Jackson, Matter of
| Decision Date | 03 February 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 8627DC647,8627DC647 |
| Citation | 352 S.E.2d 449,84 N.C.App. 167 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 37 Ed. Law Rep. 383 In the Matter of Calvin Wayne JACKSON, Jr., Juvenile. |
Garland & Alala, P.A. by James B. Garland, Julia M. Shovelin, and Elizabeth G. Sarn, Gastonia, for petitioner-appellant Gaston County Bd. of Educ.
Joseph B. Roberts, III, P.A. by Stephen T. Gheen, Gastonia, for respondent-appellee.
Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy by Martha E. Johnston, Greensboro, for Governor's Advocacy Council for Persons with Disabilities, amicus curiae.
Daniel D. Addison, Raleigh, for Governor's Advocacy Council for Children and Youth, amicus curiae.
This appeal concerns the validity of an order of Gaston County District Court Judge Larry L. Langson directing the petitioner, Gaston County Board of Education, to place the respondent, Calvin Wayne Jackson, Jr., in an appropriate school program after Calvin Jackson had been suspended from the Gaston County public schools. The issues presented involve the extent of the district court's authority in making dispositions pursuant to the North Carolina Juvenile Code, Articles 41-58 of [84 N.C.App. 169] Chapter 7A of the General Statutes, and the responsibility of the public schools toward students who have been lawfully suspended or expelled. For the reasons discussed hereafter, we conclude that the challenged order was improperly entered, and therefore we reverse.
Calvin Wayne Jackson, Jr. was suspended from the Gaston County school system on 7 October 1985 for the remainder of the 1985-86 school year, as a result of having physically assaulted a student and a teacher and verbally and profanely threatening another teacher. The suspension was upheld on appeal by a hearing board of the Gaston County Board of Education.
Beginning 9 October 1985, three juvenile petitions were filed against Calvin charging him with simple assault, breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, larceny of a firearm, and carrying a concealed weapon. Proceedings were instituted and heard pursuant to provisions of the North Carolina Juvenile Code. Jackson was apparently adjudicated a delinquent by juvenile court Judge Langson. In an order continuing the dispositional hearing to 23 January 1986, Judge Langson indicated his intent that Calvin "be placed in some type of public school situation," and ordered the Gaston County Board of Education to appear at the proceeding "to present a plan that would be of benefit both to the school and the Respondent."
Representatives of the Board, including legal counsel and school personnel, appeared at the hearing where Judge Langson questioned them regarding Calvin's suspension and attempted to involve the school system in developing an educational program for Calvin. The Board contended that the school system did not have a suitable program for Calvin or funds to implement one. Following the hearing, during which the Board declined to propose a plan, the court ordered the Gaston County School System to immediately "place the Respondent, Calvin Jackson, Jr., in whatever type of school program the School System deems appropriate."
Among the court's numerous findings of fact is the finding that Calvin had been legally suspended due to his fighting and aggressive behavior, and the further finding that in suspending Calvin, the School Board had complied with the procedures set forth in N.C.Gen.Stat.Sec. 115C-391(c) (1983). The court concluded as a matter of law:
(1) THAT pursuant to General Statute [Sec.] 7A-516(3), 7A-646, and 7A-649(a)(b) [sic] the Court has the authority to decide if it is in the Respondent's best interest to attend a Public School Facility in his County.
(2) THE COURT CONCLUDES AS A MATTER OF LAW that it is in the particular Respondent's best interest that he attend some type of School Program, so he is not left to his own devices until the school year commencing in August, 1986 starts.
(3) THE COURT FURTHER CONCLUDES AS A MATTER OF LAW that regardless of whether or not G.S. 115(c) -391(c) has been complied with, the Public School System has an obligation to school age children to provide some type of forum to the Juveniles, so that they are not left free to roam at will.
(4) THE COURT FURTHER CONCLUDES AS A MATTER OF LAW that the particular forum to be provided to the Respondent shall be left totally up to the Gaston County School System, it merely being the intention of the Court that the Juvenile be allowed to attend some Facility where he can partake of some program and in some way learn how to be a more productive citizen.
