Inniss v. Methot Buick-Opel, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1986
• Docket Number: BUICK-OPE,INC
• Citation: 506 A.2d 212
• Parties: 1 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 456 Kathleen H. INNISS v. METHOT
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 212

506 A.2d 212

1 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 456

Kathleen H. INNISS v. METHOT BUICK-OPEL, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 8, 1986.

Decided March 5, 1986.

Smith & Elliott, Dana E. Prescott, (orally), Saco, for plaintiff.

Richard E. Valentino, (orally), Saco, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

GLASSMAN, Justice.

Kathleen Inniss appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court, York County, directing a verdict for the defendant Methot Buick-Opel, Inc. (Methot) on Count VI of her complaint, alleging that Methot violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 (1979 & Supp.1985-1986), in the sale of a car to her. She also contends that the court erred in granting Methot a recoupment that reduced the jury award of damages to her on Counts I and III of her complaint, pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. §§ 2-608, 2-711(1) (1964). ¹ Methot cross-appeals, contending that the jury verdict on the claim for return of the purchase price of the car was not supported by sufficient evidence. For the reasons herein set forth, we deny the cross-appeal and vacate the judgment with direction to the Superior Court to enter a judgment for Inniss in the amount of the jury verdict.

I. Statement of Facts

In September, 1982, Inniss and Methot entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of a 1982 Buick Skylark. Inniss was aware that Methot had used the car as a demonstrator and that it had been driven nearly 6,000 miles. She paid a purchase price equivalent to that for a new car and received a new car warranty valid for 12 months or 12,000 miles. Both parties testified to their understanding that the warranty obligated Methot to repair any defect during the warranty period.

Unknown to Inniss, the car had a history of eleven repair orders prior to the sales agreement. The repair orders do not indicate that problems described were not remedied to the satisfaction of the repair personnel. Methot never informed Inniss of the existence of any defects or of the repair orders. The corporation's president testified that he does not instruct his sales personnel to disclose pre-purchase repair orders. On a customer's request he would disclose this information but could not recall any customer making such a request.

Shortly after the purchase and sales agreement, Inniss encountered a series of problems that she reported to Methot. The horn, rear window defogger, throttle, and brakes were successfully repaired, generally after more than one visit to Methot. Other conditions were not remedied prior to the end of the warranty period: a malfunctioning temperature gauge, poor starting, skipping and flooding of the engine, vibration in the front end, and flashing of the directional indicators in both directions when use of the turn signal was attempted. The engine problems and the malfunctioning of the directional indicators occurred intermittently. In addition, the purchase agreement had provided that the car was to receive a rustproofing treatment. Evidence at trial showed that much of the car had not been rustproofed, while other areas had "spotty" rustproofing. While Methot twice sanded and repainted certain surfaces, the color used did not match the original paint, and apparent foreign matter under the original paint that caused bubbles on the surface was not completely removed.

Between September and December, 1982, Inniss brought the car back to Methot on eight occasions. The repair orders disclose that Methot personnel attempted to remedy the problems that Inniss reported. The repairs were made without cost to Inniss except for one billing for an oil change. On each of these occasions Methot loaned Inniss a car to use without cost to her while her own was being repaired. After a visit on December 15 when the car registered 10,636 miles, Inniss did not bring the car to Methot until March 10, 1983, when it registered 19,250 miles. On that occasion Methot replaced the alternator belt and charged the battery, billing Inniss $29.85 for these services. Inniss did not again bring the car to Methot. On June 6, 1983, when the car registered 20,000 to 25,000 miles, Inniss sent a letter to Methot, detailing the problems with the car and requesting "restitution." Although Methot received the letter, it never responded.

Inniss subsequently filed suit, alleging, inter alia, breach of express and implied warranties, substantial impairment of value justifying revocation of acceptance and return of the purchase price, and violation of the UTPA.

II. Unfair Trade Practices Act

We first address the contention of Inniss that the court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Methot on Count VI of her complaint claiming that Methot violated the UTPA.

