In re S.M.
Decision Date | 18 March 2022 |
Docket Number | 534A20 |
Citation | 380 N.C. 788,869 S.E.2d 716 |
Parties | In the MATTER OF: S.M. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
The Law Office of Derrick J. Hensley, PLLC, Chapel Hill, by Derrick J. Hensley, for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department of Social Services.
Brendan A. Bailey and Ashley A. Edwards, Charlotte, for Guardian ad Litem.
Kathleen M. Joyce, for respondent-appellant mother.
Benjamin J. Kull, Raleigh, for respondent-appellant father.
¶ 1 Respondents appeal from the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to S.M. (Sarah).1 Respondents assert that the trial court erred in concluding it was in Sarah's best interests to terminate their parental rights. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's order.
¶ 2 On 25 May 2017, Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Sarah, age eight at the time, was neglected. The petition alleged that respondent-father asked Sarah's older half-sister, Ginny, to bathe him, despite being fully capable of bathing himself. The petition further alleged respondent-father had inappropriate sexualized discussions with Ginny, had engaged in "grooming" behaviors with Ginny, and had inappropriately disciplined both Ginny and Sarah by pinching their buttocks. The petition also noted respondent-father's previous sex offense convictions for acts against his two oldest daughters, who were now adults.
¶ 3 Respondents agreed to place Sarah in an approved kinship placement. Between May and November, Sarah moved placements three times. The safety placements reported that Sarah displayed inappropriate sexualized behavior and language. In November 2017, Sarah's final kinship placement informed DSS that she could no longer remain in the home. DSS filed a subsequent petition on 28 November 2017, alleging Sarah to be neglected and dependent. Due to the lack of a safety placement, DSS was granted nonsecure custody of Sarah.
¶ 4 On 15 December 2017, Sarah was adjudicated neglected and dependent. The trial court found she was subjected to inappropriate discipline and exposed to domestic violence in the home; respondent-father "refused to adhere to normal interpersonal boundaries" with Sarah and Ginny; and respondent-mother failed to protect Sarah. The court placed Sarah in the legal custody of DSS.
¶ 5 Following a permanency planning hearing, the trial court entered an order on 6 February 2019 setting Sarah's permanent plan as reunification with an alternative plan of guardianship with a court-approved caretaker. The trial court cited respondents’ failure to acknowledge or remediate the issues that led to Sarah's removal. In a subsequent permanency planning order entered in July 2019, the trial court noted respondents’ continued lack of progress and changed Sarah's permanent plan to adoption with alternative plans of guardianship and reunification. Following a permanency planning hearing on 14 October 2019, the court relieved DSS from further reunification efforts and removed reunification as an alternative permanent plan based on respondents’ continued failure to engage in services or acknowledge the issues that caused Sarah to be removed from the home.
¶ 6 On 15 October 2019, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving Sarah in foster care for more than twelve months without a showing of reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to Sarah's removal. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019).
¶ 7 Following a hearing on 26 and 30 June 2020, the trial court entered an order on 22 September 2020, concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights in Sarah pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). The court also concluded it was in Sarah's best interests that respondents’ parental rights be terminated. Respondents appealed.
¶ 8 Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of parental rights—an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" the existence of one or more grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019). Here, the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence to terminate respondents’ parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2), and neither respondent has challenged this portion of the trial court's ruling. Accordingly, we consider only the dispositional portion of the trial court's order.
¶ 9 At the dispositional hearing, "the court shall determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest." N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).
Id. "Although the trial court must consider each of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), written findings of fact are required only ‘if there is conflicting evidence concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence presented before the district court.’ " In re G.G.M. , 377 N.C. 29, 2021-NCSC-25, ¶22, 855 S.E.2d 478 (quoting In re A.R.A. , 373 N.C. 190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417 (2019) ).
¶ 10 " ‘The trial court's dispositional findings are binding ... if they are supported by any competent evidence’ or if not specifically contested on appeal." In re B.E. , 375 N.C. 730, 745, 851 S.E.2d 307 (2020) (quoting In re E.F. , 375 N.C. 88, 91, 846 S.E.2d 630 (2020) ). The trial court's assessment of a juvenile's best interests is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion. In re D.L.W. , 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162 (2016) (citing In re L.M.T. , 367 N.C. 165, 171, 752 S.E.2d 453 (2013) ; see also In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984) ). "Under this standard, we defer to the trial court's decision unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." In re J.J.B. , 374 N.C. 787, 791, 845 S.E.2d 1 (2020) (cleaned up).
¶ 11 Here, respondents argue that there was insufficient evidence to support many of the trial court's dispositional findings and that the court abused its discretion when it determined that termination of their parental rights was in Sarah's best interests.
¶ 12 The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding the statutory criteria set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) :
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