The Board of Education appealed the order and sought a temporary stay which was granted by this Court 20 March 1986. On 3 April 1986 this Court allowed the Board's petitions for writ of supersedeas and writ of certiorari. Thereafter, this Court granted motions of the Governor's Advocacy Council for Persons with Disabilities and the Governor's Advocacy Council on Children and Youth to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the respondent.
At the outset we note that this case is technically moot inasmuch as Calvin Jackson's suspension from the Gaston County schools terminated at the end of the 1985-86 school year. However, the case is similar to that category of cases which federal courts, in determining the existence of federal jurisdiction in otherwise moot cases, term "capable of repetition yet evading review." See, e.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Children involved in delinquency proceedings are frequently guilty of misconduct at school and thus subject to school board disciplinary proceedings as well. Until the conflict between a school system's right to suspend students for misconduct and the juvenile court's authority to fashion sensitive and appropriate dispositions which include provision for the educational needs of adjudicated delinquent juveniles is resolved, it is not improbable that the Gaston County Board of Education or other local school boards will be repeatedly subject to orders like the one in the case sub judice. Because a suspension pursuant to G.S. Sec. 115C-391(c) can never be longer than the balance of the school year, the effect of an order overriding the suspension may always be of too short a duration to allow full litigation of the issues prior to its expiration. Consequently, we exercise our discretion to decide the issues presented.
As a further preliminary matter, we reject the Board's contention that because the Board was not a party to the juvenile proceeding, the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order. Specifically, the Board argues that an order addressing a person not a party to the action violates principles of fundamental fairness and due process.
Many of the dispositive alternatives available to the juvenile court under the Juvenile Code must be implemented through third parties--generally agencies of the state or county. See N.C.Gen.Stat.Secs. 7A-647, -648, and -649. In In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 272 S.E.2d 861 (1981), our Supreme Court recognized that many of these alternatives are not self-executing, and, without the grant of authority in G.S. Sec. 7A-647 to charge costs of certain care to the county, would be "empty and unworkable." Id. at 553-54, 272 S.E.2d at 874. Likewise, many of these provisions would be unworkable if the Court lacked authority to order local public agencies to assist in implementing its dispositions in otherwise appropriate cases.
The School Board, in this case, had adequate notice of the action and its potential implications for the Board and was given an opportunity to be heard at the dispositional hearing. Under these circumstances, we conclude that fundamental fairness did not prohibit the Court from entering an order directed at the Board merely because the Board was not formally made a party to the proceeding.
The School Board further contends that the Court's order violates the Separation of Powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution. We summarily reject this argument without discussion.
The determinative issues in this case, arising from the court's first and third conclusions of law, are: (1) whether the Juvenile Code authorizes district courts to require public school attendance by an expelled or suspended juvenile, and (2) whether the public school system is legally obligated to provide an alternative forum for such students.
1. The District Court concluded that N.C.Gen.Stat.Secs. 7A-516(3), -646, and -649(8)(b) (1981) granted it the authority to require Calvin Jackson to attend a public school facility in his county. The Board maintains that (1) the Court erred in its construction of these provisions of the Juvenile Code and their relationship to N.C.Gen.Stat.Sec. 115C-391 which authorizes the suspension from school of students who willfully violate school conduct policies, and (2) the Court thus exceeded its authority under the Juvenile Code in ordering the Board to place Calvin Jackson in a public school program when Calvin had been legally suspended and no appropriate alternative educational program existed for suspended students.
G.S. Sec. 7A-516 and -646 are general statements of the purposes and policies behind the Juvenile Code which indicate that the Court, in making dispositions, should consider the needs of the child, the family, and the public and should utilize appropriate community resources whenever possible. G.S. Sec. 7A-649, which sets forth dispositional alternatives available "in the case of any juvenile who is delinquent," allows a judge to place the juvenile on probation and require as a condition of probation "[t]hat the juvenile attend school regularly." G.S. Sec. 7A-649(8)(b).
Proper construction of statutes requires that individual portions be examined within the context of the whole law and "accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent...
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