Jaycap Fin., Ltd. v. Neustaedter
| Decision Date | 12 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-17-00680-CV |
| Parties | JAYCAP FINANCIAL, LTD., Appellant, v. ALFRED NEUSTAEDTER, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 404th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Tijerina
In this interlocutory appeal, appellant Jaycap Financial Ltd. challenges the trial court's temporary injunction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). By four issues, appellant contends that the trial court's injunction is improper and requests that we dissolve it. We reverse and remand.
Appellee Alfred Neustaedter secured a loan from appellant for $4.3 million to purchase property in Canada. Appellee defaulted on the loan. Appellant sued appellee in Canada, and the Canadian court awarded appellant $4,416,578.60 plus interest "accruing at 17.5% per annum from December 18, 2013 to the date of judgment."1 Appellant foreclosed on the Canadian property and sold it to satisfy the debt. Appellant received $5,833,186.36 in net sale proceeds after all taxes were paid.
On January 25, 2017, appellant filed the Canadian judgment in the trial court in Cameron County. On January 30, 2017, appellant filed a notice of filing pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. See id. § 36A.004. Appellant sent notice that it had filed the foreign judgment in the trial court to appellee's address in Texas and in Canada, and appellee signed that he received the notices on February 7, 2017 and February 23, 2017, respectively. On June 20, 2017, the Cameron County District Clerk issued a writ of execution for the sale of property owned by appellee in Laguna Vista, Texas (the Cameron County property).
On July 31, 2017, appellee filed a motion for "emergency" injunction and damages claiming that appellant was "attempting to sell [the Cameron County property], without appropriate notice, by fraud, or with no right to sell or dispose of such property." Appellee sought a trial on the merits of his claims and temporary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the case. On July 31, 2017, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order preventing appellant from selling appellee's Cameron Countyproperty.
On August 11, 2017, appellant filed a "Motion to Overrule Debtor's Challenges to the Judgment" and plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of appellee's claims for various reasons.2 The trial court held a hearing on appellant's motions and appellee's motion for temporary injunction on August 14, 2017. At the hearing, evidence was presented that appellant was now seeking payment on the interest it alleges appellee owed as payment on the principal amount, which had been satisfied when appellant sold the Canadian property. Appellant argued that appellee was required to pay 17.5% interest on the $4.4 million judgment for two years. Appellee countered that the judgment only stated that he was required to pay 17.5% interest per annum from December 18, 2013 to the date of judgment. The trial court denied appellant's motions, and on November 27, 2017, the trial court signed a temporary injunction enjoining appellant "from proceeding with any execution of [the Cameron County property]." This appeal followed.
By its first three issues, appellant claims the temporary injunction should be dissolved because the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
"Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). It is neverpresumed and cannot be waived. Id. at 443-44. An appellate court is obligated, even sua sponte, to determine the threshold question of jurisdiction. See Hayes v. State, 518 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.); Walker Sand, Inc. v. Baytown Asphalt Materials, Ltd., 95 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the foreign judgment was previously satisfied. Appellant further argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of a foreign judgment. Finally, appellant argues that the trial court could not enjoin execution after its plenary power had expired. We disagree with appellant on each point.
Once appellant filed its petition and Canadian judgment in the trial court, the trial court had jurisdiction over the now-domesticated Canadian judgment. See Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ) ("[T]he filing of a foreign judgment partakes of the nature of both a plaintiff's original petition and a final judgment: the filing initiates the enforcement proceeding, but it also instantly creates a Texas judgment that is enforceable."); see also Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 336 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.) ( that the filing of the foreign judgment in the trial court "instantly creates an enforceable Texas judgment"). The Canadian judgment is subject to the same "procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a judgment as a judgment of thecourt in which it is filed." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.003(c), 36A.006 (); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b.
Under the then applicable Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act, a debtor to a foreign judgment had sixty days from the date he received notice of the filing of the foreign judgment in a Texas trial court to contest the trial court's recognition of the judgment.3 See Act of 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 402 § 5, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 402 (repealed). Moreover, the trial court's plenary power over a judgment expires thirty days after it is rendered. BancorpSouth Bank v. Prevot, 256 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ("Like any Texas judgment, the trial court's plenary power expired [after] thirty days . . . because no party filed a post-judgment motion attacking the judgment."); Malone v. Emmert Indus. Corp., 858 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (). Thus, "[w]hen a foreign judgment is acted on outside the plenary power of the trial court, the action is a nullity." Bahr v. Kohr, 928 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (citing Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., 920 S.W.2d at285-86).
We agree with appellant that the trial court's plenary power over the judgment had expired when it issued the temporary injunction. However, a trial court retains at all times its inherent power to enforce its judgments, and it may employ suitable methods to do so. Kennedy v. Hudnall, 249 S.W.3d 520, 523 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 308; Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982); see also Miga v. Jensen, No. 02-11-00074-CV, 2012 WL 745329, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). In addition to its inherent authority, the trial court is vested with express statutory authority to enforce its judgments, including by issuing injunctive relief.4 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011; TEX. R. CIV. P. 308; Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). The only limit on a trial court's authority to issue enforcement orders is that they may not be inconsistent with the original judgment and must not constitute a material change in substantial adjudicated portions of the judgment. See Custom Corporates, Inc. v. Security Storage Inc., 207 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Cook v. Stallcup, 170 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
Here, appellee sought to enjoin an execution sale for specific property on the basis that the judgment "has been fully or substantially paid[.]" The trial court signed a temporary injunction order enjoining appellant "from proceeding with any execution of [theCameron County property]." The trial court's order is not inconsistent with the underlying judgment, and it does not materially change the judgment. Rather, the temporary injunction relates to enforcement of the judgment, a matter which is within the trial court's inherent power and for which it retains jurisdiction. See Kennedy, 249 S.W.3d at 523; Ford v. Wied, 823 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (); see also 34 TEX. JUR. 3d Enforcement of Judgments § 84 (2019) . Therefore, we conclude that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted injunctive relief. We overrule appellant's first three issues.
By its fourth issue, appellant argues that the temporary injunction fails to satisfy Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683's requirement that a temporary injunction set forth the reason for its issuance. Appellee agrees on this point, but he maintains that appellant is estopped from asserting error under the invited-error doctrine because appellant submitted the proposed...
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