In re S.B.G.

• Decision Date: 24 October 2022
• Docket Number: A22-0589
• Citation: 981 N.W.2d 224
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the WELFARE OF the CHILD OF: S.B.G., Parent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

981 N.W.2d 224

In the MATTER OF the WELFARE OF the CHILD OF: S.B.G., Parent.

A22-0589

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed October 24, 2022

Granted December 2, 2022

Travis J. Smith, Kayla M. Johnson, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant-father S.B.G.)

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota (for respondent Nobles County Community Service Agency)

Aaron M. Kinser, Kinser Law Office, P.L.L.C., Worthington, Minnesota (for respondent-mother I.Q.)

Carma Nordahl, Sheldon, Iowa (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Tracy M. Smith, Judge.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge S.B.G.’s parental rights to a child were terminated because he is required to register as a predatory offender. S.B.G. argues that the district court erred by misinterpreting the statutes that authorize termination of parental rights based on a requirement to register as a predatory offender. We conclude that the district court properly interpreted the applicable statutes. We also conclude that the district court did not err by finding that the petitioning county was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify S.B.G. with the child or by concluding that termination is in the child's best interests. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

In November 2019, the state filed a criminal complaint against S.B.G. in Nobles County alleging, among other charges, five violations of Minnesota Statutes section 609.352, subdivision 2a (2018), which prohibits an adult from using a variety of means of electronic communication to commit certain acts toward a child "with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person." The state alleged one count under paragraph (1), which prohibits the act of soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct; two counts under paragraph (2), which prohibits the act of engaging in electronic communication with a child "relating to or describing sexual conduct"; and two counts under paragraph (3), which prohibits the act of electronically distributing to a child a communication or a photographic or video image that relates to or describes sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1)-(3).

In December 2020, S.B.G. pleaded guilty to one of the five counts: a count alleging a violation of paragraph (3). S.B.G. admitted that, on or about August 7, 2019, when he was 20 years old, he engaged in electronic communications with a 15-year-old girl in which he described sexual acts. In December 2020, the district court imposed an executed sentence of 36 months of imprisonment. Pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, the district court dismissed all other charges.

Three months later, in March 2021, I.Q. gave birth to a child, H.Q. Nobles County petitioned the district court to adjudicate H.Q. as a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The county then sought to determine the biological father of the child. S.B.G. provided a DNA sample, analysis of which indicated a 99.9999 percent probability that he is the biological father of H.Q.

In December 2021, the county petitioned the district court to terminate S.B.G.’s parental rights to H.Q. on a single statutory ground: Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(9), which authorizes the termination of parental rights if a parent has been convicted of any one of certain specified crimes. The matter was tried to the district court on one day in March 2022. The county called two witnesses: the social worker who was assigned to I.Q. during the CHIPS proceedings and the guardian ad litem. The county also introduced eleven documentary exhibits, including eight exhibits relating to S.B.G.’s prior criminal proceedings. S.B.G. called his mother as a witness and testified on his own behalf.

In April 2022, the district court filed a five-page order in which it made findings of fact and concluded that the county had established the alleged statutory ground for termination and that termination would be in H.Q.’s best interests. Accordingly, the district court ordered the termination of S.B.G.’s parental rights to H.Q.

S.B.G. appeals. In his principal brief, he argues that the district court erred for three reasons. In his reply brief, he argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over this termination-of-parental-rights case even though S.B.G. had not been formally adjudicated as a parent of H.Q.?

II. Did the district court err by interpreting Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(9) (2020), and section 260.012(g) (2020), to require a prior conviction of any offense that requires registration as a predatory offender, but not to require a prior conviction of one of the offenses expressly and specifically enumerated in Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a) or (b) (2020)?

III. Did the district court err by not considering whether the county made reasonable efforts to reunify H.Q. with S.B.G.?

IV. Did the district court err by concluding that termination of S.B.G.’s parental rights is in H.Q.’s best interests?

ANALYSIS

I.

We begin by considering S.B.G.’s argument that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case on the ground that there is "no legally recognized parent-and-child relationship" between him and H.Q. He notes that he and I.Q. never have been married, that he did not sign the child's birth certificate, and that he did not sign a recognition or declaration of parentage. He asserts that, without a formal adjudication of a parent-child relationship, a district court necessarily lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case in which a petitioner seeks to terminate parental rights.

The concept of subject-matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's authority ‘to hear and determine a particular class of actions and the particular questions’ presented to the court for its decision." Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc. , 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Robinette v. Price , 214 Minn. 521, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1943) ). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction "depends on the scope of the constitutional and statutory grant of authority to the court." McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights , 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016). A party may raise a question about subject-matter jurisdiction "at any time." Dead Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Otter Tail County , 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn. 2005).

The relevant constitutional provision states, "The district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases." Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3. The jurisdictional statute governing termination of parental rights provides, "The juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning ... the termination of parental rights to a child ...." Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 2(1) (2020). Similarly, a rule of court provides, "The juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings described in Minn. Stat. § 260C.101." Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 24.01, subd. 2 ; see also McCullough , 883 N.W.2d at 585 (stating that "court rules can also define subject-matter jurisdiction"). In most counties, including Nobles County, the district court is authorized to exercise the jurisdictional authority of the juvenile court. See Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(5) (2020) ; see also Minn. Const. art. VI, § 11 ; Minn. Stat. §§ 260.019, subd. 1, 260.021, subd. 4, 484.011 (2020).

These provisions of law make clear that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, which is among the class of cases known as termination-of-parental-rights cases. We do not doubt that an absence of parentage may be dispositive of the merits of a termination-of-parental-rights case. If a party raises an issue in the district court concerning the existence or non-existence of a party's parentage, that issue may need to be determined. But an alleged absence of parentage does not defeat a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction over a termination-of-parental-rights case. In fact, a district court is authorized by statute "to treat a person determined to be the biological father of a child by a positive test as if the individual were a presumed father under section 257.55." Minn. Stat. § 260C.150, subd. 2 (2020). In addition, a district court is authorized to establish a party's parentage "according to the requirements of section 257.54," which is a provision in the Minnesota Parentage Act. Id. , subd. 1 ; see also Minn. Stat. § 257.51 -.74 (2020). These statutory provisions confirm that a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case in which a petitioner seeks to terminate a biological father's parental rights even if the biological father's parentage has not been formally adjudicated.

Thus, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.

II.

S.B.G.’s primary argument is that the district court erred by concluding that the county proved that his parental rights may be terminated pursuant to section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(9).

A.

We begin by identifying the relevant statutory provisions. "The juvenile court may upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent to a child ... if it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist: ...." Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1, 1(b). The statute identifies nine conditions that may justify the involuntary termination of parental rights. See id. , subd. 1(b). In this case, the county relied on the ninth condition: "the parent has been convicted of a crime listed in section 260.012, paragraph (g), clauses (1) to (5)." Id. , subd. 1(b)(9).

Section 260.012 (the statute referenced in section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(9) ) generally provides that, when a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a child who is alleged to be in need of protection or services, "the court shall ensure that reasonable efforts ... by the social services agency are made to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal and to reunite...