Izzo v. Meriden-Wallingford Hosp.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15263,MERIDEN-WALLINGFORD,15263
• Citation: 237 Conn. 259,676 A.2d 857
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Stephanie IZZO v.HOSPITAL et al.

Page 857

676 A.2d 857

237 Conn. 259

Stephanie IZZO v. MERIDEN-WALLINGFORD HOSPITAL et al.

No. 15263.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 15, 1996.

Decided June 4, 1996.

John M. Letizia, Woodbridge, with whom, on the brief, was Andrew A. Cohen, for appellants (named defendant et al.).

Ernie R. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and William J. McCullough and Michael J. Belzer, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee (defendant second injury fund).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and PALMER, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an employee's executed acknowledgment of a preexisting physical defect, in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 31-325, ¹ which was not approved by the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) until after the occurrence of the employee's compensable injury, is effective to transfer liability from the employer to the second injury fund (fund). ² Meriden-Wallingford Hospital and its insurer, Connecticut Hospital Association Workers' Compensation Trust (collectively referred to as the employer), appeal from the decision of the compensation review board (board) in favor of the fund, vacating the ruling of the commissioner. ³ The employer claims that the board improperly concluded that an acknowledgment must be approved by the commissioner prior to the occurrence of a compensable injury in order to effectuate a transfer of liability from the employer to the fund. The fund responds that § 31-325 provides that an acknowledgment is not effective until it is approved by the commissioner, and that it must be effective at the time of the compensable injury in order to transfer liability. We conclude that § 31-325 does not require preinjury approval by the commissioner of the claimant's executed acknowledgment in order to effectuate a transfer of liability from the employer to the fund. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the board and reinstate the ruling of the commissioner. ⁴

The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. In September, 1983, the claimant sought employment as a nurse at Meriden-Wallingford Hospital. Prior to her application, the claimant had sustained lower back injuries and had undergone spinal surgery. At the hospital's request, the claimant agreed to execute an acknowledgment of physical defect form in accordance with § 31-325. The acknowledgment, which described the claimant's preexisting spinal fusion and disc disease, was signed by Leo Willett, the claimant's treating physician, on September 20, 1983. Prior to signing the acknowledgment, the claimant met with her attorney to discuss the meaning and effect of the acknowledgment and to make sure that she understood the implications of signing it. Thereafter, the claimant signed the acknowledgment and delivered it to Jean Sterling, a hospital employee responsible for processing acknowledgments. The acknowledgment, however, was not submitted to the commissioner for approval at that time. The claimant began working at the hospital in November, 1983, but worked for only four hours before she was laid off. Several weeks thereafter she began employment at the veterans hospital, where she executed another acknowledgment, which was immediately approved by the commissioner for the third district.

In February, 1984, the claimant returned to her nursing position at Meriden-Wallingford Hospital. On January 17, 1986, she sustained a compensable injury to her lumbar spine. This injury was attributable in material degree to the claimant's preexisting back condition, which was adequately described in each of her previously executed acknowledgments. Her compensation claim was accepted by the employer, and a voluntary agreement was filed with and approved by the commissioner for the eighth district on November 24, 1986. ⁵ On November 28, 1990, approximately four years later, Meriden-Wallingford Hospital submitted the claimant's earlier executed acknowledgment to the commissioner for the eighth district for approval, at which time it was approved by one of the staff members. ⁶

On November 12, 1992, after several formal hearings, the commissioner issued his initial finding and dismissal of the employer's claim to transfer its worker's compensation liability to the fund. On December 1, 1992, however, after the employer had filed several motions relating to the commissioner's finding and dismissal of its transfer claim, ⁷ the commissioner, sua sponte, reissued his opinion as a revised finding and award in favor of the employer. Thereafter, the employer again moved to correct the findings, which motion was granted on December 12, 1992. Thus, the commissioner's final ruling consists of his sua sponte ruling of December 1, transferring the employee's claim, as modified by his order of December 12.

The commissioner found that, although Meriden-Wallingford Hospital had failed to have the claimant's acknowledgment approved by the commissioner when the claimant signed the acknowledgment in 1983, it was, nevertheless, valid to effectuate a transfer of liability to the fund pursuant to § 31-325 because the acknowledgment had been approved prior to the transfer. The commissioner further found that the acknowledgment, executed and approved during the claimant's employment with the veterans hospital, was valid, under the successor employer provision in § 31-325, to effectuate a transfer of liability to the fund.

The fund then petitioned the board to review the finding and award of the commissioner. The board sustained the fund's appeal, reasoning that, because workers' compensation liability is part of the employment contract, any alteration of the contract under § 31-325, namely, through an effective acknowledgment, must occur prior to the compensable injury. The board, therefore, concluded that, as of the date of the claimant's injury, the employment contract did not include the rights and liabilities set forth in § 31-325. The employer appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the board and reinstate the decision of the commissioner with regard to the Meriden-Wallingford Hospital acknowledgment.

The employer claims that the board improperly concluded that the Meriden-Wallingford Hospital acknowledgment was not valid to effectuate a transfer of liability from the employer to the fund. Specifically, the employer argues that: (1) approval by the commissioner is not required by § 31-325 because it is a directory provision, which, as a result of statutory changes in 1967, no longer affects the claimant's substantive rights; ⁸ and (2) even if we were to interpret the approval provision of § 31-325 as a mandatory requirement that must be satisfied before liability can be transferred from the employer to the fund, such approval need not occur prior to the compensable injury. It need only occur before liability may be transferred. We agree that § 31-325 does not require preinjury approval of the claimant's executed acknowledgment and, therefore, that in the present case, the approved acknowledgment served to effectuate a transfer of liability from the employer to the fund.

The question of whether a commissioner's approval of an executed acknowledgment that occurs after the compensable injury may serve to effectuate a transfer of liability from an employer to the fund under § 31-325 presents an issue of statutory interpretation and, therefore, is a question of law regarding which our review is plenary. State v. Burns, 236 Conn. 18, 22, 670 A.2d 851 (1996). "[I]t is axiomatic that the process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 512, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-60, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., [226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993) ]; see Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 852-57, 633 A.2d 305 (1993).... State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994).

We begin our analysis, therefore, with the language of § 31-325, which provides in relevant part that "[n]o such acknowledgment shall become effective unless the defect in question is plainly described therein, nor until one of the compensation commissioners finds that the person who signed such acknowledgment fully understood the meaning thereof ... nor until such commissioner, in writing, approves thereof, files the same in the district where the employer's business is located, and furnishes each of the parties thereto with a copy thereof." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statute contains only three requirements that must be met in order for an acknowledgment to become effective: (1) the physical defect must be plainly described therein; (2) the commissioner must find that the person who signed it fully understood its meaning; and (3) the commissioner must approve it in writing, file it and furnish copies to the parties. ⁹

In the present case, it is undisputed that the acknowledgment executed by the claimant while employed by the Meriden-Wallingford Hospital plainly and adequately described the preexisting physical defect at issue. It is also...