Jackson v. State

Decision Date21 September 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97SA275,97SA275
Citation966 P.2d 1046
Parties98 CJ C.A.R. 4914 Richard JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The STATE of Colorado; The Board of County Commissioners of Morgan County; Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; The Director of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Gale A. Norton, in her official capacity as Chairperson of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Steve Zotos, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Pat Ahlstrom, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Margaret W. Carpenter, in her official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Jeffrey J. Corriveau, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Daniel L. Corsentino, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; George E. Epp, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Rev. Gill Ford, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Joe Johnson, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Ed Jordan, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Charles J. Johnston, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Al Kiburas, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Frank R. Martinez, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; David Michaud, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Richard L. Murdie, in his official capacity as member of the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board; Allan F. Stanley, in his official capacity as member of the
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Powers Phillips, P.C., Richard W. Daily, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Paul Farley, Deputy Attorney General, John August Lizza, First Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law Section, Denver, for State Defendants-Appellants.

George Monsson, Morgan County Attorney, Ft. Morgan, for Defendant-Appellant The Board of County Commissioners of Morgan County.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We address several constitutional challenges to the facial validity and application of the Sheriff Training Statute. See §§ 30-10-501.5 to -501.7, 9 C.R.S. (1997). The Sheriff Training Statute promulgates training and certification requirements for county sheriffs and mandates the suspension of their salaries in the event that they fail to comply with those requirements. In January of 1997, Sheriff Richard Jackson filed an action under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979), challenging Morgan County's application of the Sheriff Training Statute to withhold his salary. The trial court issued a permanent injunction, ruling that the Sheriff Training Statute was unconstitutional and unenforceable against Sheriff Jackson and that its application to him violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. While this suit was pending, the General Assembly repealed and reenacted a similar version of the Sheriff Training Statute. The trial court held that the reenacted Sheriff Training Statute was also unforceable. The court issued an order prohibiting the State from suspending Sheriff Jackson's salary and awarded attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980).

In accordance with section 13-4-102(1)(b), 5 C.R.S. (1997), 1 the Board of County Commissioners of Morgan County (the "BOCC"), the Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (the "POST Board"), its Director and individual members of the POST Board in their official capacities, and the State of Colorado (collectively "the State" or "State-defendants") bring this direct appeal of the trial court's rulings and judgment. We affirm both the permanent injunction issued by the trial court and its related orders. We hold that when the General Assembly enacted the original Sheriff Training Statute in 1990, it lacked the authority to impose any qualifications on the constitutionally created office of county sheriff. Hence, we hold that because the original Sheriff Training Statute sought to impose qualifications for the job of sheriff in the form of certification requirements, it was unconstitutional. We further hold that the training and certification requirements contained in the reenacted Sheriff Training Statute cannot be applied to Sheriff Jackson during his current term of office. Lastly, we affirm the trial court's rulings with respect to the violation of Sheriff Jackson's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we return this case to the district court for calculation of attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

I. BACKGROUND

As background to this constitutional dispute, we detail the relevant facts developed in the trial court. In 1990, the General Assembly passed the Sheriff Training Statute, § 30-10-501.5, 12A C.R.S. (1996 Supp.) (the "predecessor training statute") 2, requiring that all county sheriffs complete certain training requirements and obtain basic peace officer certification. In November of 1994, Morgan County voters elected Richard Jackson to the position of county sheriff. When his term of office began in January of 1995, Sheriff Jackson did not have the proper certification as a peace officer and therefore was not in compliance with the Sheriff Training Statute. A member of the Morgan County Board of Commissioners advised Sheriff Jackson that he must obtain peace officer certification or his pay would be suspended pursuant to the training statute.

After this notification, Sheriff Jackson completed the training program approved by the POST Board for peace officer certification and was scheduled to take a written exam necessary for certification. Before the date of the exam, Sheriff Jackson was diagnosed with lung cancer, which required immediate surgery and subsequent chemotherapy and radiation treatments. This illness prevented Sheriff Jackson from sitting for the exam for several months. In January of 1997, Sheriff Jackson took the exam despite undergoing radiation treatment the day of the test. He did not pass the exam and to date he has not attempted to retake the certification examination.

After Sheriff Jackson failed the exam, the POST Board Director informed the Morgan County Commissioners of this fact and the commissioners voted unanimously to suspend Sheriff Jackson's salary and benefits, including his health insurance, effective for his January 31, 1997 paycheck. 3 Immediately upon learning of the commissioners' vote, Sheriff Jackson obtained a temporary restraining order from the Denver District Court prohibiting the suspension of his salary and benefits. At the State's request, the Denver court transferred the case to the Morgan County District Court, which entered a preliminary injunction.

In May of 1997, the legislature repealed and reenacted the Sheriff Training Statute (the "reenacted training statute"). 4 Following the reenactment of this statute, the State sought to dissolve the preliminary injunction and enforce the statute's provisions against Sheriff Jackson.

As part of its final orders, in July of 1997, the trial court declared that the predecessor training statute was unconstitutional, and that the reenacted training statute was not applicable to Sheriff Jackson. The court ruled that the State's attempts to carry out the predecessor training statute's provisions violated Sheriff Jackson's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court entered judgment on behalf of Sheriff Jackson and awarded attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The State-defendants appeal from that judgment.

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PREDECESSOR TRAINING STATUTE

Initially, we address the constitutionality of the predecessor training statute as it existed before the passage of Referendum C. 5 This version of the Sheriff Training Statute required a person elected to the office of Sheriff for the first time to complete certain training requirements and to obtain basic peace officer certification from the POST Board within one year. See § 30-10-501.6(1)(b). The district court held that the predecessor training statute was unconstitutional based upon the reasoning of our decision in Reale v. Board of Real Estate Appraisers, 880 P.2d 1205 (Colo.1994), which invalidated a similar statute requiring a county assessor to obtain a real estate appraiser's license within one year of taking office.

We agree with the trial court's application of our logic in Reale to invalidate the predecessor training statute. There is no difference between requiring a county assessor to obtain a real estate appraiser's license within one year of taking office and requiring a county sheriff to obtain peace officer certification within one year of taking office.

In Reale, we recognized that the Colorado Constitution provides for the office of county assessor and establishes specific requirements for holding this office. See Reale, 880 P.2d at 1206 (citing Colo. Const. art. XIV, § 10). We held that these constitutional qualifications were exclusive and that "[t]he Colorado Constitution reserves no authority in the state legislature to change, add to, or...

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