In the Matter of Welfare of D. A. C., No. A08-1889 (Minn. App. 8/18/2009)
| Decision Date | 18 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-1889.,A08-1889. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. A. C. |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 27-JV-07-15909.
William Ward, Hennepin County Public Defender, Kellie M. Charles, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN (for appellant).
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant D.A.C. challenges his adjudication and sentence, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search because his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police: (1) improperly stopped him without a reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant was involved in criminal activity or carrying a weapon and (2) impermissibly expanded the scope of the Terry stop. Because we conclude that the stop and frisk of appellant was lawful, we affirm.
Appellant was charged in Hennepin County District Court with possession of a pistol in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(a), 2 (2006). At a Rasmussen hearing, appellant argued that the stop and frisk of his person by police was illegal and consequently, the evidence obtained from the search—a .22 caliber pistol—should be suppressed. The district court denied appellant's motion to suppress, concluding that law enforcement had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an investigative Terry stop and frisk of appellant and that law enforcement did not impermissibly expand the scope of the search. Appellant waived his right to a trial and submitted the case to the district court on stipulated facts. After the district court adjudicated appellant delinquent, appellant brought this appeal, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Appellant argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when he was stopped and seized by police. Specifically, appellant contends that (1) the police lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant was involved in criminal activity and therefore, a Terry stop was not justified, and (2) a suspicion on the part of police that appellant was carrying a weapon did not justify a Terry stop. We disagree.
"When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence." State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review de novo whether a search or seizure is justified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). And we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Id.
Before examining the search and seizure of the contraband, we must analyze the stop that led to its discovery. In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Minn. 1983).
Appellant argues that his detention was improper because the officers did not have a reasonable basis to suspect that he was engaged in criminal activity. Specifically, appellant contends that his presence near a group of people who were suspected of drug activity and police suspicion that he was carrying a weapon did not justify the stop.
Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). One such exception is the brief investigatory stop, which requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998) (citations omitted). Under Terry v. Ohio, the police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity, and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968).
A determination of whether the police have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop is based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981); Engwer v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 383 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Minn. App. 1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the "reasonable suspicion standard is not high." State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). "Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires a showing that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity." State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). "That standard is met when an officer `observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.'" Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (quoting G.M., 560 N.W.2d at 691). And the grounds for making a stop can be based on the collective knowledge of all investigating officers. In re Welfare of G.M., 542 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. App. 1996), aff'd, 560 N.W.2d 687 (Minn. 1997).
Both flight and evasive conduct can create reasonable suspicion, particularly when coupled with proximity to wrongdoing. Flight "is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000), quoted in State v. Houston, 654 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003). And the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that "evasive conduct," combined with circumstances beyond "merely being in a high crime area," may give rise to reasonable suspicion. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843.
Here, a Minneapolis police officer was informed by his lieutenant that he had observed an individual dealing narcotics in front of the doorway of Snow Foods, "a place of [a] lot of drug activity, [and] shots fired," and was instructed to investigate. When the officer entered the parking lot of Snow Foods, he saw approximately 15 to 18 people in the parking lot, all of whom were walking westbound. The officer noticed an individual who matched the description of the narcotics dealer, but his attention was diverted to appellant when appellant "reached to his side and made a couple quick steps as if he was going to run." The officer saw appellant reach down at his right side a second time, and noticed a small bulge at appellant's right side. The officer chose to "focus solely" on appellant and ordered appellant "to show me his hands" and to "get down on the ground."
Appellant argues that there was no basis for the police to believe he was part of the group involved in drug activity. But appellant testified that it would appear to an onlooker that he was walking with two to four other people. Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that it was reasonable for the officer to infer that appellant may be associated with the drug activity and that the district court did not clearly err in finding that appellant was "walking in a group" with a person suspected of drug activity after observing appellant in close proximity to that group.
Appellant also argues that any police suspicion that he was carrying a weapon near his waist is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. "A Terry stop permits an officer who suspects that an individual is engaged in illegal activity and also believes that a suspect may be armed and dangerous to frisk the suspect in order to reduce concerns that the suspect poses a danger to officer safety." State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250-51 (Minn. 2007) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972)). Here, the police suspicion that appellant was carrying a weapon was not the sole factor that justified the stop, and contrary to appellant's assertions, the officer's testimony establishes that appellant's presence in a high-crime area was not the sole basis of the stop. The stop was based on the lieutenant's reported observations of narcotics dealing, the officer's knowledge that Snow Foods was a high-crime area, appellant's furtive hand movements toward his waistband, and his evasive behavior indicating that he might flee. See Engwer, 383 N.W.2d at 419 (); see also Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843 ().
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify his stop of appellant.
Appellant argues that the officer improperly assumed that weapons might always be present when a law enforcement officer confronts a citizen and thus, the patdown search for weapons violated his constitutional rights. We disagree.
A police officer may conduct a pat-search narrowly confined to a frisk for weapons if the officer has an "objective articulable basis" for believing that a lawfully stopped person may be armed and dangerous and that such a search is necessary to protect the officer's safety or the safety of others. In re Welfare of M.D.R., 693 N.W.2d 444, 450 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. June 28, 2005); see also ...
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