In re T.R.P., No. 629A05.

• Docket Nº: No. 629A05.
• Citation: 636 S.E.2d 787
• Case Date: November 17, 2006
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

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636 S.E.2d 787 In the Matter of T.R.P. No. 629A05. Supreme Court of North Carolina. November 17, 2006.

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Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 173 N.C.App. 541, 619 S.E.2d 525 (2005), vacating an order entered 16 June 2004 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in District Court, Wilkes County, and dismissing the case. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 March 2006.

Paul W. Freeman, Jr., Wilkesboro, for petitioner-appellant Wilkes County Department of Social Services.

Robert W. Ewing, Winston-Salem, for respondent-appellee mother.

EDMUNDS, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a review order when the juvenile petition that initiated the case was not verified as mandated by N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a). Because we hold that the district court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction here in the absence of the verification, we conclude that the trial court's order was void ab initio. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the custody review order and dismissing the case.

On 22 August 2003, petitioner Wilkes County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging that respondent-mother's daughter, T.R.P., was a neglected juvenile. When the petition was filed, T.R.P. had been living for approximately four months with her maternal aunt, with whom respondent had placed her. The petition alleged that respondent and her boyfriend were manufacturing methamphetamine in respondent's home and that respondent had not cooperated with WCDSS in establishing a safety plan for her children.¹ Although the juvenile petition setting forth these allegations was notarized, it was neither signed nor verified by the Director of WCDSS or any authorized representative thereof.

In an order signed 6 November 2003, the trial court granted temporary legal and physical custody of T.R.P. and her siblings to WCDSS. After several hearings, the trial court on 15 March 2004 signed an order adjudicating T.R.P. and her siblings as neglected and continuing custody of the children with WCDSS. On 24 May 2004, the trial court held a custody review hearing as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906(a). The trial court's resulting order, announced in open court and later filed on 16 June 2004, continued legal custody of T.R.P. with WCDSS and, although the trial court found respondent had "been cooperative with [WCDSS] since the initial adjudication," placed T.R.P. in her father's physical custody when school began, provided he met several specified conditions.

On 3 June 2004, respondent gave written notice of appeal of the custody review order to the Court of Appeals. In her brief to that court, respondent contended for the first time that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the challenged review order because the juvenile petition was not verified as required by law. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals vacated the custody review order and dismissed the case, holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. In re T.R.P., 173 N.C.App. 541, 619 S.E.2d 525 (2005).

On 8 November 2005, petitioner filed notice of appeal with this Court based on the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that because respondent failed to challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction before appealing the custody review order, she is barred from presenting that issue in the instant appeal. Petitioner also argues that under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906, the trial court had jurisdiction to conduct a review hearing that was independent of its jurisdiction to hear the original juvenile petition.

Jurisdiction is "[t]he legal power and authority of a court to make a decision that binds the parties to any matter properly brought before it." Black's Law Dictionary

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856 (7th ed.1999) (defining "judicial jurisdiction"). A court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties to "bring [them] into its adjudicative process." Id. at 857, 619 S.E.2d 525. More importantly for our purposes, the court must also have subject matter jurisdiction, or "[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought," in order to decide a case. Id.; see also Boyles v. Boyles, 308 N.C. 488, 491, 302 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1983) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is "the power to pass on the merits of the case"); 6A Strong's North Carolina Index 4th: Courts § 7 (2000) (discussing generally subject matter jurisdiction). "A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity." Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964). Subject matter jurisdiction is the indispensable foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest, and in its absence a court has no power to act:

A judgment is void, when there is a want of jurisdiction by the court over the subject matter. . . .

"A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. No rights are acquired or divested by it. It neither binds nor bars any one, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless."

Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956) (quoting Stafford v. Gallops, 123 N.C. 19, 21-22, 31 S.E. 265, 266 (1898)).

Our General Assembly "within constitutional limitations, can fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts of this State." Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941). "Where jurisdiction is statutory and the Legislature requires the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the Court to certain limitations, an act of the Court beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction." Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 75, 215 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982). Thus, for certain causes of action created by statute, the requirement that pleadings be signed and verified "is not a matter of form, but substance, and a defect therein is jurisdictional." Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 28, 40 S.E. 822, 822 (1902) (discussing an unverified amendment to a complaint in a divorce action). In such cases, the filing "is not complete or operative" until certified. Alford v. McCormac, 90 N.C. 151, 152-53 (1884); see In re Green, 67 N.C.App. 501, 504, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1984) ("[T]he failure of the petitioner to sign and verify the petition before an official authorized to administer oaths render[s] the petition fatally deficient and inoperative to invoke the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter.").

Abuse, neglect, and dependency actions are statutory in nature and are governed by Chapter 7B of the North Carolina General Statutes (the Juvenile Code). Such actions are typically initiated when the local department of social services (DSS) files a petition making appropriate allegations. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-405 (2005) ("An action is commenced by the filing of a petition. . . ."); see also id. § 7B-401 (2005) ("The pleading in an abuse, neglect, or dependency action is the petition."). The Juvenile Code sets out the specific requirements for a valid juvenile petition: "[T]he petition shall be drawn by the [DSS] director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing." Id. § 7B-403(a) (2005).

Although petitioner and the dissenters argue that requiring a verification to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction elevates form over substance, verification of a juvenile petition is no mere ministerial or procedural act. The dissent cites Alford v. Shaw, a stockholder derivative suit, for the proposition that a failure to verify a complaint is not a jurisdictional defect. Alford v. Shaw, 327 N.C. 526, 398 S.E.2d 445 (1990). However, a shareholder derivative suit "appears to be the only situation where a specific requirement that the pleadings be verified is not considered jurisdictional in nature." State v. Moraitis, 141 N.C.App. 538, 541, 540 S.E.2d 756, 758 (2000) (quoting In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C.App. 285, 288, 426 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1993)). In contrast, a review of the Juvenile Code reveals that, unlike the routine clerical information that must be included in a petition pursuant to

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N.C.G.S. § 7B-402, verification of the petition in an abuse, neglect, or dependency action as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-403 is a vital link in the chain of proceedings carefully designed to protect children at risk on one hand while avoiding undue interference with family rights on the other.

A juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency action under Chapter 7B may be based on an anonymous report, see, e.g., In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 280, 582 S.E.2d 255, 256 (2003), and, however based, frequently results in DSS' immediate interference with a respondent's constitutionally-protected right to parent his or her children. See In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 543, 614 S.E.2d 489, 491 (2005) ("Parents have a fundamental right to the custody, care, and control of their children."), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Aug. 23, 2005, ch. 398, sec. 12, N.C. Sess. Laws 1455, 1460-61; Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 144, 579 S.E.2d 264, 266 (2003) ("[T]he `Due Process Clause . . . protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.' This parental liberty interest `is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests'. . . ." (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56-57 (2000) (plurality))). Accordingly, the relevant statutes require a prompt and thorough assessment of any report of abuse, neglect, or dependency. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7B-302(a) (2005). The gravity of a decision to proceed and the...