In re the Custody of D.T.R.Michael L. Richards

• Decision Date: 04 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. A10–1098.,A10–1098.
• Citation: 796 N.W.2d 509
• Parties: In re the CUSTODY OF D.T.R.Michael L. Richards, Petitioner Below,v.Derek Reiter, Respondent,Lynette A. Marthe, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

796 N.W.2d 509

In re the CUSTODY OF D.T.R.Michael L. Richards, Petitioner Below,

v.Derek Reiter, Respondent,Lynette A. Marthe, Appellant.

No. A10–1098.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 4, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

A biological mother has standing to appeal a district court's determination of paternity of her child as an aggrieved party on the grounds that the determination of paternity directly impacts the mother's responsibility for child support and her rights related to care, custody, and control of the child.

Anne Heimkes Tuttle, Laura Schultz, Tuttle Bergeson, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota, for respondent.David F. Herr, Haley N. Schaffer, Sarah B. Riskin, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

The petitioner below, Michael Richards, brought a petition seeking joint legal custody of and parenting time with D.T.R., and named the mother, appellant Lynette Marthe and her then-husband, respondent Derek Reiter, as parties to the proceeding. The district court adjudicated Reiter as the legal father of D.T.R. and dismissed Richards' petition. Marthe appealed, but Richards did not. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that Marthe lacks standing to appeal. Because we conclude that Marthe is an aggrieved party and has standing to appeal a paternity determination, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

The minor child, D.T.R., was born in May 2004, during the marriage of Marthe and Reiter. At the time, both Marthe and Reiter believed that Reiter was D.T.R.'s biological father. Reiter was listed as the father on D.T.R.'s birth certificate, and has been the father to D.T.R. since his birth. In July of 2008, however, genetic testing established that Richards was D.T.R.'s biological father.

In August 2008 Richards filed a petition for joint legal custody of D.T.R. pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.156 (2010), alleging that he was the father of D.T.R., and that he and Marthe signed a Recognition of Parentage for D.T.R. in July 2008, in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 257.75 (2010). The petition named the mother, Marthe, and her then-husband, Reiter, as parties. Richards requested that the court: (1) determine Reiter's non-paternity of D.T.R., (2) grant permanent joint legal custody to Richards and Marthe and sole physical custody to Marthe, and (3) determine that Richards be required to pay guideline child support to Marthe. Reiter responded to the petition, alleging that he and Marthe signed a Recognition of Parentage for D.T.R. at the time of D.T.R.'s birth and requesting that he be adjudicated the legal father and awarded joint legal and physical custody of D.T.R.

Before trial, the parties stipulated that Richards was the biological father of D.T.R., but could not agree who should be adjudicated the legal father of D.T.R. pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 257.52 (2010). The case proceeded to trial in December 2009. At trial, Richards, Marthe, and Reiter testified. The district court took judicial notice that at the time of the trial, a dissolution action was also pending in Wright County between Marthe and Reiter. The parties stipulated that this case involved competing paternity presumptions under the Minnesota Parentage Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 257.51–.74 (2010), and that the court needed to weigh the competing presumptions and adjudicate paternity.

The Parentage Act provides a statutory framework for determining parentage. Generally, the Parentage Act defines the parent-child relationship, describes certain presumptions of paternity, and sets forth the procedure for bringing an action in district court to determine the father-child relationship, as well as the mother-child relationship. See Minn.Stat. §§ 257.52, .55, .57, .60. Under the Parentage Act, the biological mother or a man presumed or alleged to be the father may bring an action, subject to certain time limits, to determine the existence of the father-child or mother-child relationship. Minn.Stat. § 257.57, subds. 1–2. Moreover, the mother and each man presumed or alleged to be the father are necessary parties in any action to determine the existence of the father-child or mother-child relationship. Minn.Stat. § 257.60.

The presumptions in the Parentage Act applicable to the facts of this case are that (1) a man who is married to a child's mother when the child is born, or who was married to a child's mother within 280 days before the child's birth, is presumed to be the child's biological father pursuant to section 257.55, subdivision 1(a); and (2) under section 257.62, subdivision 5(b), positive blood or genetic results create an “evidentiary presumption” of paternity that may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. When faced with competing presumptions, the court must evaluate the presumptions and “the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.” Minn.Stat. § 257.55, subd. 2.

In April 2010 the district court filed detailed and thorough findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order concluding that a parent-child relationship exists between Reiter and D.T.R., and adjudicated Reiter as D.T.R.'s father. The court concluded that Reiter's presumption of paternity was “founded on the ‘weightier considerations of policy and logic’ ” under section 257.55, subdivision 2, and that Richards had not rebutted that presumption based on clear and convincing evidence. The court found that Reiter had been involved in D.T.R.'s life since D.T.R. was born and D.T.R. knew Reiter as his father. The court's order did not address custody, parenting time, or financial issues.

Marthe appealed the district court's determination of paternity, but Richards did not. The court of appeals questioned Marthe's standing to appeal the dismissal of Richards' petition. After additional briefing on the issue, the court of appeals dismissed Marthe's appeal on the ground that she lacks standing to appeal. In re the Custody of D.T.R., No. A10–1098, Order at *3 (Minn.App. filed Aug. 3, 2010). The court relied on State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680 (1950), to support its decision. D.T.R., Order at *2. Subsequently, we granted review. The only issue before us is whether Marthe has standing to appeal the district court's adjudication of paternity.

I.

To answer the question presented, we first examine the doctrine of standing and then apply that doctrine to the facts of this case. Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine, and the lack of standing bars consideration of the claim by the court. See Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.2007) (citing Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn.1989)). Because standing is a jurisdictional issue, we evaluate decisions on standing de novo. See Swenson v. Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn.2011) (reviewing jurisdiction de novo). The interpretation of a statute or case law is also reviewed de novo. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn.2006) (citing Am. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co. v. Solum, 641 N.W.2d 891, 895 (Minn.2002)).

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the “constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.... Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

Id. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted).

Minnesota case law also requires that a party have standing before a court can exercise jurisdiction. See Annandale Advocate, 435 N.W.2d at 27. Generally, we examine standing at various stages of the litigation proceeding, including when a plaintiff brings a cause of action and when a party appeals a decision. Standing to bring an action can be conferred in two ways: “either the plaintiff has suffered some ‘injury-in-fact’ or the plaintiff is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing.” Enright, 735 N.W.2d at 329. To demonstrate an injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must show “a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130).

Standing to appeal may be conferred by a statute or by the appellant's status as an aggrieved party. City of St. Paul v. LaClair, 479 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn.1992). The appellant's status as an aggrieved party depends on whether “there is injury to a legally protected right.” Id. (citing Joint Anti–Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140–41, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)).

Prior to 1963, Minn.Stat. § 605.09 specifically required that a party be “aggrieved” in order to appeal a decision. Minn.Stat. § 605.09 (1961). In 1963, the Legislature removed the “aggrieved” language, but maintained the focus on the types of judgments that provide a basis for an appeal. Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 806, § 8, 1963 Minn. Laws 1414, 1416. Section 605.09 was repealed in 1974 when the Legislature eliminated certain statutory provisions that conflicted with portions of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Act of April 9, 1974, ch. 394, § 11, 1974 Minn. Laws 702, 707.

Currently, Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03 sets forth appealable judgments and orders that were formerly discussed in section 605.09. While the “aggrieved party” language does not appear in Rule 103.03, we have previously stated that the “deletion [of ‘aggrieved party’ from section 609.05] effected a change in form only.” Twin Cities Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Holter, 311 Minn. 423, 425 n. 3, 249 N.W.2d...