In re Webb
Decision Date | 23 May 2019 |
Docket Number | S247074 |
Citation | 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 107,440 P.3d 1129,7 Cal.5th 270 |
Parties | IN RE Bettie WEBB on Habeas Corpus |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Angela Bartosik, Chief Deputy Public Defender, and Robert Louis Ford, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner Bettie Webb.
Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Mark A. Amador, Linh Lam, James Atkins, Lilia E. Garcia and Marissa A. Bejarano, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent the People.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Katie L. Stowe, Deputy Attorney General, and Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitor General, for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the People.
Bettie Webb, defendant in the underlying criminal matter, was arrested and charged with two felony counts. She posted bail and was released from custody. At arraignment, the court imposed, as an additional condition of release, that she waive her Fourth Amendment right to be free of warrantless or unreasonable searches. We granted review to decide whether, when a criminal defendant posts bail, the court has authority to impose additional release conditions. We conclude that the court does have authority to impose reasonable conditions related to public safety. Because the question has become moot as to defendant, we do not decide whether the court properly imposed the specific condition.
As the Court of Appeal summarized, defendant ( In re Webb (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 44, 47, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16, fns. omitted ( Webb ).) Specifically, the court ordered defendant to " ‘submit your person, property, vehicle, personal effects to search at any time and any place, with or without a warrant, with or without reasonable cause when required by a pretrial services officer, a probation officer, or any other law enforcement officer.’ " ( Id . at p. 47, fn. 2, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16.)
Defendant challenged the search condition by a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which that court denied. She then filed the instant "petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending the magistrate lacked statutory or inherent authority to impose the bail search condition, and imposition of the condition constitutes a pretrial restraint without due process protections such as notice and a hearing or any showing that she poses a heightened risk of misbehaving while on bail." ( Webb , supra , 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47-48, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16 ; see People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 884, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 785, 135 P.3d 32 [].)
The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. Ultimately, the majority concluded the trial court had neither statutory nor inherent authority to condition defendant’s bail on a Fourth Amendment waiver, and it ordered the condition vacated. It disagreed with language in Gray v. Superior Court (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 ( Gray ) and In re McSherry (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 856, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 497 ( McSherry ) that concluded that, even when a defendant posts bail, the court has inherent authority to impose reasonable bail conditions. Because the majority concluded the court had no authority to impose the condition at all, it did "not reach Webb’s contention that the court denied her due process rights to notice and a fair hearing in imposing the bail condition." ( Webb , supra , 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 57, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16.)
Acting Presiding Justice Benke authored a concurring opinion. Relying heavily on Gray , supra , 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, and McSherry , supra , 112 Cal.App.4th 856, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 497, she argued "that a trial court has inherent authority to impose conditions on a defendant’s release, even when a defendant is able to post the amount of bail set forth in the court’s bail schedule." ( Webb , supra , 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 57, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P.J.).) However, noting that this authority is "fairly narrow" ( id . at p. 59, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16 ), she agreed that the court erred in imposing the search condition under the circumstances. She argued that when defendant had posted bail and her guilt had not been established, ( Id . at pp. 59-60, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 16.)
The San Diego County District Attorney petitioned for review, raising a single issue: "Do trial courts possess inherent authority to impose reasonable bail conditions related to public safety on felony defendants who are released on monetary bail?" We granted the petition to resolve the conflict between the majority opinion in the Court of Appeal and the opinions in Gray , supra , 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, and McSherry , supra , 112 Cal.App.4th 856, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 497.
The district attorney informs us that, after the petition for review was filed, the underlying matter was resolved by a guilty plea and probation disposition. Accordingly, this question is moot as to defendant. Nevertheless, the district attorney urges us to decide "the issue presented because it presents a question of statewide general public concern." We agree. "We have discretion to decide otherwise moot cases presenting important issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review." ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 28 P.3d 151.) Questions involving release on bail especially tend to evade review. Accordingly, we will decide the issue presented even though it is moot as to defendant.
Regarding the merits, we note preliminarily what the issue does not involve. The petition for review presented only the broad question of whether trial courts have authority to impose conditions on felony defendants who are released on bail, i.e., the point on which the majority below disagreed with Gray , supra , 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, and McSherry , supra , 112 Cal.App.4th 856, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 497. The district attorney expressly did not seek review of the specific question "of whether the bail condition imposed in this case was a proper exercise of the trial court’s inherent authority." Additionally, this question has become moot as to defendant. Accordingly, we need not and do not decide the narrow question.
We are also aware that recent legislation, titled "Pretrial release or detention: pretrial services," makes major changes in California’s pretrial release procedures. (§§ 1320.7 et seq.; Sen. Bill No. 10 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).) If and when that legislation becomes the law, the issue here will become moot, as release procedures will be governed by statute. By its terms, the new legislation was to be effective October 1, 2019. (§ 1320.6; Stats. 2018, ch. 244, § 3.) Following its enactment, this legislation was suspended pursuant to a referendum petition. Now, it will only be effective if approved as a referendum measure at the November 2020 election. Accordingly, the issue before us remains important.
Finally, defendant did post bail. For this reason, the issues regarding the propriety of requiring bail as a condition of release raised in In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, review granted May 23, 2018, S247278, are not presented. We express no opinion regarding the recent legislation or the issues raised in Humphrey .
In In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d 804 ( York ), we held that a trial court could condition the release of an accused on his or her own recognizance on "the defendant’s agreement to submit to random drug testing and warrantless search and seizure during that period." ( Id . at p. 1137, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d 804.) In doing so, however, we distinguished between persons released on their own recognizance and those released after posting bail. We said that the petitioner’s challenge to the release condition "rests upon the flawed premise that a defendant who seeks [own recognizance] release has the same reasonable expectation of privacy as that enjoyed by persons not charged with any crime, and by defendants who have posted reasonable bail." ( Id . at p. 1149, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d 804.)
The majority below believed that York ’s distinguishing between those released on their own recognizance and those...
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In re Corpus
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