Iravedra v. Public Building Authority, Civil No. 01-1581(DRD).

• Decision Date: 23 September 2003
• Docket Number: Civil No. 01-1581(DRD).
• Citation: 283 F.Supp.2d 570
• Parties: Maria IRAVEDRA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

283 F.Supp.2d 570

Maria IRAVEDRA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 01-1581(DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 23, 2003.

Victor P. Miranda-Corrada, Hato Rey Tower, San Juan, PR, for plaintiffs.

Juan M. Rivera-Gonzalez, Lespier & Munoz Noya, Commonwealth Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, Roberto A. Fernandez-Quiles, Hato Rey, PR, Jose A. Santiago-Rivera, Wilfredo Jirau-Toledo, Bayamon, PR, for defendants.

Maria Iravedra, Bayamon, PR, Pro se.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Co-Defendant's, Wilfredo Jirau Toledo, in his personal capacity, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 36). Plaintiff opposed, thereafter filed a Motion supplementing their Opposition. (Docket Nos. 40 & 46). Co-Defendant thereafter submitted a Supplement to his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket No. 49).¹

Co-Defendant moves to dismiss the instant action on the ground that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not provide for individual liability against his person for Plaintiff's gender, sexual harassment, and national origin claims. Co-Defendant further states that Plaintiff's due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is time barred, because filing of an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), does not toll the running of the one-year statute of limitations, provided for Section 1983 claims. For the reasons set forth below, Co-Defendant's Motion is hereby GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Cuban immigrant, became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1978. Her career in the public sector began in 1987. In 1998, she was appointed as the Public Building Authority's Human Resources Director. Plaintiff's claims are alleged to have arisen under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, for deprivation of her due process rights, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.(Docket No. 1, ¶ 1). Pursuant to the facts alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was terminated on September 29, 1999, motivated exclusively by her national origin and gender. Plaintiff, a female employee, also claims to have been a victim of sexual harassment. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was illegally discriminated and wrongfully terminated by Defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII). Plaintiff also invoked supplemental jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, for violation of Puerto Rico's Act No. 17 of April 22, 1988, 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 155 et seq., (better known as the Puerto Rico's Sexual Harassment Law, or Law 17) and under Puerto Rico's Act No. 69 of July 6, 1985, 29 P.R. Laws Ann., § 1321 et seq., (better known as the Puerto Rico's Gender Discrimination Law, or Law 69).

Plaintiff filed this action on May 7, 2001, against Defendant, Wilfredo Jirau-Toledo, in his personal and individual capacity, against the Public Building Authority as Plaintiff's employer, and against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Docket No. 1).² Pursuant to the complaint, Plaintiff's dismissal was retaliatory in nature "because she rejected [her boss'] sexual advances and because of her natural origin." (Docket No. 1, ¶ 26). Plaintiff contends that Jirau-Toledo, as the Executive Director of the Public Building Authority, is individually liable for the alleged discriminatory conduct under the three statutes, to wit, Title VII, and Puerto Rico's Law No. 17, and Law No. 69.

On July 30, 2000, Plaintiff filed administrative charges of discrimination with the Anti Discrimination Unit of Puerto Rico's Department of Labor and the EEOC alleging discrimination on the basis of sex (gender), and national origin, and stated that the last discriminatory act on behalf of Defendants took place on September 29, 1999, date of her discharge.³ The EEOC issued the corresponding "right-to-sue" letter on April 23, 2001; Plaintiff received it the same day. Plaintiff filed suit in this District Court on May 7, 2001. (Docket No. 1).