With respect to a directed verdict, we have previously stated:

[T]he presiding Justice should direct a verdict only sparingly, as the exception rather than the rule. Only if the correctness of directing a verdict appears so clear to the presiding Justice that all reasonable doubts of possible error or uncertainty have been removed in his mind should he grant it.

Moore v. Fenton, 289 A.2d 698, 700 n. 1 (Me.1972), quoted in Butler v. Poulin, 500 A.2d 257, 260 (Me.1985). Despite this policy disfavoring directed verdicts, there are circumstances when the direction of a verdict is appropriate. A directed verdict must be granted when, after viewing the evidence with all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a contrary verdict could not be sustained. Seiders v. Testa, 464 A.2d 933, 935 (Me.1983). To avoid a directed verdict, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of the elements of the action. See Department of Human Services v. Earle, 481 A.2d 175, 178-79 (Me.1984).

The UTPA declares unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or business." 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (1979). ² The Act was amended in 1973 to include a private right of action. P.L.1973, ch. 251 (codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. § 213 (1979 & Supp.1985-1986). ³ As we recognized a half decade ago:

The scope of the Unfair Trade Practices Act has yet to be clearly defined by this Court; its limits can best be drawn on a case-by-case basis in which the issues are sharply focused in light of specific fact situations.

Edwards v. Black, 429 A.2d 1015, 1016-17 (Me.1981). The conduct against which the complaint is directed should have some attribute of unfairness or deception to trigger the procedures of the UTPA. State ex rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866, 874 (Me.1981). In the proper circumstances a defendant's failure to honor statutory warranties may constitute evidence of a violation of the UPTA, but a breach of warranty does not constitute a per se violation. Id. at 873-74; Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294, 298 (Me.1979).

In the instant case the court found that Inniss had failed to establish a prima facie showing of an unfair or deceptive act within the meaning of the UTPA. On appeal Inniss argues on three grounds that she established a prima facie case. We disagree.

First, Inniss contends Methot misrepresented the car as new when it was in fact a demonstrator model registering nearly 6,000 miles. From her own testimony, however, it is clear that Methot informed Inniss of the use of the car as a demonstrator and that Inniss was aware of the registered mileage. Inniss's receipt of a new car warranty for 12,000 miles in addition to the 6,000 miles registered also undermines her contention of misrepresentation. Thus, Inniss failed to make a prima facie showing of misrepresentation.

Second, Inniss contends Methot failed to disclose numerous and substantial defects of which it was aware. The evidentiary basis for this contention is the existence of the eleven undisclosed pre-purchase repair orders. A careful examination of these orders does not disclose, however, that Methot, prior to the purchase and sales agreement, identified problems with the car that were not remedied to the satisfaction of the repair personnel. Thus, Inniss failed to establish that Methot was aware of substantial defects still existing at the time of the sales agreement.

Finally, Inniss contends Methot both failed and refused to complete repairs properly during the warranty period. The failure to successfully repair may constitute a breach of express or implied warranties but, as we have indicated, a breach of warranty does not per se constitute a violation of the UTPA. Inniss's contention of a refusal to repair is not borne out by the repair orders and other evidence admitted at trial. Between September and December 1982 Inniss brought the car to Methot on eight occasions. Methot attempted to remedy the reported problems without billing Inniss for the services and materials, and while providing her with another car for her temporary use. As of the final December visit the warranty was still valid for an approximate additional 7,400 miles. Nevertheless, Inniss did not bring the car to Methot again until March, 1983 when the warranty had expired. The March, 1983 repair order discloses a starting problem that may well reflect normal wear and tear on the car and that required relatively minor repairs. Thus the evidence does not support a contention that Methot refused to complete repairs of defects reported to it or engaged in dilatory or half-hearted efforts at repairs during the warranty period.

Because Inniss failed to establish an adequate evidentiary basis for any of her three contentions, we need not decide whether any of these contentions, alone or in combination, would, if adequately established, constitute a prima facie case under the UTPA. We hold that the court did not err by directing a verdict in favor of Methot on Count VI of Inniss's complaint.

III. Recoupment

In its answer to questions submitted on a special verdict form, the jury found that Inniss was entitled to a return...