Jacobsen v. Department of Labor and Industries, No. 31376-6-II (WA 4/19/2005)
| Decision Date | 19 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 31376-6-II,31376-6-II |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | LARRY D. JACOBSEN, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant. |
Appeal from Superior Court of Grays Harbor County. Docket No: 02-2-00780-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 12/15/2003. Judge signing: Hon. F Mark McCauley.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Penny L. Allen, Attorney at Law, Ofc of the Atty General, PO Box 40121, Olympia, WA 98504-0121.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Carol L. Casey, Attorney at Law, 219 Prospect St, Port Orchard, WA 98366-5325.
The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) appeals the trial court's exclusion of temporary total disability benefits (TTD or `time loss') from the prior benefit payments it deducted from Larry Jacobsen's permanent total disability pension reserve. The Department argues that such deduction is necessary to prevent Jacobsen's double recovery for his disability and to further the purpose of RCW 51.32.080(4). Holding that the statute neither required nor allowed deduction of Jacobsen's time loss benefits from his pension, we affirm.
I. Adjudication of Jacobsen's Claim
On April 25, 1980, Larry Jacobsen injured his back in the course of his employment with Short Haul, Inc. On May 1, 1980, he filed a worker's compensation claim. The Department issued an order paying him time loss1 compensation for his temporary total disability beginning April 26, 1980. Jacobsen underwent treatment to restore his ability to work.2
On November 25, 1987, the Department attempted to close Jacobsen's claim and to award him $9,000 for permanent partial disability (PPD), based on his physical and mental health impairments stemming from his injury on the job in April 1980. When Jacobsen appealed, the Department reinstated his claim and continued until June 24, 1989, to pay him time loss payments for his temporary total disability.
On November 14, 1989, the Department again attempted to close Jacobsen's claim with an increased PPD award of $17,250, less previously paid PPD awards. Jacobsen again appealed. Again, the order did not become final. It appears from the record that while Jacobsen's claim remained open, the Department continued to pay him time loss.3
On October 4, 1990, the Department issued a closing order, increasing Jacobsen's permanent partial disability award to $30,000. This time, Jacobsen did not appeal, and the order became final.
On November 7, 1991, Jacobsen filed an aggravation claim.4 The Department determined that Jacobsen's condition had objectively worsened compared to his earlier condition on October 4, 1990. On June 18, 1992, the Department issued an order reopening Jacobsen's claim effective October 24, 1991, and it reinstated Jacobsen's time loss payments. The Department continued to pay him time loss compensation for temporary total disability, resulting from aggravation of his original injury, until November 15, 2000.
On January 5, 2001, the Department issued an order finding Jacobsen permanently totally disabled; it placed him on the pension rolls effective November 16, 2000. This order directed that $19,309.30, of the $30,000 in permanent partial disability it had previously paid Jacobsen, be deducted from his pension reserve fund. Jacobsen appealed the Department's order to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals.
A Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) administrative law judge issued a proposed decision, instructing the Department to take into consideration the amount of all time loss compensation the Department had paid Jacobsen after November 25, 1987.5 Jacobsen appealed to a three-member Board, which denied his petition and adopted the proposed decision as its final order.
Jacobsen appealed the Board's final order to Grays Harbor County Superior Court. He challenged the Board's allowing the Department to include time loss compensation in determining what his permanent total disability (PTD) compensation would have been had he received a pension in the `first instance.' Reviewing the administrative record in its appellate capacity, the superior court held that RCW 51.32.080(4) did not authorize the Department to consider previously paid time loss compensation in determining Jacobsen's `first instance' calculation. The superior court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, reversed the Board's order, and remanded to the Department to recompute any permanent partial disability deduction from Jacobsen's pension reserve.
The Department appeals, raising the following issue: Does RCW 51.32.080(4) require or allow the Department to take into consideration prior temporary total disability payments (time loss) to Jacobsen, in addition to permanent partial disability payments, when calculating the deduction from Jacobsen's permanent total disability pension reserve? We answer no.
Courts retain the ultimate authority to interpret a statute. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 325-26, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983). Construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo under the error of law standard. City of Pasco v. Pub. Empl. Relations Comm'n, 119 Wn.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992).
In so doing, we give effect to the Legislature's intent in promulgating the statute. Washington's Industrial Insurance Act `is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.' Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987).
We begin our review with the statute's plain language. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wn.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). Where a statute is unambiguous, as here, we determine legislative intent from the statutory language alone. Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc. v. Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994).
The Department challenges the trial court's ruling that it could not deduct from Jacobsen's pension the temporary total disability compensation (`time loss') it had already paid him because RCW 51.32.080(4) does not expressly mention temporary total disability (TTD or `time loss') in calculating such a deduction. The Department argues that (1) permanent partial disability (PPD) pension compensation and time loss compensation (TTD) are both `total disability' compensation,6 and (2) it must avoid overlapping total disability benefits by excluding those periods in which the worker actually received time loss from the `first instance'7 calculation in RCW 51.32.080(4) forward. We disagree.
RCW 51.32.080(4) requires:
If permanent partial disability compensation is followed by permanent total disability compensation, any portion of the permanent partial disability compensation which exceeds the amount that would have been paid the injured worker if permanent total disability compensation had been paid in the first instance, shall be deducted from the pension reserve of such injured worker and his or her monthly compensation payments shall be reduced accordingly.
(Emphases added.) Our Supreme Court has held that this PPD deduction statute applies `in all cases where permanent partial disability compensation is followed by permanent total disability compensation.' Stuckey v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 129 Wn.2d 289, 299-300, 916 P.2d 399 (1996) (emphases added).
The purpose of this PPD deduction statute, RCW 51.32.080(4), is to `ensure that injured workers who first receive permanent partial disability awards and later receive total disability pensions do not receive greater benefits than workers who endure permanent total disabilities in the first instance.' Stuckey, 129 Wn.2d at 296 (emphases added).
The Department relies on Harrington v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d 1, 113 P.2d 518 (1941). But Harrington does not apply here. Harrington was permanently totally disabled in the first instance, for which he received a lump sum settlement from his pension reserve. 9 Wn.2d at 2-3. In rejecting Harrington's new unrelated claim for additional time loss compensation, after he returned to work and was injured again, the Court held, `Having been classified as permanently and totally disabled, {the worker} could not, in law, be further disabled.' Harrington, 9 Wn.2d at 7 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that Harrington had `already received the highest disability rating known to the law, and upon that rating had been granted the highest compensation allowable under the workmen's compensation act.' Harrington, 9 Wn.2d at 7. Accordingly, in disallowing additional time loss benefits for the new injury, the Court held that `{a} subsequent lesser disability cannot be superimposed upon the maximum disability recognized by the law.' Harrington, 9 Wn.2d at 8.8
Here, however, Jacobsen did not similarly seek additional payment for either a new injury or for a subsequent, lesser disability superimposed on and following payment for the maximum disability recognized by law. Rather, his original injury resulted in only temporary disability in the `first instance,' for which he received temporary time loss compensation, in contrast to Harrington's permanent disability, for which he received permanent compensation in the first instance. Unlike the facts in Harrington, it was not until many years later, after Jacobsen's condition aggravated, that the Department finally adjudicated him permanently and totally disabled and attempted to adjust his pension compensation. We decline the Department's request to stretch the reasoning of Harrington, which is factually distinguishable, to resolve an issue for which the plain language...
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