Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 2018
• Docket Number: NO. 14-17-00511-CR,14-17-00511-CR
• Citation: 565 S.W.3d 900
• Parties: Nicholas JACKSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

565 S.W.3d 900

Nicholas JACKSON, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 14-17-00511-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed December 20, 2018.

Martha Hill Jamison, Justice

Appellant Nicholas Jackson was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor for failing to stop and give information and was sentenced to two days in Harris County Jail. He appeals his conviction and the assessment of certain court costs. Concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, appellant did not prove he was egregiously harmed by purported jury charge error, and the court costs assessed against appellant are constitutional, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

Jack Simmons was in the left turn lane at Montrose and Fairview Streets in Houston, Texas. Appellant’s car was ahead of him while waiting to turn left. The solid green light afforded only an unprotected left turn. Appellant did not complete his turn before the light turned red, so he backed out of the intersection and made contact with the front of Simmons’s car. Simmons felt his vehicle "shudder" from the impact and heard a pop and crack. When the light turned green again, both appellant and Simmons completed the left turn.

Simmons followed appellant for some distance while appellant kept driving. Simmons alerted the Houston Police Department at some point. Meanwhile, Simmons sounded his horn and flashed his lights four or five times. He pulled up next to appellant and asked, "Are you going to stop?" Appellant waved at Simmons but continued driving.

Officer Peters responded to Simmons’s call and conducted a traffic stop. The stop was recorded on Peters’s bodycam. Peters took a statement from Simmons and asked to see where appellant hit his vehicle. Simmons used a light on his cell phone to show Peters the damage. Peters also asked Simmons whether he wanted to prosecute or just obtain appellant’s insurance information. Peters informed appellant that he had failed to pull over after an accident. Appellant appeared surprised and stated that he did not believe he had been in an accident. Peters told appellant that Simmons’s vehicle had very little damage except to his front license plate.¹ Appellant’s vehicle had no damage.

Appellant was indicted for "intentionally and knowingly" failing to stop and give his name and address to Simmons. The jury charge included a definition of "knowingly." Appellant did not object to the charge. A jury found appellant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to two days' confinement in county jail, plus court costs, including a district attorney’s fee of $25, a jury fee of $40, and a sheriff’s fee of $15 for "Summoning Witness/Mileage."

Discussion

Appellant challenges his conviction on the grounds of legal insufficiency and jury charge error. Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of certain court costs assessed against him.

I. The evidence is legally sufficient.

In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to prove he was knowingly involved in an accident. When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, whether any rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v. State , 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). We do not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Rather, we defer to the factfinder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Id. This standard applies equally to both circumstantial and direct evidence. Id. Each fact need not point directly and independently to the appellant’s guilt, as long as the cumulative effect of all incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

To establish failure to stop and give information, the State was required to prove that while operating a vehicle, appellant was "intentionally or knowingly" involved in an accident resulting in damage to another vehicle and failed to stop or provide required information. Tex. Transp. Code §§ 550.022(c), 550.023 ; Steen v. State , 640 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Appellant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the evidence that he was intentionally or knowingly involved in an accident.

Appellant argues that the totality of the evidence does not support a determination that he was knowingly involved in an accident with Simmons because appellant drove prudently while Simmons followed him, acted surprised when the officer said appellant had been involved in an accident, and sustained no damage to his vehicle, among other things.² We disagree.

The jury also heard the following testimony:

• Simmons felt his vehicle shudder when appellant backed into him;

• Simmons heard a pop and crack at the same time;

• While following Jackson, Simmons sounded his horn and flashed his lights about four or five times each;

• Simmons pulled alongside Jackson, rolled down his window and asked, "are you going to stop?" and

• The officer saw damage to the front of Simmons’s vehicle.

Intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Darkins v. State , 430 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). While appellant provided evidence that he did not know he was involved in an accident with Simmons, the jury weighed this evidence against the above evidence.

The jury has the responsibility of weighing all the evidence, resolving any evidentiary conflicts, and drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. See Garcia v. State , 57 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In light of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences the jury was free to make, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to show that appellant was knowingly involved in a traffic accident. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

II. Appellant was not egregiously harmed by the trial court’s definition of "knowingly" submitted to the jury.

In his second issue, appellant argues that he was egregiously harmed because the charged offense is a "circumstances of conduct" offense and the court’s charge did not limit the definition of "knowingly" to the circumstances surrounding his failure to stop and give information. The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of offenses: "result of conduct," "nature of conduct," or "circumstances of conduct." Robinson v. State , 466 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Circumstances of conduct offenses prohibit otherwise innocent behavior that becomes criminal only under specific circumstances. Id.

In analyzing a jury charge issue, our first duty is to decide whether error exists. Middleton v. State , 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If so, we then analyze that error for harm. Id. When a defendant fails to object to the charge, we will reverse only when the error was so egregious and created such harm that the defendant did not have a fair trial. Bluitt v. State , 137 S.W.3d 51, 52-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ; Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). To determine whether a defendant has sustained egregious harm from a non-objected-to instruction, appellate courts consider (1) the entire charge; (2) the state of the evidence, including contested issues; (3) arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information. Bluitt , 137 S.W.3d at 52-53 ; Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171.

Appellant complains that the trial court’s definition of "knowingly" in the charge was too broad because it defined the term as involving knowledge of the result, nature, and circumstances of conduct and thus was not limited only to circumstances of conduct.³ Presuming that the failure to stop and give information is a circumstances of conduct offense and that the court erred in not limiting the definition of "knowingly" as asserted by appellant, we conclude the error did not create harm such that the defendant did not have a fair trial.⁴

Appellant concedes that the focus of the evidence and the contested issues at trial were directed at whether he knew he had been in an accident. He further concedes that closing arguments also centered on whether he was knowingly involved in an accident. Appellant argues only that the charge should have omitted language involving nature of conduct and result of conduct offenses.⁵ He does not argue that the state of the evidence, arguments of counsel, or any other relevant information advanced an erroneous theory. See Bluitt , 137 S.W.3d at 52-53. We conclude that appellant did not meet his burden of showing egregious harm and overrule his second issue.

III. Challenged statutes imposing court costs are constitutional.

In his third through fifth issues, appellant challenges the constitutionality of statutes imposing court costs for district attorney’s, jury’s, and sheriff’s fees. Appellant did not object to the imposition of court costs in the trial court. The costs were assessed in open court but not itemized in the judgment. The cost bill was generated the same day as the judgment, but it is not clearly incorporated into the judgment. The judgment includes a blank for "court costs," which states "$ as assessed."

Convicted defendants may object to the assessment of mandatory court costs against them for the first time on appeal when the judgment does not contain an itemization of the imposed court costs. London v. State , 490 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Bowden v. State , 502 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). We presume that the...