evidence submitted by the state's attorney is sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain * * * the charge of robbery as alleged in case number 98 JD 701. The minor accordingly is found delinquent * * *."

At the December 16, 1998 dispositional hearing, the circuit court committed the respondent to the Department of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday. Respondent filed a motion to reconsider his adjudication as a violent juvenile offender, which the circuit court denied.

The appellate court reversed, holding that respondent did not expressly and understandingly waive his right to a jury trial. 315 Ill.App.3d at 624, 248 Ill.Dec. 471, 734 N.E.2d 179. In remanding for a new trial, the appellate court stated that there was no written jury waiver in the record and the transcripts of the proceedings were devoid of any mention of respondent's right to a trial by jury. 315 Ill. App.3d at 624, 248 Ill.Dec. 471, 734 N.E.2d 179.

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case involves whether respondent knowingly waived his right to a jury trial under the Act. Since the facts are not questioned, the issue is a question of law. Accordingly, our review is de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill.2d 512, 516, 230 Ill.Dec. 204, 693 N.E.2d 333 (1998). We note that respondent raised this issue for the first time in the appellate court. Ordinarily, errors not objected to during trial or raised in the post-trial motion are considered waived. Under Supreme Court Rule 615(a), we will review plain errors affecting substantial rights, even if those errors were not objected to during trial or presented in a post-trial motion. See 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). We will invoke the plain error rule in two limited circumstances: "(1) where the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) when the errors are of such magnitude that defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process." People v. Nieves, 192 Ill.2d 487, 502-03, 249 Ill.Dec. 760, 737 N.E.2d 150 (2000). As this case deals with the knowing waiver of the fundamental right to a jury trial, we will consider this issue under the plain error doctrine. People v. Smith, 106 Ill.2d 327, 333, 88 Ill.Dec. 42, 478 N.E.2d 357 (1985); People v. Taylor, 291 Ill.App.3d 18, 20-21, 225 Ill.Dec. 474, 683 N.E.2d 977 (1997).

Section 5-36(d) of the Act provides that when the State seeks to adjudicate a minor a violent juvenile offender under the Act, a "[t]rial on the petition shall be by jury unless the minor demands, in open court and with advice of counsel, a trial by the court without a jury." 705 ILCS 405/5-36(d) (West 1996). We note that, in a similar fashion, defendants in criminal cases are generally entitled to a trial by jury unless "understandingly waived by defendant in open court." 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1998). Also, in criminal cases, jury waivers are required to be in writing. 725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West 1998). The Juvenile Court Act, however, does not have a similar provision requiring a written waiver. This court has recently noted that "virtually all of the constitutional requirements of a criminal trial have been introduced into juvenile delinquency proceedings * * * includ[ing] the right to adequate notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses." In re A.G., 195 Ill.2d 313, 318, 253 Ill.Dec. 911, 746 N.E.2d 732 (2001). The right to a trial by jury, however, is not an absolute right in juvenile proceedings (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d 67, 46 Ill.Dec. 156, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980)), but rather is only available in a limited number of situations under the Act (see In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d 37, 42, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000) (the Act grants a jury trial to habitual and violent juvenile offenders, but it does not grant such a right to juveniles charged with first degree murder); 705 ILCS 405/5-35(d), 5-36(d) (West 1996)).

To be a valid jury waiver, it must be knowingly and understandingly made. Smith, 106 Ill.2d at 334, 88 Ill.Dec. 42, 478 N.E.2d 357. A determination of whether a jury waiver is valid cannot rest on any precise formula but depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. People v. Frey, 103 Ill.2d 327, 332, 82 Ill.Dec. 661, 469 N.E.2d 195 (1984). A jury waiver may be valid if it is...