Jackson v. Wainwright, 60271
| Decision Date | 07 October 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 60271,60271 |
| Citation | 421 So.2d 1385 |
| Parties | Ronald JACKSON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Karen M. Gottlieb and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Theda R. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.
By petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner (hereinafter referred to as defendant) asserts ineffective assistance by counsel on his direct appeal from his conviction and sentence of death, and, that because of this, he is entitled to a belated appellate review. The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stems from acts or omissions before this Court in Jackson v. State, 366 So.2d 752 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). We have jurisdiction. Art. V § 3(b)(9), Fla.Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(3); Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla.1981).
Defendant has identified four legal errors which he contends his appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal. He argues that the failure to present those issues denied him his rights to a full and meaningful appeal and to the effective assistance of appellate counsel as guaranteed by the sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States. These asserted legal errors include: 1) the trial court's admission of oral statements made by defendant during interrogation proceedings conducted after invocation of his Miranda rights; 2) the trial court's application of a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, i.e., defendant's failure to display remorse for the offense; 3) the trial court's improper construction of mitigating circumstances, i.e., impaired mental state of defendant at the time of the offense and his inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law; and, 4) the trial court's instructions to the jury that where one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found death is presumed to be the proper sentence, unless they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating factors. We have considered these assertions in light of the standards announced in Knight and find no substantial deficiency in defendant's representation on appeal by which he was prejudiced.
Defendant was first arrested by a Florida highway patrol officer and was immediately advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to remain silent, and interrogation ceased. Defendant was then turned over to Dade County officers and placed in the Dade County jail. Approximately four hours after defendant had invoked his privilege of remaining silent, Dade County officers gave defendant a fresh set of warnings. Defendant says his counsel should have challenged the admissibility of oral statements made by him during interrogations conducted after defendant's assertion of his fifth amendment right of silence. Instead, defendant says his counsel challenged the admissibility of the statements on other grounds, overlooking the merits of this claim which certainly had an "arguable chance of succeeding." We disagree.
In Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 868, 89 S.Ct. 154, 21 L.Ed.2d 136 (1968), it appeared that Jennings was first warned by Ft. Pierce, Florida, police of his Miranda rights. After Jennings answered a few questions he announced that he would not answer any further questions and the interrogation immediately stopped. Approximately one hour later, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrived at the police station to interrogate Jennings. Proceeding as if there had been no prior interrogation, the FBI agent again gave full and complete warning. Subsequent to these warnings, the defendant signed a waiver and did not hesitate to discuss the matter with the agent. Jennings challenged the admissibility of the statements arguing that he had refused to answer any further questions from Fort Pierce police and it was improper, under Miranda, for the FBI agent to question him. The Court held that there was no error in the admission of the statement obtained by the FBI. It cannot be said that a challenge to the admissibility of the statement on this ground would have an "arguable chance of success," as to warrant the conclusion that defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to review this argument on appeal, or that defendant's counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to reargue this point.
Defendant argues that in the findings of fact supporting the sentence of death, the trial judge expressly relied upon, in addition to two statutory aggravating and two statutory mitigating factors, one nonstatutory aggravating factor, i.e., defendant's failure to display remorse for the offense.
The first paragraph of these findings of fact reads as follows:
That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist in this particular case that far outweigh any mitigating circumstances in the record. The death of this decedent occurred while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of Armed Robbery. In addition thereto the defendant clearly committed the capital felony in order to eliminate the victim of the robbery. He forcibly transported the victim against her will, from the scene of the robbery to a lonely desolate area to accomplish the capital felony. These facts alone, in this Court's judgment could justify the imposition of the death penalty, but this particular killing is far more useless and heinous than this.
366 So.2d at 756 (emphasis added).
In the Court's reasoned judgment, these facts alone were sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, however, the Court also discussed the heinous nature of the crime, and then said:
The facts of this case are the most "heinous, atrocious and cruel" that this Court has ever considered. It...
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