Jeffery v. St. Louis Fire Dep't
Decision Date | 27 December 2016 |
Docket Number | No. ED 104290,ED 104290 |
Citation | 506 S.W.3d 394 |
Parties | Gordon JEFFERY, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS FIRE DEPARTMENT, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jonathon C. Burns, The Burns Law Firm, St. Louis Missouri, for Appellant.
J. Brent Dulle, Nancy E. Emmel, Chloe R. Woods, City Counselor's Office, Michelle M. Burriel, St. Louis, Missouri, for Respondent.
Gordon Jeffery ("Appellant") appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of the City of St. Louis dismissing his suit of employment discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Appellant argues that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies because his administrative charge provided his employer, the St. Louis City Fire Department (the "Department"), with notice of the claim he later pursued in his petition. We agree Appellant exhausted his administrative remedies. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellant is an African American employed with the Department. On March 27, 2014, Appellant filed an administrative charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that:
On May 26, 2015, Appellant received a right to sue letter from the MCHR. Appellant filed suit against the Department on August 24, 2015. In his petition, Appellant alleged, inter alia , that:
The Department filed a motion to dismiss in January 2016. The motion court granted the motion in March 2016. In its order and judgment, the court found that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his suit because his administrative charge did not notify the Department of his claim that the Department's employees intentionally discriminated against Appellant. This appeal follows.
In his sole point on appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court improperly concluded that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Appellant asserts that his administrative charge placed the Department on notice of the claim he later pursued in his petition. The Department contends that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he alleged a distinct theory of intentional discrimination in his petition that was not contained in his administrative charge.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Ambers–Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr. , 459 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Mo. banc 2015). When reviewing the petition, "we accept the allegations in the petition as true and grant the plaintiff all reasonable inferences from those allegations." Gerke v. City of Kansas City , 493 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). We do not weigh the factual allegations' credibility or persuasiveness, and instead we review the petition to determine whether "the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case." Id. Moreover, we will affirm the trial court's dismissal "if it can be sustained on any ground supported by the motion to dismiss." Beck v. Fleming , 165 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Mo. banc 2005).
Appellant brought his claim of discrimination pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). In deciding cases under the MHRA, courts are guided by both Missouri law and "applicable federal employment discrimination decisions." Smith v. Aquila, Inc. , 229 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).
However, Missouri's discrimination safeguards under the MHRA can offer greater protection than federal standards, and "[i]f the wording in the MHRA is clear and unambiguous, then federal caselaw which is contrary to the plain meaning of the MHRA is not binding." Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights , 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. banc 2007).
The MHRA requires that a claimant must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to petitioning the courts for relief. Reed v. McDonald's Corp. , 363 S.W.3d 134, 143 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). In order to exhaust his administrative remedies, he must give notice of his claims by including them in his administrative complaint. Id. Administrative complaints are "interpreted liberally in an effort to further the remedial purposes of the legislation that prohibits unlawful employment practices. Id. (quoting Alhalabi v. Missouri Department of Natural Resources , 300 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) ). Therefore, "administrative remedies will be exhausted as to all incidents that are like or reasonably related to the allegations" contained in the administrative charge. Id. When determining whether the claims in a subsequent civil suit are "like or reasonably related" to the allegations contained in the administrative charge, courts have held that the scope of the subsequent civil suit may be as broad as the scope of the administrative investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Alhalabi , 300 S.W.3d at 525.
Appellant cites to Alhalabi in support of his argument that he exhausted his administrative remedies because his administrative charge provided notice of the claim of discrimination he later asserted in his petition. In Alhalabi , the claimant filed a charge of discrimination with the MCHR, which issued a notice of his right to sue. Alhalabi , 300 S.W.3d at 524. The claimant then filed a petition that included discrimination claims as well as a hostile work environment claim. Id. At trial, the jury found in the claimant's favor on his hostile work environment claim, but not his discrimination claims. Id. The respondent appealed, arguing that the claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the MHRA, because the claimant had not raised the hostile work environment claim in his administrative charge. Id.
On appeal, this Court held that although the claimant had not explicitly used the phrase "hostile work environment" in his administrative charge, his allegations sufficiently set forth a hostile work environment claim because he alleged pervasive, racially discretionary conduct. Id. at 526. We further held that, even assuming that the claimant's charge did not set forth a claim for hostile work environment, it was likely that the scope of the administrative investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination would include whether the claimant was employed in a hostile work environment. Id.
The Department seeks to distinguish Alhalabi by arguing that Appellant, unlike the claimant in Alhalabi, alleged new acts of discrimination in his petition that constituted a new theory of discrimination. The Department argues that Appellant alleged a "disparate impact" claim of discrimination in his administrative complaint, but alleged acts of "intentional disparate-treatment" in his petition. For example, Appellant alleged in his petition, but not in his administrative charge, that "[the Department] discriminatorily, maliciously, and fraudulently failed to properly grade [Appellant's] Battalion Chief Examination on the basis of [Appellant's] race so that he would have a subpar score" and "[the Department's] conduct was outrageous because of [the Department's] evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of [Appellant] ...."
Missouri and federal courts have recognized the distinction between the theories of "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment" in the employment discrimination context. See Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc....
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