In The Matter Of D.L.D.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. COA09-1253.,COA09-1253.
• Parties: In the Matter of D.L.D., Juvenile.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

694 S.E.2d 395

257 Ed. Law Rep. 1096

In the Matter of D.L.D., Juvenile.

No. COA09-1253.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

April 20, 2010.

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Appeal by juvenile from order entered 24 March 2009 by Judge Brian C. Wilks in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 2010.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State.

Hartsell & Williams, P.A., by Christy E. Wilhelm, Concord, and Benjamin G. Goff, for the juvenile.

CALABRIA, Judge.

D.L.D. (“the juvenile”) appeals an order entered 24 March 2009 adjudicating him delinquent, ordering a Level 2 disposition, and placing him under the supervision of a court counselor for a period of twelve months subject to an intermittent confinement if suspended or excluded from school. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On 6 January 2009, Corporal R.A. Aleem (“Corporal Aleem”) of the Durham County Sheriff's Department (“DCSD”) was assigned to Hillside High School (“HHS”) in Durham County, North Carolina. Corporal Aleem had worked for the DCSD for thirteen years, including six years as an undercover narcotics officer. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Corporal Aleem and HHS Assistant Principal Bob Barbour (“Barbour”) reviewed surveillance video footage and when Barbour switched the viewing monitor to “live” coverage, both of them watched two male students enter a bathroom while another male student stood outside. Corporal Aleem was familiar with that bathroom because he had arrested more than a dozen suspects for controlled substances offenses. Barbour told Corporal Aleem that the scene on the monitor looked “fishy” and the two men went to “check on it.”

As they approached the bathroom, one male student stood outside the men's bathroom, another male student stood outside the women's bathroom, and both of them stared at Barbour and Corporal Aleem. When Barbour and Corporal Aleem arrived at the men's bathroom, they observed the juvenile and two other male students exit the bathroom. When the juvenile saw Barbour and Corporal Aleem, he “immediately turned around and ran back into the bathroom.” Corporal Aleem followed the juvenile into the bathroom and saw him put something inside his pants. Barbour escorted the other two students back into the bathroom. Corporal Aleem told Barbour he saw the juvenile put something into his pants. Barbour replied, “we need to check it.” Corporal Aleem frisked the juvenile. The frisk revealed a container used to hold BB gun pellets. Inside the container were three individually wrapped bags of a green leafy material. Corporal Aleem identified the contents of the bags as marijuana. Based upon Corporal Aleem's training and experience, each bag was worth approximately $20.00.

Subsequently, Corporal Aleem restrained the juvenile in handcuffs and escorted him to a conference room in the main office at HHS. Barbour stated, “we need to go ahead and check him and make sure he doesn't have anything else.” At that point, Corporal Aleem searched the juvenile and discovered $59.00 in currency in his pocket. The juvenile immediately stated, “the money was not from selling drugs,” but was his mother's rent money. Barbour called the juvenile's mother, and when she arrived at HHS, she began “fussing at [the juvenile] pretty heavily” and contradicted his claim that the money was for her rent.

The juvenile was arrested and charged with possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. On 12 January 2009, Corporal Aleem filed a juvenile petition alleging the juvenile committed the delinquent act of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. On 19 March 2009, the juvenile filed a motion to suppress all statements and evidence obtained on the ground that the statements and evidence were obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 23, of the North Carolina Constitution, and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-2101 (2008).

The adjudication was held during the 24 March 2009 Juvenile Session of Durham County District Court. During the hearing, the juvenile made an offer of proof for his motion to suppress statements and physical evidence during voir dire examinations of Corporal Aleem. Following voir dire, the trial court denied the juvenile's motions to suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated the juvenile as delinquent and proceeded to disposition. Following a disposition hearing, the trial court entered a Level 2 disposition and placed the juvenile under the supervision of a juvenile court counselor for a period of twelve months under a number of conditions, including inter alia, obtaining a substance abuse assessment, cooperating with all recommended treatment, and submitting to random alcohol and drug testing. The juvenile appeals.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

The juvenile argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress physical evidence. More specifically, he argues that the search violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree.

“Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence, and if so, whether the findings support the trial court's conclusions of law.” In re I.R.T., 184 N.C.App. 579, 584, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007) (quoting State v. McRae, 154 N.C.App. 624, 627-28, 573 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2002)). “The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewable de novo.” In re J.D.B., 196 N.C.App. 234, 237, 674 S.E.2d 795, 798 (2009) (citation omitted). “However, where there is no material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, specific findings of fact are not required.” In re M.L.T.H., --- N.C.App. ----, ----, 685 S.E.2d 117, 122 stay granted, 363 N.C. 744, 687 S.E.2d 687 (2009) (citation omitted). “ ‘In that event, the necessary findings are implied from the admission of the challenged evidence.’ ” Id. at ----, 685 S.E.2d at 122 (quoting State v. Leach, 166 N.C.App. 711, 715, 603 S.E.2d 831, 834 (2004)).

“Ordinarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant-must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 734 (1985). However, “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742, 83 L.Ed.2d at 734. North Carolina has adopted the “reasonableness” standard for student searches at school. In re D.D., 146 N.C.App. 309, 315, 554 S.E.2d 346, 350-51 (2001). It has also applied this standard to searches of students conducted by law enforcement officers. In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C.App. 143, 147, 607 S.E.2d 304, 307 (2005). The reasonableness standard applies to “incidents where a resource officer, acting in conjunction with a school official, detains a student on school premises.” Id. at 148, 607 S.E.2d at 307. There are three situations when the reasonableness standard applies:

Generally, school search cases fall into three categories. First, courts apply the T.L.O. reasonableness standard to those cases where a school official initiates the searches on his own or law enforcement involvement is minimal. Courts characterize these cases as ones in which the police officers act in conjunction with the school official.

More recently, the T.L.O. standard has also been applied to cases where a school resource officer conducts a search, based upon his own investigation or at the direction of another school official, in the furtherance of well-established educational and safety goals.

...

Courts draw a clear distinction between the aforementioned categories of cases and those cases in which outside law enforcement officers search students as part of an independent investigation or in which school official[s] search students at the request or behest of the outside law enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies. Courts do not apply T.L.O. to these cases but instead require the traditional probable cause requirement to justify the search.

D.D., 146 N.C.App. at 318, 554 S.E.2d at 352 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Furthermore, the reasonableness standard applies in North Carolina where “a police officer works in conjunction with school officials, in varying degrees, to maintain a safe and educational environment.” Id. at 319, 554 S.E.2d at 353 (italics, internal quotation and citation omitted). “Congress has declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2628, 168 L.Ed.2d 290, 303 (2007).

Thousands of school boards throughout the country ... have adopted policies aimed at effectuating this message. Those school boards know that peer pressure is perhaps the single most important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs, and that students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in school appear to tolerate such behavior.

Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). Therefore, keeping schools drug free is vital in maintaining a safe and educational environment.

In the instant case, Corporal Aleem was assigned to HHS on 6 January 2009. He had made “numerous arrests” for controlled substances at this particular bathroom at HHS. Barbour and Corporal Aleem were conducting another investigation when they observed the monitoring cameras. Barbour directed Corporal Aleem's attention to the scene at the bathroom where two male juveniles were entering the bathroom and one was standing outside. Barbour told Corporal Aleem that the situation “looked kind of fishy,” and suggested they go “check on it.” When Barbour and Corporal Aleem arrived at the bathroom, they observed the juvenile exiting the bathroom. When the...