In his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Co-defendant argues that the claims against him should be dismissed because Title VII does not provide for the imposition of individual liability. Co-Defendant further sustains, in his Motion supplementing the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, that even if Plaintiff timely filed her Title VII claims with the EEOC, the statute of limitations for the Section 1983 claims were not tolled during the pendency of the Title VII administrative proceedings. Because the last discriminatory act occurred on September 29, 1999, i.e., date Plaintiff's discharge took place, and since the complaint including the Section 1983 claims was filed on May 7, 2001, more than a year after the discharge, Co-Defendant requests that such claims be dismissed as time-barred.⁴

In her Opposition, Plaintiff avers that "as regards to the individual liability of supervisors plaintiff disagrees with the position adopted in this district rejecting individual liability under Title VII." (Docket No. 40, ¶ 5). Plaintiff further alleges, and the Court quotes, that "[t]o our knowledge, as of this date neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for their circuit have decided that there is no individual liability in Title VII cases." (Docket No. 40, ¶ 5). Since, according to Plaintiff, the matter is yet to be decided and since the issue has been amply discussed by this Court in other cases, then she refrained from considering it "in order to save time and resources." (Docket No. 40, ¶ 5). As to the statute of limitations defense, Plaintiff stated that pursuant to this Court's decision in Leon-Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 964 F.Supp. 585 (D.Puerto Rico 1997), the filing of an EEOC charge is capable of tolling the § 1983 statute of limitations.

The Court now considers Co-Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c).

II. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c)

The FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE allow a party to move for judgment on the pleadings, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial...." See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(c). When considering a motion under Rule 12(c), courts "must accept all of the nonmovant's well-pleaded factual averment as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [his or her] favor." See Santiago de Castro v. Morales Medina, 943 F.2d 129, 130 (1st Cir.1991)(citing Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988)). Although recently the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "nothing in the text of Rule 12(c) compels [a] court to apply any particular standard when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings," NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2002), on several previous occasions the appellate court has consistently reiterated the long-standing standard that judgment on the pleadings, under Rule 12(c), "may not be entered unless it appears beyond a doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief." Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 788 (1st Cir.1998); Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 3 F.3d 495, 497-98 (1st Cir.1993); International Paper Co. v. Jay, 928 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir.1991). Thus, under Rule 12(c), courts need not credit conclusory statements or merely subjective characterizations, but rather plaintiffs must set forth in their complaint specific, nonconclusory factual allegations regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery. Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir.1992); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989). Pursuant to this standard, the Court now reviews Plaintiffs' pleadings.

III. APPLICATION

A. Individual Liability under Title VII—

As to this type of claims, the Court must express that, in the past, we have addressed the present issue and agreed that Title VII does not provide for the imposition of individual liability. See Vizcarrondo v. Board of Trustees, 139 F.Supp.2d 198, 205 (D.Puerto Rico 2001). In Vizcarrondo, this Court stated that although the First Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have yet to decide this issue of individual liability of supervisors, See e.g. Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 992 (1st Cir.1997) (circuit has not resolved issue and declined to address); see also Scarfo v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 951-952 (1st Cir.1995), this district, and in particular the undersigned, has followed the majority of circuits that have confronted this issue holding that no personal liability can attach to agents and supervisors under Title VII. See Acevedo Vargas v. Colon, 2 F.Supp.2d 203, 206-207 (D.Puerto Rico 1998) (Title VII); Contreras Bordallo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya de P.R., 952 F.Supp. 72 (D.Puerto Rico 1997) (Title VII); Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 975 F.Supp. 115, 120 (D.Puerto Rico 1997) (ADEA). In Cotto v. Citibank, N.A., 247 F.Supp.2d 44, 46-47 (D.Puerto Rico 2003), this Court reached the same conclusion, therefore dismissing Plaintiff's claim under Title VII, against defendants in their individual capacity. See also, Barbosa v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2000 WL 1739309 (D.Puerto Rico 2000), this Court expressed that although Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 56 n. 6 (1st Cir.2000), (took no view on whether there is individual liability under the ADEA); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 992-93 (1st Cir.1997) (avoiding the issue with regard to Title VII), a majority of the circuits, as well as courts in this district, have held that there is no individual liability for claims under Title VII, see Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th Cir.1998); Bales v. Wal-Mart...