James v. Superior Court

• Citation: 143 Cal.Rptr. 398,77 Cal.App.3d 169
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 26 January 1978
• Parties: In the Matter of JAMES PAUL H., a minor, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 19283.

Page 398

143 Cal.Rptr. 398

77 Cal.App.3d 169

In the Matter of JAMES PAUL H., a minor, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Respondent PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 19283.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 26, 1978.

Joseph J. Storto, Riverside, for petitioner

Byron C. Morton, Dist. Atty. of Riverside County, by James B. Chew, Deputy Dist. Atty., for respondent and real party in interest.

OPINION

GARDNER, Presiding Justice.

In this case we hold that in the absence of any statutory procedure for so doing the juvenile court has the inherent power to determine a minor's mental competence to understand the nature of proceedings pending under Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b) and to assist counsel in a rational manner at that hearing.

Under Welfare & Institutions Code section 602, a petition had been filed in the juvenile court alleging that the minor, age 17, had committed forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. 3). The real party in interest filed a notice of motion, under Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b), to declare minor not a fit and proper subject for the juvenile court.

Prior to the proposed Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b) proceedings, the court had appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. John McMullin, to examine the minor "due to the possible issue of diminished capacity of minor at the time of the alleged offense." Dr. McMullin filed a report in which he concluded that minor showed borderline mental retardation and had a "long-standing drug dependency . . . which will require a structured environment." Dr. McMullin further opined that there was nothing to indicate diminished capacity; that at the time of the offense minor was legally sane; and further that minor was "aware of the nature and the purpose of the charges against him and is, within the limits of his mental capabilities, able to cooperate with counsel in presenting a defense."

Dr. McMullin referred minor to Dr. Stephen Lawrence, a psychologist, for interview and testing. Dr. Lawrence then filed a report in which he, too, concluded that minor was mentally retarded and had a long standing and severe drug dependency (paint sniffing). Dr. Lawrence concluded that the minor had the mental capacity to form the specific intent to kidnap and rape and that he was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offense although he did suffer from some diminished capacity. However, Dr. Lawrence concluded that minor was not presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him, was not presently able to cooperate with counsel in a rational manner and "(h)ence, the defendant is judged presently legally incompetent to stand trial." ¹

Armed with Dr. Lawrence's report, counsel for minor objected to proceeding with the Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b) hearing on the ground his client was incompetent. The court overruled the objection, stating that competency was not an issue. Minor filed a petition for writ of prohibition. This court issued an alternative writ.

Minor's position is that although he would come within the framework of Penal Code sections 1367-1368 were he an adult, such procedures do not exist in the juvenile court, and therefore the court is unable to proceed. He asks that we dismiss all pending proceedings.

Real party in interest contends: (1) the issue is premature since the court has not indicated any doubt as to the minor's We find neither position acceptable. However, neither do we find any statutory procedure in the Juvenile Court Law which fits this situation. Therefore, we improvise.

present competency; and (2) the minor's present competency is not a prerequisite to the court's proceeding with the Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b) hearing. In this respect, the real party in interest argues that the minor will in no way be prejudiced by proceeding with such a hearing even though he cannot cooperate with his attorney. The argument proceeds that if, as a result of the hearing, he is sent to the adult court, proceedings under Penal Code sections 1367-1368 can be instituted. If he is not found unfit under Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b), he will remain in the juvenile court where the question of his mental competency can be thrashed out within the framework of the Juvenile Court Law, i. e., by recourse to Welfare & Institutions Code sections 705 and 6550. (See In re Michael D., 70 Cal.App.3d 522, 140 Cal.Rptr. 1.)

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A WELFARE & O COUNSEL AT A WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 707(b) HEARING

Unquestionably, a minor has a right to counsel in the juvenile court. Not only is this established by statute (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 700, 679), it has been established as a matter of constitutional due process (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). It is true that the holding in Gault was limited to those proceedings which might result in a commitment to an institution. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme in California, both before and after Gault, provides counsel for the minor in all proceedings which require or permit the minor's personal participation. It is true that the attorney of one presently incapable of cooperating with his client may contest any issue susceptible of fair determination without the personal participation of the client. Such matters as demurrers and Penal Code section 995 motions come within this concept. (See People v. Superior Court (Hulbert), 74 Cal.App.3d 407, 141 Cal.Rptr. 497 (1977).) However, Welfare & Institutions Code section 707 proceedings are not such proceedings. The section itself provides that the court may consider not only the probation officer's report but "any other relevant evidence which . . . the minor may wish to submit."

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MEANS THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

The right to counsel is meaningless unless that right is construed to mean effective counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) explicitly referred to a minor's right to effective counsel. (Kent, supra, at p. 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045.) If a person cannot effectively communicate or cooperate with his counsel that counsel rather obviously cannot be effective. "Counsel cannot effectively represent a defendant who is unable to understand the proceedings or to rationally assist him." (Hale v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 221, 228, 124 Cal.Rptr. 57, 61, 539 P.2d 817, 821 (1975); see Chambers v. Municipal Court, 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 813, 118 Cal.Rptr. 120 (1974).)

COMPETENCY HEARINGS ARE REQUIRED BY PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS

Due process demands that a person constitutionally entitled to the right to effective counsel be afforded a hearing as to his competency to cooperate with that counsel. "When facts giving rise to a doubt regarding a defendant's present sanity become known to the trial judge, due process requires that the court, on its own motion, suspend proceedings in the case until the question is determined in a sanity hearing." (People v. Tomas, 74 Cal.App.3d 75, 88, 141 Cal.Rptr. 453, 459 (1977).) Tomas relied on Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975),

which cases hold that failure to afford a defendant a hearing on his present competency to cooperate with his attorney deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT TO HOLD SUCH A HEARING

Having laboriously determined that the minor is entitled to a competency hearing at a Welfare & Institutions Code section 707(b) proceeding and facing the unquestioned fact that the authors of the Juvenile Court Law have simply failed to provide any proceedings comparable to Penal Code sections 1367-1368, the question remaining is whether the court has the inherent power to hold such a hearing. We hold that it does.

Courts have the inherent power to create new forms of procedure in particular pending cases. "The . . . power arises from necessity where, in the absence of any previously established procedural rule, rights would be lost or the court would be unable to function." (Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Courts, § 123, p. 392.) This right is codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 187 which provides that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court by the Constitution or by statute ". . . all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code." (See also Code Civ.Proc., § 128(8).) As the Supreme Court said in People v. Jordan, 65 Cal. 644 at p. 646, 4 P. 683 at p. 684, "in the absence of any rules of practice enacted by the legislative authority, it is competent for the courts of this State to establish an entire Code of procedure in civil cases, and an entire system of procedure in criminal cases, . . . ." (See also Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 805, 31 Cal.Rptr. 316, 382 P.2d 356 (1963), recognizing the inherent power of courts to adopt "any suitable method of practice . . . if the procedure is not specified by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council.") (At p. 813, 31 Cal.Rptr. at 322, 382 P.2d at 362).

In In re M.G.S., 267 Cal.App.2d 329, 72 Cal.Rptr. 808, the court had no difficulty whatsoever in applying the defense of legal insanity in juvenile court proceedings even though no statutory mention is made of that defense, nor does there exist in juvenile court proceedings any statutory...