State Of North Carolina v. Chambers
| Decision Date | 07 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. COA09-1430,No. 08 CRS 37918,58735,COA09-1430,08 CRS 37918 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRIAN LEIGH CHAMBERS |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Donald W. Laton, for the State.
James N. Freeman, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
Appeal from judgment entered 12 August 2009 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr., in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 April 2010.
Brian Leigh Chambers ("defendant") appeals as a matter of right from a jury verdict finding him guilty of possessing cocaine. Defendant pled guilty to being an habitual felon after the jury verdict. On appeal, defendant contends he is entitled to an order dismissing the charges against him, or in the alterative a new trial, because the trial court committed reversible error in: (1) denying defendant's motion for a mistrial after "prejudicial" testimony was elicited by the State; (2) declining to strike testimony from a police officer regarding statements made by defendant following his arrest; (3) declining to dismiss thecharges for insufficiency of the evidence; and (4) failing to set aside defendant's sentence as an habitual felon on the grounds that the sentence violated defendant's constitutional rights. After careful review, we find no error.
On 8 August 2008, Officer Kyle Krawczyk of the Winston-Salem Police Department ("W.S.P.D."), was on patrol in the area of Waughtown Street and Longview Drive as part of a special assignment to deter robberies in the area. Officer Krawczyk received a radio call from Officer Eric Johnson that suspicious activity, consistent with illegal narcotics purchases, had occurred nearby involving a white Toyota Paseo. After receiving a description of the vehicle and the driver, Officer Krawczyk began "doing moving surveillance on the vehicle" in the 1400 block of Belleauwood Street. The vehicle's registration was verified through entering the vehicle's tag number into the DMV mobile database. The database search showed that the registered owner of the vehicle was defendant.
Officer Krawczyk followed defendant's vehicle for several blocks, and after observing defendant throw a white piece of paper out of the car, he initiated a traffic stop for littering. He approached defendant's vehicle on the driver's side, identified himself, and advised defendant of the reason for having stopped him. While speaking with defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, Officer Krawczyk observed a Kenmore vacuum cleaner on the front passenger floorboard. After asking defendant from whom he purchased the vacuum and receiving no reply, Officer Krawczykwalked to the passenger side of the vehicle to examine the vacuum. While observing the vacuum, Officer Krawczyk noticed a "rocklike white substance" lying on the front passenger's seat. Officer Krawczyk seized the substance from the front seat, reexamined it, and determined that the substance "appeared to look like cocaine." The substance was then packaged, sealed, and labeled in accordance with W.S.P.D. policy and procedure. Defendant was placed under arrest.
Officer Johnson, prior to radioing Officer Krawczyk, also observed defendant's vehicle in the 1400 block of Belleauwood Street. Officer Johnson was parked facing east on Belleauwood Street when defendant drove by him, allowing Officer Johnson to observe his vehicle registration and perform a DMV query. Officer Johnson continued to observe defendant to a point where defendant's vehicle was briefly out of his line of sight as it reached the bottom of Belleauwood Street; however, Officer Johnson could see unidentified individuals approach from the right-hand side of the street. After about 10 seconds, Officer Johnson witnessed defendant continue up Belleauwood Street.
Officer Johnson testified that later that day at the jail, defendant approached him and stated, "I will help you out." Defendant said that he would like to assist in providing information to the police. Defendant stated that he had purchased the confiscated crack rock in the Easton neighborhood, and that he had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase crack cocaine in the 1400 block of Belleauwood Street where he was arrested. Officer Johnsontestified that he gave defendant a Miranda warning. Defendant was not asked to sign a waiver following notification of his Miranda rights.
Lori Knops, a forensic chemist for the State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI") crime laboratory, conducted a chemical analysis on the "rocklike white substance" found in defendant's vehicle. Ms. Knops' analysis of the substance involved two individual tests, both designed to detect the presence of a controlled substance. Each test confirmed the presence of cocaine or cocaine base. Ms. Knops concluded that the material she analyzed was cocaine base of a total weight of.09 of a gram.
On 10 November 2008, defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(3) (2009). Defendant was also charged with being an habitual felon. Defendant's case was heard at the 10 August 2009 Session of Criminal Superior Court for Forsyth County before Judge Wood. During the course of the trial, defendant made, and the trial court denied, defendant's motion for a mistrial and defendant's motions to dismiss.
On 12 August 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of possession of cocaine, and defendant subsequently pled guilty to being an habitual felon. Defendant made a motion to set aside the habitual felon conviction, which was denied by the court. That same day, the trial court entered the judgment sentencing defendant to a minimum of 8 0 months, and amaximum of 105 months to be served in the Department of Corrections. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal.
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial after the State, and the State's witness, made several references to inadmissible evidence. We disagree.
Our Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2009) (). Our standard of review when examining a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. State v. Allen, 141 N.C. App. 610, 617, 541 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2000). A "'[m]istrial is a drastic remedy, warranted only for such serious improprieties as would make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial verdict.'" State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 418, 358 S.E.2d 329, 337 (1987) (quoting State v. Stocks, 319 N.C. 437, 441, 355 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1987)). A trial court "must declare a mistrial upon the defendant's motion if there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings... resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant's case." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1061 (2009). "Absent a showing of gross abuse of a trial court's discretion, the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal." State v. Brown, 177 N.C. App. 177, 189, 628 S.E.2d 787, 794-95 (2006).
Here, the specific grounds for mistrial alleged are (1) the response by a witness for the State on direct examination, and (2) subsequent questions by the State. Specifically, defendant contends that the State's references to a "field test" administered on the "rocklike white substance" presented the jury with inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence that compromised defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. The transcript reveals that, after testifying about the initial vehicle stop of defendant, Officer Krawczyk offered the following testimony on direct examination:
Though the trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, the trial court nevertheless: (1) sustained defendant's objections; (2) allowed defendant's motion to strike and instructed the jury not to "consider anything about any field test"; (3) removed the jurors from the courtroom after repeated mention of the term "field-test"; and (3) gave a curative instruction immediately following the jurors' return to the courtroom. Thus, it does not appear from the record that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's first motion for a mistrial.
Defendant further argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the trial court informed the prosecutor that one more mention of a "field test" would require a mistrial. Thereafter, in closing arguments, the State mentioned "field test." The trial court excused the jury, and outside of the presence of the jury, determined that the remark was an inadvertent "slip of the tongue." The trial court reached this conclusion because it was uttered in the context of a "laboratory test" conducted by the SBI as opposed to the "field test" conducted by the Officer Krawczyk. See State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 536, 669 S.E.2d 239, 259 (2008) () (quoting State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41 (1994)). The trial court again denied defense counsel's motion for...
To continue reading
Request your trial