In re A.S.M.R.

• Decision Date: 20 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 379A19,379A19
• Citation: 850 S.E.2d 319,375 N.C. 539
• Parties: In the MATTER OF: A.S.M.R. and M.C.R.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

375 N.C. 539

850 S.E.2d 319

In the MATTER OF: A.S.M.R. and M.C.R.

No. 379A19

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed November 20, 2020

Lauren Vaughan and Charles E. Wilson Jr., Shelby, for petitioner-appellee Cleveland County Department of Social Services.

No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Leslie Rawls, Charlotte, for respondent-appellant father.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock, Asheville, for respondent-appellant mother.

DAVIS, Justice.

The issues in this case are whether (1) the existence of non-jurisdictional defects in an unappealed order adjudicating a juvenile to be neglected deprives a department of social services of standing to subsequently move for the termination of parental rights as to that juvenile; and (2) a trial court is required to make explicit findings in an adjudication order that jurisdiction exists under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) where evidence that clearly establishes jurisdiction is present in the record. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of respondents over their two children.

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a termination of parental rights proceeding initiated by petitioner Cleveland County Department of Social Services (DSS) against the respondent parents on the basis of neglect. Respondent-mother is the biological mother of two children—"Anna"¹ born in December 2015 and "Matthew" born in December 2016. Respondent-father is the legal father of Anna² and the biological father of Matthew. DSS first became involved with the family in June 2017 following a domestic violence incident between respondents. DSS found the family to be in need of services to address several issues related to mental health, domestic violence, and parenting, and the case was subsequently transferred for in-home case management. Due to respondents’ failure to make reasonable progress to address these issues, DSS filed a juvenile petition on 1 September 2017 alleging that Anna and Matthew were neglected juveniles and obtained nonsecure custody of the children.

An adjudication hearing took place on 25 October 2017. At this proceeding, respondents waived their right to an evidentiary hearing, stipulated to the admission of the juvenile petition into evidence, and stipulated that the trial court could adjudicate Anna and Matthew to be neglected based on the information contained within the petition. The trial court entered an adjudication order on 2 November 2017 concluding that the children were neglected juveniles. The trial court entered a separate disposition order on 20 November 2017 in which it ordered that the children remain in DSS custody and that respondents address issues relating to domestic violence, substance abuse, parenting skills, and housing.

The trial court held permanency planning review hearings in December 2017, February 2018, May 2018, and July 2018. Following the July 2018 hearing, the trial court changed the children's primary permanent plan to adoption. On 23 October 2018, DSS filed motions to terminate respondents’ parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). Following a hearing on 22 May 2019, the trial court entered an order on 13 June 2019 concluding that both grounds for termination existed. The trial court also determined that it was in the children's best interests for respondents’ parental rights to be terminated. Respondents gave notice of appeal to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1).

Analysis

I. Standing of DSS to Seek Termination of Parental Rights

Respondents’ first argument on appeal is based upon alleged evidentiary errors and insufficient findings in the trial court's 2 November 2017 adjudication order. These alleged errors concern a conclusion of law that was mislabeled as a finding of fact, an invalid stipulation to a conclusion of law, a nonbinding stipulation as to the admission of the juvenile petition into evidence, and insufficient factual findings to support the ultimate determination of neglect. Respondents argue that (1) due to this combination of errors the trial court's adjudication order was invalid and therefore insufficient to legally place custody of the children with DSS; and (2) without a valid order granting DSS custody, DSS consequently lacked standing to move for the termination of respondents’ parental rights. See In re E.X.J. , 191 N.C. App. 34, 39, 662 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2008) ("If DSS does not lawfully have custody of the children, then it lacks standing to file a petition or motion to terminate parental rights, and the trial court, as a result, lacks subject matter jurisdiction."), aff'd per curiam , 363 N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009).

