In re Richardson

• Decision Date: 13 August 2020
• Docket Number: Case Number: 20-30790-jda
• Citation: 621 B.R. 413
• Parties: IN RE: Kim RICHARDSON, Debtor.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Michigan

621 B.R. 413

IN RE: Kim RICHARDSON, Debtor.

Case Number: 20-30790-jda

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed August 13, 2020

David Ross Ienna, Jaafar Law Group PLLC, Hussein N. Rahal, Terrance A. Hiller, Jr., Dearborn, MI, for Debtor.

Sandra L. O'Connor, Troy, MI, for Trustee

OPINION DENYING TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

Joel D. Applebaum, United States Bankruptcy Judge

Introduction

Debtor, Kim Richardson, seeks to exempt $2,214.71 consisting of cash on hand and in bank accounts under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5451(1)(b) which provides "a debtor in bankruptcy under the bankruptcy code ... may exempt from property of the estate ... (b) provisions and fuel for comfortable subsistence of each householder and his or her family for 6 months." The chapter 7 trustee ("Trustee") objects to the claim of exemption, asserting that Debtor's cash, whether on hand or in bank accounts, does not fall within the meaning of this exemption and must be turned over to the her. For the reasons set forth below, the Trustee's objection is DENIED.

Jurisdiction

This matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).

Factual Background

The facts in this matter are not in dispute. Debtor filed her voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 26, 2020. At the time of filing, Debtor had $32.00 cash on hand, $2,177.71 in a checking account, and $5.00 in a savings account for a total of $2,214.71. Debtor sought to exempt this amount under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5451(1)(b), quoted above. The Trustee objected to Debtor's claim of exemption on the grounds that the "statute does not refer to cash or funds in a bank account, and those assets are not exempt under that statute." [Dkt. No. 19, p.2] Debtor, relying primarily on an unpublished opinion in the case In re Barlow , Case No. 17-48802-MBM (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2017) [Dkt. Nos. 17, 18], argues that "funds in a bank account (and by extension, cash on hand) may be exempt under MCL § 600.5451(1)(b) if such funds are de minimis , and are used by the debtor for food, fuel and other living expenses." [Dkt. No. 20-1, p. 1].

On July 8, 2020, a hearing was held on the Trustee's objection. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and invited, but did not require, the parties to file supplemental briefs. The Trustee filed her supplemental brief on July 24, 2020. [Dkt. No. 28]. Debtor elected to rely on the brief filed in support of her response to the Trustee's objection. [Dkt. No. 20-1]

Legal Analysis

On June 15, 2020, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia , 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020). Although the issue in Bostock bears no resemblance to the issue presented here, the Bostock opinion is nevertheless the Supreme Court's most recent instructions on statutory interpretation and should be applied in this case. See In re Spradlin , 231 B.R. 254, 256 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) ("Michigan law on statutory interpretation is essentially the same as it is under federal law. ‘The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’ ") (internal citations omitted)

According to the Bostock Court, a statute is interpreted "in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment." Bostock , 140 S.Ct. at 1738.

With this in mind, our task is clear. We must determine the ordinary public meaning of Title VII's command that it is "unlawful ... for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. § 2000e-2(a)(1)." To do so, we orient ourselves to the time of the statute's adoption, here 1964, and begin by examining the key statutory terms in turn before assessing their impact on the cases at hand and then confirming our work against this Court's precedents .

Id. at 1738-1739 (emphasis added).

To analyze the ordinary public meaning of the terms at issue in the 1964 statute, the Supreme Court turned to roughly contemporaneous dictionaries, including Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954) and Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1975) . The specific exemption section at issue in this case, however, has a much longer history, dating back to 1846 and possibly before. See Thomas R. Morris, "The History and Future of Michigan Debtor Exemptions ," Michigan Business Law Journal (Summer 2010). Therefore, this Court reviewed dictionaries from that time period including Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), Worcester's A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language (1846), Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856), and De Colange, The American Dictionary of Commerce (1881), among others.

Bostock instructs that this Court's analysis must begin by examining the key statutory terms before applying them to this case and considering the Court's analysis against applicable precedent. In this case, the key statutory terms at issue are "provisions" and "comfortable subsistence." Turning first to the definition of "provisions," Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), defined the word "provision" when used as a noun to mean "(1) The act of providing or making previous preparation. (2) Things provided; preparation; measures taken beforehand, either for security, defense or attack, or for the supply of wants. (3) Stores provided; stock. (4) Victuals; food; provender; all manner of eatables for man and beast. (5) Previous stipulation; terms or agreement made, or measures taken for a future exigency." As a verb, the word "provision" was defined to mean "[t]o supply with victuals or food." In Worcester's A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language (1846), "provision" when used as a noun meant "[a]ct of providing; thing provided; terms settled; care taken; measures taken beforehand; accumulation of stores beforehand; stock collected: -- victuals; food; fare." As a verb, "provision" is simply "to supply with provisions." In the Michigan exemption statute, "provisions" is a noun. Although the most common definition seems to be a stockpile of supplies and victuals, both dictionaries' definitions of the "provision" and "provisions" are broader and include all things provided and all preparations or measures taken beforehand. Notably, nothing in these definitions explicitly excludes cash.

In De Colange's American Dictionary of Commerce (1881), "provisions" is defined narrowly. "Under this term, taken in its most extensive sense, in reference to man, may be comprised all those articles used as food by the inhabitants of this and other countries; but commercially it is understood to comprise only fresh and salted butchers' meat, hams, and bacon, butter and cheese, eggs and a few other articles." While this definition excludes cash, it also excludes paper products, toiletry items and many other items that are ordinarily thought of as provisions. Contrasted with the Webster and Worcester definitions, the De Colange definition demonstrates that the terms "provision" and "provisions" as ordinarily used was elastic and broad, covering everything from the very specific -- "fresh and salted butchers' meat, hams, and bacon, butter and cheese, eggs and a few other articles" -- to the very general -- any "act of providing or making previous preparation. [ ] Things provided; preparation; measures taken beforehand, either for security, defense or attack, or for the supply of wants."

In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856), a specialized legal dictionary presumably consulted by lawyers and legislators at the time, "provision" has two definitions. The first is "property which a drawer of a bill of exchange places in the hands of a drawee ...." The second definition is an "allowance granted by a judge to a party for his support; which is to be paid before there is a definitive judgment. In a civil case, for example, it is an allowance made to a wife who is separated from her husband." This latter definition contemplates a stream of cash payments as an allowance or form of spousal support.

If this were the end of the inquiry, the Trustee's more restrictive view of the word "provisions" as excluding cash would likely be the more plausible one. However, the question isn't simply the definition of the word "provisions," but what the statute "says about it." Bostock , 140 S.Ct. at 1739 ("Still, that's just the starting point. The question isn't just what "sex" meant, but what Title VII says about it.") Under either Michigan or federal law, statutory construction is a holistic endeavor requiring a court to give meaning to all words in the statute under consideration. United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988) ; In re Spradlin , 231 B.R. at 257 (compiling Michigan cases). Here, in addition to "provisions," the Court must also consider the term "comfortable subsistence." Even using the contemporary dictionary relied upon by the Trustee, the word "comfortable" means "1.a: affording or enjoying contentment and security; b: affording or enjoying physical comfort; 2.a: free from vexation or doubt; b: free from stress or tension." Merriam-Webster.com . The word "subsistence" is even more revealing. In Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), subsistence is defined as "competent provisions; means of supporting life; that which supplies the means of living; as money, pay or wages ." (emphasis added). Similarly, in Worcester's A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language (1846), subsistence is...