Jaffe v. National League for Nursing

• Decision Date: 07 December 1995
• Citation: 635 N.Y.S.2d 9,222 A.D.2d 233
• Parties: Elizabeth S. JAFFE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR NURSING, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 9

635 N.Y.S.2d 9

222 A.D.2d 233

Elizabeth S. JAFFE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR NURSING, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Dec. 7, 1995.

D.R. Solin, for plaintiff-respondent.

A.P. Marks, for defendants-appellants.

Before ELLERIN, J.P., and WALLACH, ROSS, NARDELLI and TOM, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol H. Arber, J.), entered December 16, 1994, which denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, the motion is granted with respect to the first cause of action, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

This is a case of alleged employee harassment and intimidation, leading to forced resignation. While we reject the notion that the Workers' Compensation Law provides an exclusive remedy for such intentional torts (Thompson v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 86 A.D.2d 867, 868, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308; see, Orzechowski v. Warner-Lambert Co., 92 A.D.2d 110, 112, 460 N.Y.S.2d 64), the facts fall short of the rigorous standard of outrageous conduct necessary to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121-122, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699). The general rule is that an employee at will may be discharged "at any time for any reason or even for no reason" (Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86), and courts will closely scrutinize complaints which seek to circumvent this rule with allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress (id., 58 N.Y.2d at 303, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86; Ranieri v. Lawlor, 211 A.D.2d 601, 622 N.Y.S.2d 30; Hurwitch v. Kercull, 182 A.D.2d 1013, 1014-1015, 582 N.Y.S.2d 568).

We agree, however, that the allegation of "a hard slap on [plaintiff's] backside," during an outburst of rage by the individual defendant, met the criteria of offensive and intentional bodily contact (Masters v. Becker, 22 A.D.2d 118, 120, 254 N.Y.S.2d 633) in stating a cause of action for assault and battery.