In re Treinen
Decision Date | 28 March 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 29,424.,29,424. |
Parties | In the Matter of Robert Dale TREINEN. An Attorney Licensed to Practice Before the Courts of the State of New Mexico. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Virginia L. Ferrara, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.
Briggs F. Cheney, Esq., Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.
{1} This matter is before the Court following attorney disciplinary proceedings conducted according to the Rules Governing Discipline. This Court is called upon to resolve two issues. First, whether this Court has the authority to impose discipline on an attorney who has pled no contest to a criminal act and who has been given a conditional discharge pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-13(A) (1994). And second, whether there may be an exception in this case to this Court's general rule that attorneys on probation for a criminal offense will not be permitted to practice law. See In re Griffin, 101 N.M. 1, 1, 677 P.2d 614, 614 (1983) (). We answer both questions in the affirmative and adopt the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board that Robert Dale Treinen (Respondent) receive a deferred suspension and be placed on disciplinary probation pursuant to Rule 17-206(A)(2), (B)(1) NMRA 2006.
{2} Respondent entered a plea of no contest to one misdemeanor count for battery against a household member and two felony counts for intimidation of a witness and false imprisonment. He initially was given a deferred sentence and placed on supervised probation for a period of five years. However, the lower court reconsidered its previous sentence and instead placed Respondent on supervised probation under a conditional discharge pursuant to Section 31-20-13(A). The amended order of conditional discharge included the following recommendation by the district court judge:
This Court/Judge VERY STRONGLY and EMPHATICALLY recommends that the Defendant NOT be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law. Except for this unfortunate and highly uncharacteristic incident, he has no other felony arrests, and provides highly needed legal services to poor and disadvantaged persons (in one of the VERY FEW law firms to provide these critical services — commonly at little or no charge to these disadvantaged persons — and these many disadvantaged victims and persons in particular, and the public in general would be greatly damaged by any suspension or disbarment.) Also, on his own initiative (without suggestion or request of the Court) he entered, attended and fully participated in and completed anger/conflict management, Domestic Violence counseling & treatment and alcohol counseling, is highly and sincerely remorseful of the present incidents, took full responsibility in the Pleas and at Sentencing, and his counselors emphasize that Defendant is HIGHLY UNLIKELY to ever repeat any violent conduct, toward anyone.
{3} A sentence of conditional discharge may be imposed under Section 31-20-13(A), which provides, in pertinent part, that
[w]hen a person who has not been previously convicted of a felony offense is found guilty of a crime for which a deferred or suspended sentence is authorized, the court may, without entering an adjudication of guilt, enter a conditional discharge order and place the person on probation on terms and conditions authorized by [NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-5 (2003) and NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-6 (2004)].
(Emphasis added.)
{4} Respondent argues that the imposition of a conditional discharge precludes the imposition of discipline by this Court on the basis of his probationary status because there has been no "adjudication of guilt." See State v. Fairbanks, 2004-NMCA-005, ¶ 8, 134 N.M. 783, 82 P.3d 954 ( ); State v. Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268 ( ); State v. Herbstman, 1999-NMCA-014, ¶ 11, 126 N.M. 683, 974 P.2d 177 (1998) () (citation omitted).
{5} We reject the notion that a conditional discharge precludes this Court from imposing discipline against an attorney who violates our Rules of Professional Conduct. We recognize that Rule 16-804(B) NMRA 2006 provides that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act," but that rule does not require that the lawyer must be convicted of a criminal act. Accordingly, we have in the past disbarred attorneys for engaging in apparent criminal conduct even though there had been no criminal prosecution or conviction. See, e.g., In re Duffy, 102 N.M. 524, 526, 697 P.2d 943, 945 (1985) (Riordan, J., specially concurring) ( ); In re Ortega, 101 N.M. 719, 723, 688 P.2d 329, 333 (1984) ( ); cf. In re Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 719 N.E.2d 480, 485 (1999) ( ); In re Karahalis, 429 Mass. 121, 706 N.E.2d 655, 658 (1999) ( ); In re McEnaney, 718 A.2d 920, 921 (R.I.1998) ().
{6} Despite Respondent's suggestion that the conditional discharge statute was intended to preclude disciplinary proceedings, and despite what the Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute to mean in other contexts, we simply note that this Court has the sole authority to direct what constitutes grounds for the discipline of lawyers. The authority of the New Mexico Supreme Court emanates from the New Mexico Constitution, Article VI, Section 3, which gives the Court "superintending control over all inferior courts" and carries with it the inherent power to regulate all pleading, practice, and procedure affecting the judicial branch of government. See NMSA 1978, § 36-2-1 (1941) ( ); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1975) ( ). Our inherent power of superintending control encompasses as well this Court's authority and duty to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar, to prescribe standards of conduct for lawyers, to determine what constitutes grounds for the discipline of lawyers, and to discipline, for cause, any person admitted to practice law in this state. See NMRA, Discipline Rules, Preface.
{7} Any legislative attempt to limit what conduct we may consider as grounds for imposing attorney discipline would be an unconstitutional infringement of this Court's authority to regulate the practice of law. Cf. Application of Sedillo, 66 N.M. 267, 273, 347 P.2d 162, 166 (1959) ( ); State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 85 N.M. 521, 528-29, 514 P.2d 40, 47-48 (1973) ( ).
{8} In sum, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to disciplining an attorney for criminal conduct, and any legislative attempt to provide otherwise would be unconstitutional. In any event, we do not believe the Legislature intended to encroach upon our disciplinary authority with its enactment of Section 31 20-13(A). For these reasons, we conclude that a sentence of conditional discharge does not prevent this Court from imposing discipline for criminal conduct. We now consider what discipline would be appropriate in this instance.
{9} We have repeatedly ruled that attorneys on probation for a criminal offense will not be permitted to practice law pursuant to a license granted by this Court and have routinely disbarred or suspended attorneys for the duration of any sentence of probation. See, e.g., In re Lopez, 116 N.M. 699, 866 P.2d 1166 (1994); In re Bryan, 116 N.M. 745, 867 P.2d 415 (1993); In re Kraemer, 112 N.M. 101, 811 P.2d 1312 (1991); In re McCulloch, 103 N.M. 542, 710 P.2d 736 (1985); In re Griffin, 101 N.M. 1, 677 P.2d 614; In re Norrid, 100 N.M. 326, 670 P.2d 580 (1983). This policy was most recently reiterated in In re Key,...
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