J. L. Shiely Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 37437,37437
• Citation: 91 N.W.2d 116,252 Minn. 535
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: J. L. SHIELY COMPANY, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.

Page 116

91 N.W.2d 116

252 Minn. 535

J. L. SHIELY COMPANY, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 37437.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 13, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court.

An actor who participates, with or without formal pleading or intervention, as an active contestant on the merits for the determination of issues of law or fact, and who by the outcome of the proceeding will be bound and affected either favorably or adversely with respect to an asserted interest peculiar to him as distinguished from an interest common to the public or other taxpayers in general, is a party to the proceeding.

Held, (a) appellant was not a 'party to a proceeding' before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission within the meaning of M.S.A. § 216.24, nor (b) was it such a 'party affected' by the commission's order involved so as to bring it under the statute.

James H. Mulally, St. Paul, for appellant.

Stuart W. Rider, Jr., Roland D. Graham, Minneapolis, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the district court dismissing an appeal from an order of the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission.

The proceeding out of which this appeal arises was commenced before the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission, herein referred to as the commission, by the filing of a petition by the Minnesota Lines Committee in June 1954, in behalf of respondent, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, hereafter called the railroad, to publish a rate of 75 cents per net ton on sand and gravel moved from Spur No. 383 of the railroad near Hastings, Minnesota, to St. Paul, Minneapolis, Minnesota Transfer, and St. Louis Park, Minnesota.

After several resettings the hearing was finally held by the commission on June 24, 1956. Appellant, J. L. Shiely Company, referred to as Shiely, received notices of the reset hearing dates according to the affidavit of its executive vice president. It appeared at the hearing as a protestant, at which time witnesses testified for both the railroad and Shiely and were cross-examined by the parties. Thereafter on July 12, 1956, the commission filed its report, findings of facts, and order which read in part:

'* * * that the petition herein be and the same is hereby denied without prejudice to the proponent railroad company herein establishing a rate of 75 cents per net ton, subject to Ex Parte No. 196, increases for application from and to the points named in paragraph 1 hereof, and at the same time establishing a rate of 52 cents per net ton, subject to Ex Parte 196 increase, from and to the points named in paragraph 5, hereof.'

On October 9, 1956, the commission filed an order reopening the matter and set a date for further hearing. In January 1957 Shiely petitioned the commission to be permitted to file a complaint in intervention. The railroad opposed the petition which was denied without prejudice to the petitioner filing a separate complaint as to the unreasonableness of the present rate or rates. No appeal was taken by Shiely from that action of the commission.

After two cancellations of the original date, the second hearing was held on April 16, 1957. Shiely was given notice of all the reassignment dates according to the affidavit of its officer and was represented at the April 16th hearing by its attorney, at which time a witness was heard and an exhibit received in its behalf.

With respect to the policy of the commission in connection with hearings, the affidavit of the commission's secretary states that the hearings before the commission are public and any person, whether he received a notice or not, is permitted to state his position on any matter before the commission and give testimony material to such proceedings. However, persons receiving notices of hearings and persons appearing to take part in such hearings are not parties to such proceedings unless such person be a party as defined by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission Rules of Practice. Rule III reads in part as follows:

'The parties to proceedings before the commission are termed: (a) complainants; or (b) respondents; but in addition, according to the nature of the proceeding and their relation thereto, there may be (c) intervenors.

'The person or persons against whom complaint is made are styled respondents.

'Complainants permitted to intervene, as hereinafter provided, are styled intervenors; and if such permission is granted, the petitioner, thereby, becomes an intervenor and a party to the proceeding. But leave will not be granted except on petition containing allegations reasonably pertinent to the issues tendered on behalf of complainant or respondent and which do not unduly broaden them.'

Rule IV provides that any person entitled to complain to the commission and anyone having an interest therein may petition for leave to intervene in any pending proceeding prior to or at the time set for the hearing but not thereafter except for good cause shown; such petition must set forth the grounds for the proposed intervention and the interest of the petitioner in the proceedings and should conform to the requirements of a formal complaint. Appearance may be entered without applying for or receiving leave to intervene in all general or special investigations commenced by the commission without complaint (which was not the situation here in these proceedings which were commenced by a petition or complaint).

On May 16, 1957, the commission filed its second report, findings of fact, and order, as follows:

'It Is Therefore Ordered, that the applicant railroad be and is hereby authorized to establish a rate of 75cents per net ton, subject to Ex Parte 196 increases on sand and gravel for application from and to the points named in paragraph 1 hereof, and at the same time establish a rate of 75cents per net ton, subject to Ex Parte 196 increases from St. Paul to Minnesota Transfer, Minneapolis and St. Louis Park, Minnesota, without the addition of switching charges from the shipper's location on the tracks of the Port Authority of the City of St. Paul.'

After the filing of the second report, findings, and order, Shiely appealed therefrom to the District Court of Ramsey County, pursuant to M.S.A. § 216.24. The pertinent part of that statute pertaining to appeals to the district court from orders of the commission provides:

'Any party to a proceeding before the commission, or any party affected by any order thereof, or the State of Minnesota, by the attorney general, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county in which the complainants, or a majority of them, reside, * * *.'

On June 12, 1957, the railroad moved said district court for a dismissal of Shiely's appeal on the ground that the later was not a party to the proceeding before the commission or affected by the order and that therefore the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties Shiely filed with the clerk of the district court certified copies of all of the proceedings before the commission in both hearings, to be referred to the judge before whom the motion for dismissal was to be heard. On October 1, 1957, the district court ordered a dismissal of Shiely's appeal on the grounds that it had neither been a party to the proceeding nor a party affected by the commission's order within the meaning of § 216.24, and that it was improperly and unlawfully before the court and that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter. This appeal is from that order.

The legal issues raised by Shiely on appeal are: (a) Whether it became a party to the proceeding entitling it to appeal to the district court from the commission's order, or (b) whether it became a party affected by the commission's order.

(a) Shiely cites cases from this court covering the right to appeal to the district court from an order of the commission under § 216.24. It argues that in its earlier decisions this court made rather technical interpretations of the statute, as in Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 461, 62 N.W. 826, and State v. Tri-State T. & T. Co., 146 Minn. 247, 178 N.W. 603. It claims, however, that in State v. Rock Island M.T. Co., 209 Minn. 105, 295 N.W. 519, and In re Flying Cloud Airport, 226 Minn. 272, 32 N.W.2d 560, we overruled our earlier decisions. The railroad argues to the contrary and claims that the first two decisions are controlling and that the last two expressly distinguished but did not overrule the earlier ones.

In State v. Tri-State T. & T. Co. supra, this court defined the phrase 'party to a proceeding' in an appeal from an order of the commission under § 216.24. In that case proceedings were commenced by the commission on an order to show cause why certain telephone rates should not be reduced. The city of St. Paul received a notice of the hearing and appeared in behalf of itself and its citizens objecting to the maintenance of high rates. It appeared at the hearing and participated in the proceedings, including cross-examination of witnesses called by the telephone company. It appealed to the district court from an order of the commission which temporarily approved maintenance of the higher rate. The district court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the city was not a party to the proceeding before the commission. Upon appeal to this court we said that the term 'parties' includes those who are directly interested in the subject matter and who have the right to control the proceeding, examine and cross-examine the witnesses, and appeal from order to judgment finally entered. We also said that one is not a party merely because he is interested in the results. We held in that case that the city was never made and never became a party; it had no right to control the proceedings; it was not bound by the order made by the commission; it could commence new proceedings by filing a complaint with the...