Jefferson-El v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: JEFFERSON-EL,No. 63,63
• Citation: 330 Md. 99,622 A.2d 737
• Parties: Barry A.v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 99

330 Md. 99

622 A.2d 737

Barry A. JEFFERSON-EL v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 63, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 6, 1993.

Victoria S. Lansburgh, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Mary O'Malley Lunden, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge.

We granted the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Barry A. Jefferson-El, the petitioner, to consider when a trial judge, accused by a defendant of being partial against him, must grant the defendant's recusal motion to avoid the appearance of impropriety. A divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals held, in an unpublished opinion, that the facts and circumstances of the present case did not mandate recusal. We shall reverse.

I.

Because, to a significant degree, the issue involves appearances, it is necessary that we set out in some detail the circumstances under which it arose. In 1986, the petitioner, having been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and theft, was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, by Judge Edward Angeletti, to concurrent terms of fifteen years imprisonment, nine of which were suspended in favor of five years probation. He was released from incarceration on April 14, 1990 and, thereafter, charged with burglary, rape, and other related sex offenses. He was acquitted of all counts following a jury trial presided over by Judge Angeletti. Judge Angeletti then addressed the jury:

I just hope the ladies and gentlemen, that you had a very good reason for the verdict that you rendered in this case. You know, you're supposed to be protecting the community. I hope and pray that when you go home tonight and you think about this situation, and think about what you've just done. That you believe that you've protected this community.

On behalf of the court, we extend our thanks to you for your service. But I can tell you that your verdict is an abomination, and it has no relationship to reality [or] justice. I want you, all of you, the ladies on this jury to think about what you've just done.

On the next day, at the State's request, Judge Angeletti issued a warrant charging the petitioner with violating Rule 8 of his probation. ¹ The application for warrant alleged that the petitioner admitted, during trial, using, buying, and selling cocaine.

When the revocation proceedings were called, the following occurred:

The Court: Ms. Croyder [the prosecutor] is present. I don't know if it's necessary for Ms. Croyder to testify in this case, Mr. Parker [defense counsel], because I presided over the trial. This defendant under oath came in and testified to the statements made by him on the witness stand and as a result of the statements he made in that case, a jury entered a verdict of not guilty of the charge of a very serious charge of rape. The Court is fully aware of those facts. He's charged with the violation of Rule 8. Does he admit or deny that violation, Mr. Parker?

Mr. Parker: First of all, your Honor--

The Court: That's using drugs while he was on probation.

Mr. Parker: While he's on probation?

The Court: That's correct, sir.

Mr. Parker: Mr. Jefferson first, he would ask your Honor to recuse himself from this matter.

The Court: Motion denied. Mr. Parker, I had this case. He was found not guilty in front of this court and this court will not recuse itself in this case.

Mr. Parker: For the record, I want to put the reasons on the record.

The Court: Put all the reasons on the record you would like, sir.

Mr. Parker: Your Honor, you were the judge before the pending case that he had involving an accusation of a rape. After which, Mr. Jefferson says that you made certain remarks to the jury concerning him which were prejudicial and he has also filed complaints to the Judicial Disabilities Committee. I'm going to ask if Mr. Jefferson would put his reasons on the record why he thinks Judge Angeletti would not be impartial in this case and to recuse himself....

The Defendant: My name is Barry Jefferson and I would ask that the Honorable Judge Angeletti recuse himself from the hearing in my case due to the fact on 2-12-1991, I was before the Honorable Judge Angeletti on first degree rape and the jury found me not guilty on all the counts and the Honorable Judge Angeletti said to the jury and as quoted, I don't know what y'all verdict was based on because it was not the evidence or the truth. But what I want you to know is that you are an abomination to society and at that point, I filed a complaint to the Commissioner on Judicial Disabilities. I filed a copy with the NAACP legal department because I view it as a racial discrimination thing, whereas the prejudice statement and I don't feel like I'm receiving a just hearing before this judge on this date. Those are my reasons.