In response, DSS contends that respondents’ assertions of error as to the adjudication order—even if correct—cannot be used to attack the standing of DSS to seek termination of respondents’ parental rights because respondents failed to appeal the adjudication order. DSS asserts that the proper avenue for review of the trial court's adjudication order was an appeal of that order. Because they did not appeal from the 2 November 2017 adjudication order, DSS argues that respondents are now barred from collaterally challenging the validity of that order.

We agree with DSS that respondents are precluded from contesting the validity of the trial court's adjudication order in the present appeal, which is an appeal only of the trial court's subsequent termination order. Respondents have abandoned any challenge to the 2 November 2017 adjudication order by failing to appeal that order. For this reason, they cannot now contest the termination order from which this appeal arises by pointing to non-jurisdictional errors allegedly contained in that prior adjudication order.

As an initial matter, respondents are correct that DSS must have had proper legal custody of the juveniles in order to possess standing to seek the termination of parental rights over the juveniles. "[S]tanding is a ‘necessary prerequisite to a court's proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction ....’ " Willowmere Cmty. Ass'n v. City of Charlotte , 370 N.C. 553, 561, 809 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2018) (quoting Crouse v. Mineo , 189 N.C. App. 232, 236, 658 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2008) ). Our General Assembly has determined that "[a]ny county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction " has standing to file a petition or motion to terminate parental rights. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2019) (emphasis added).

Even assuming, without deciding, that the 2 November 2017 adjudication order actually did contain the errors asserted by respondents, those errors did not affect DSS's standing to ultimately seek termination of respondents’ parental rights. A termination proceeding is separate and distinct from an underlying adjudication proceeding. See In re R.T.W. , 359 N.C. 539, 553, 614 S.E.2d 489, 497 (2005) ("[A] termination order rests on its own merits."), superseded by statute on other grounds , Act of Aug. 23, 2005, S.L. 2005-398, § 12, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455, 1460–61 (amending various provisions of the Juvenile Code).

Although this Court has not previously considered the precise argument raised by respondents in this case, the Court of Appeals addressed this issue over thirty years ago in In re Wheeler , 87 N.C. App. 189, 360 S.E.2d 458 (1987). The respondent-parent in In re Wheeler —whose parental rights had been terminated by the trial court—argued that a fundamental error existed in the trial court's initial order adjudicating the child to be an abused and neglected juvenile because that order failed to recite the standard of proof as required by statute. Id. at 193, 360 S.E.2d 458. The respondent asserted that due to this error "the order was invalid and could neither serve as [p]etitioner's ... authority to file the [termination] petition nor bind the Court in the termination proceeding on the issue of abuse." Id.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the respondent that the trial court's failure to recite the applicable standard of proof constituted error but determined that the respondent had abandoned this argument. Id. at 193–94, 360 S.E.2d at 461. The court explained that

the proper avenues for [r]espondent to attack the adjudication of neglect and abuse and the dispositional order granting custody to [p]etitioner were 1) appeal, ... or 2) a motion for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 1A-1, Rule 60. Although collateral attack in an independent or subsequent action is a permissible means of seeking relief from a judgment or order which is void on its face for lack of jurisdiction, ... the error in this case was not a jurisdictional error subject to that kind of challenge. Because no appeal was taken or other relief sought from the [adjudication] order, it remained a valid final order which was binding in the later proceeding on the facts regarding abuse and neglect which were found to exist at the time it was entered.

Id. at 193–94, 360 S.E.2d at 461 (citations omitted).

In In re O.C. , 171 N.C. App. 457, 615 S.E.2d 391 (2005), the Court of Appeals decided a similar issue. In that case, the respondent-parent argued that a termination order should be reversed due to the trial court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for her for the adjudication proceeding that had taken place nineteen months earlier. Id. at 462, 615 S.E.2d at 394. The Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that even assuming that the trial court had, in fact, erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for the adjudication proceeding, this error did not "bear[ ] [any] legal relationship with the validity of the later order on termination." Id. at 462, 615 S.E.2d at 394–95. The Court of Appeals held that this was so because "[o]nly the order on termination of parental rights is before th[e] Court; the order on...