Jefferson County v. St. Louis County
| Decision Date | 31 January 1893 |
| Citation | 113 Mo. 619,21 S.W. 217 |
| Parties | JEFFERSON COUNTY v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
The act authorizing a toll bridge connecting plaintiff and defendant counties provided that the counties might purchase the bridge, and make it a free bridge. This was done, each county court paying half the purchase price; but, as the superstructure of the bridge was in unsafe condition, it was rebuilt by plaintiff county, the court of defendant county refusing to join in the expense, on the ground that its financial condition would not warrant such steps. Held, that an action to compel contribution from defendant county could not be maintained, for under Gen. St. 1865, c. 53, § 1, which provides that each county court shall determine what bridges shall be built and maintained at the expense of the county, it was left to the discretion of the county court to determine whether such bridge was a necessity, and whether the condition of its revenue was such that it could incur the expense.
Appeal from circuit court, St. Louis county; W. W. Edwards, Judge.
Action by Jefferson county against St. Louis county to compel contributions for a bridge built by plaintiff over a stream dividing the two counties. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Fred Wislizenus and Chas. H. Kleinschmidt, for appellant. John R. Warfield, A. McElhinney, and R. L. Mudd, for respondent.
By an act of the general assembly, in 1855, as amended in 1857, the Lemay Ferry Bridge Company of St. Louis & Jefferson Counties was incorporated, and granted the exclusive right to erect a bridge across the Meramec river, at Lemay ferry, in the counties of St. Louis and Jefferson, and take tolls as prescribed in said act. By section 7 the county court of St. Louis county was authorized to subscribe to the stock of said company, and by section 8 the county court of Jefferson county was permitted to subscribe to said stock all unexpended moneys of the road and canal fund, or the fund arising from the sale of 500,000 acres of land donated by the general government to the state of Missouri, and by section 9 the two counties were authorized "at any time to purchase the stock of said bridge, and make it a free bridge, at pleasure, after having purchased said stock." The bridge was built, and, the company having executed a deed of trust, upon default the bridge was sold, and bought by John C. Hall, and was owned by his estate in 1876. Upon a petition of citizens of Jefferson county to purchase and make it a free bridge to public travel, and after much negotiation between Hall's estate and the county courts of the two counties, the two courts purchased the bridge for $10,000, each paying $5,000, and a deed made to both, and their assigns, forever, November 27, 1876. Neither county ever purchased any of the stock. The scheme and charter separating St. Louis county and the city of St. Louis went into effect October 22, 1876, as was judicially declared in March, 1877, by this court. The old county court of St. Louis county did not know this, however, and continued to act for the county, under its old boundaries, as a de facto court, until the decision in this court was promulgated. The county court of the new county organized under the "scheme" April 30, 1877. A conference was had on 25th June, 1877, and Jefferson county's proposition to repair the bridge for travel was rejected by St. Louis county court, "for the reason that the financial condition of St. Louis county will not permit the granting of the request for aid, as made by Jefferson county." At this time the bridge was in a dangerous condition, and the county court of St. Louis ordered it to be closed, as dangerous to travel. Thereafter Jefferson county repaired the bridge, in a substantial way. It expended $2,925 in November, 1877, in rebuilding it. In 1883 it spent nearly $300 in repairing the piers. In 1885 a new iron bridge was erected by the St. Louis Bridge & Iron Company for Jefferson county at a cost of $9,870. The old superstructure was entirely removed, and an entirely new bridge erected in its stead. The evidence substantially showed that the old bridge, when purchased, was worthless, and the two counties, in their joint answer to a dower suit by Hall's widow, alleged it was not worth $20. In 1886 Jefferson county brought this action against St. Louis county, in equity, for contribution to the expenses of repairing and rebuilding. The position of Jefferson county is that by the purchase the two counties became tenants in common of the bridge and its franchises; that from that time it was the private property of the two counties; and as to that the counties were not quasi municipal corporations, but were charged with all the duties towards each other and towards third persons which would exist in case natural persons were owners; and that, as a tenant in common is liable to his cotenant for contributions for necessary repairs made by the latter upon notice, so St. Louis county is liable to Jefferson county for her share of the cost of repairing and rebuilding this bridge. St. Louis county controverts these claims, and contends that it is simply a part of the state; that certain powers are conferred upon it by law to enable it to perform certain functions for the state; that it is not a corporation at all, much less a private corporation, with powers and liabilities of a private citizen or natural person. Insists that it is only amenable to the laws governing counties in regard to bridges generally; that by the statute its county court was vested with a discretion as to whether it would expend its moneys in further repairs or rebuilding this bridge; that its county court decided that it was not to the interest of St. Louis county to make said repairs, that her finances would not admit of it, and having so decided, and notified Jefferson county, it was in no wise liable for the maintenance of said bridge.
1. The liability of counties in this state has been settled by adjudications of this court. They are held to be "quasi corporations created by the legislature for the purposes of public policy;" in other words, political subdivisions of the state, having just such powers, and only such, as the state, by its lawmaking power, confers upon them. In Reardon v. St. Louis Co., 36 Mo. 555, it was held by this court that counties are not responsible for the neglect of duties enjoined on them, unless the action is given by the statute. In that case the plaintiff sought to recover of the county damages for the death of her husband, who was killed by stepping off a county bridge over the Gingras river, in said county. She alleged negligence in failing to provide proper guards to the bridge. It was held that The doctrine thus announced has since been approved in Hannon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313; Swineford v. Franklin Co., 73 Mo. 279; Clark v. Adair Co., 79 Mo. 536. But in Hannon v. St. Louis Co. a distinction was drawn between those duties imposed by the state for the discharge of a public duty, and those in which, owing to their nature, the county, as to such, would be regarded as a private corporation; and it was there held that, as to its own property, no sound reason could be given why a county should not be held answerable to the same rules as would prevail were a municipal or private corporation, or an individual, a party defendant. It becomes, then, a most material inquiry here as to what was the relation of St. Louis county to this bridge. In Clark v. Adair Co., supra, this court unanimously concurred in holding that the county was not liable for damages caused by a defect in a county bridge, because no action was authorized by the statute, and because the duty of maintaining bridges on the highways was a duty enjoined for public purposes. That case was decided with a full knowledge of the distinction drawn in the Hannon Case, and by it we understand this court most clearly held that as to a county bridge the county did not bear such a...
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