The Court: Well what may have occurred insofar as what took place after you were found not guilty, Mr. Jefferson, is not relevant on the issue of the charge against you in this case and in this case, you are charged with having violated Rule 8 of the rules of probation and that is using drugs, controlled dangerous substances, while you were on probation and one has nothing to do with the other and the court will deny your motion to recuse itself.

The majority of a panel of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Judge Moylan perceived the issue to be a simple one--whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's recusal motion. He concluded that there was no abuse. Concurring, Judge Davis recognized that there could be an issue of appearance of impropriety, but believed "that no harm inured to the appellant in the context in the particular proceeding, i.e., a violation of probation hearing, the grant of probation being, as the majority opinion reminds us, a matter of grace than of right." ² Dissenting, Judge Alpert was troubled by the "tone" of both the trial, as reflected in Judge Angeletti's statements to the jury, and the probation violation proceedings. He observed:

although there was no actual impropriety in Judge Angeletti's hearing the probation revocation after presiding at the trial giving rise to the alleged violation, given his strong view of the jury's verdict in the rape trial ("an abomination"), he should have declined to hear the probation revocation to avoid the appearance of impropriety.... One could reasonably assume that the trial court believed that appellant committed perjury during the February 12, 1991 trial. Thus, it would appear to a reasonable person that Judge Angeletti was not going to allow "the very intelligent and articulate" Mr. Jefferson-El to talk his way out of trouble again.

Applying the objective standard, Judge Alpert concluded "that a reasonable person, knowing and understanding all the relevant facts herein, would recuse the trial court."

II.

A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a fair trial. Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 423, 463 A.2d 808, 811 (1983); Scott v. State, 289 Md. 647, 655, 426 A.2d 923, 928 (1981); Smith v. State, 64 Md.App. 625, 635, 498 A.2d 284, 289 (1985). See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967). It is well settled in Maryland that fundamental to a defendant's right to a fair trial is an impartial and disinterested judge. Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 78, 581 A.2d 1, 9 (1990); In re Turney, 311 Md. 246, 253, 533 A.2d 916, 920 (1987); Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 104, 206 A.2d 812, 817 (1964); Thanos v. Superintendent, 204 Md. 665, 667-68, 104 A.2d 926, 927 (1954); Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 581, 102 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1954); Western Md. Dairy Corp. v. Brown, 169 Md. 257, 268, 181 A. 468, 473-74 (1935). "A fair and impartial trial is a judicial process by which a court hears before it decides; by which it conducts a dispassionate inquiry and renders judgment only after receiving evidence." Spence, 296 Md. [622 A.2d 741] at 423, 463 A.2d at 811, citing People v. Diaz, 1 Ill.App.3d 988, 275 N.E.2d 210, 212-13 (1971). "It is beyond dispute that the trial judges perform a unique and persuasive role in that system: 'confidence in the judiciary is essential to the successful functioning of our democratic form of government.' " Scott v. U.S., 559 A.2d 745, 748 (D.C.App.1989), citing U.S. v. Quattrone, 149 F.Supp. 240, 242-43 (D.D.C.1957).

It is because judges occupy a distinguished and decisive position that they are required to maintain high standards of conduct. Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 149, 355 A.2d 455, 463 (1976); Patterson v. State, 275 Md. 563, 579, 342 A.2d 660, 669 (1975); See also Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 10-11, 209 A.2d 776, 781-82 (1965); Vandergrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 311, 206 A.2d 250, 254 (1965). Their conduct during a trial has a direct bearing on whether a defendant will receive a fair trial because their opinion or manifestations thereof usually will significantly impact the jury's verdict. In addition, if the defendant has elected to be tried by a jury, it is the province of that jury to decide the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

Maryland Rule 1232, Canon 3 C of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A judicial appointee should not participate in a proceeding in which the judicial appointee's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:

(a) the judicial appointee has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

The canon has not been interpreted to require a trial judge, who has presided over a prior case, involving the same defendant or incident, automatically to recuse him or herself from presiding over a subsequent trial...